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F r o m

W

elcome to our fourth
year. It may well
prove to be a momentous one, as it
has been in the past. 2020 will mark the
75th anniversary of the end of WWII, the
100th anniversary of the ratification of
the Treaty of Versailles, the 100th anniversary of the Nineteenth Amendment,
the 250th anniversary of the Boston Massacre, 400 years since the Mayflower
sailed, 500 years since Magellan and his
crew crossed from the Atlantic into the
Pacific, and the 2500th anniversary of the
Battle of Thermopylae. This reminds us
that it is important to think about the
past at various temporal scales—but it
holds other lessons as well.

t h e

E d i t o r

years since the birth of Robert
Grossteste, who many consider the father of the scientific method. It is also, I
will have you know, the 400th anniversary of the end of the Wanli period (1573
-1620) of the Ming dynasty, the 1000th
anniversary of the death of the Persian
poet Abū al-Qāsim Firdawsī, 1250 years
since the death of Tang dynasty poet Du
Fu, and 2750 years since Piye succeeded
his father, Kashta, as ruler of the Nubian
kingdom of Napata.

thropocene” in the novel Oryx and
Crake (2003) by Margaret Atwood. We
are happy to be able to publish as well a
Portuguese translation of this article
that Dr. Massuno has prepared for us.
Marilyn Ahearn, Sustainability, Environment and the Arts in Education (SEAE)
Research Cluster, Southern Cross University, Australia, offers this edition’s
research on the pedagogy of big history.
Her article is based upon a workshop
that Dr. Hearn presented at the 2018
International Big History Association
(IBHA) conference at Villanova. Her
focus is the impact of a 17-week big history program on 8-9 year old students
and their teacher. From the Environmental Science Division of the Argonne
National Laboratory (University of Chicago, Lemont, Illinois), David J. LePoire,
in work supported by the U.S. Department of Energy, shows us how size
scales ranging from the atomic nucleus
to the universe can be estimated with
only a few fundamental physics constants. It is stunning to learn that nine
of the fundamental distances that we
discuss in big history relate to one another by the same factor of 150,000. Our
final essay has been written by IBHA
Board Member Barry Wood, University
of Houston, who brings geology, biology, and paleontology to bear on the four
-billion-year story of the making of India.

This edition of the Journal of Big History
cuts across time, distance, size and discipline in a manner befitting our mission. Daniel Barreiros, Bioethics and
Applied Ethics Center, Universidade
Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), and
It reminds us, for one, that we are una- Daniel Vainfas, PhD Student at the Inble to mark anniversaries of events that stitute of Economics (UFRJ), examine
occurred prior to the invention of writ- temporal scales as they apply to the hising. So what’s missing from this list is as tory and theory of warfare. Specifically,
significant as what’s included. It rethey use the science of ethology to
minds us, too, that lists are culturallyreevaluate the idea that war is a continconstructed, and that from a big history uation of politics by other means and
perspective, much has been left out,
the belief in a universal “warrior culboth on a geographic scale, and also
ture.” It is an excellent example of how
concerning subject-matter, which
research can be undertaken in big histohenceforth shall be known as the “scale ry, in this case, to completely overturn
of interdisciplinarity.” Thus it behooves models of warfare that have been all but
us to recall that 2020 also marks the
canonized. Another Brazilian scholar,
100th anniversary of the publication of
Tatiana de Freitas Massuno, PostdoctorThe Outline of History by H. G. Wells
al Fellow, Philosophy Department, Ponand The Age of Innocence by Edith
tifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de
Wharton, 200 years since Hans ChrisJaneiro (PUC- Rio), deploys literature to
tian Ørsted discovered electromaghave at questions of genetic engineernetism, 400 years since Francis Bacon
ing, transhumanism, ecological awareDavid R. Blanks
published Novum Organum, and 800
ness, and what she calls the “good An-
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Abstract
As a social phenomenon, is war subordinate to politics, as Carl von Clausewitz argued in the early nineteenth century,
or, instead, is it the product of an instinctive ‘warrior culture’, common to all peoples and times and beyond politics, as
John Keegan suggested in the late twentieth? Should we emphasize ‘essential historical elements in the search for a temporal continuum in warfare? In this article, we stress the relevance of the ‘perennity of war’ thesis, and the impropriety of a
dichotomy between political rationality vs. instinct. The results of the clash between these two strands of thought about
the origins of warfare face limitations due to the absence of a temporal ‘play of scales’, so that short-term approaches
emerge as incompatible with macro-historical views. We suggest that a deep understanding of the phenomenon of warfare
must consider the interaction and the feedback between processes at different time scales.

Introduction
If war (in general) is the “father
of all things” as said by Heraclitus, the
Wars of the French Revolution were
the parents of the modern theory of
coalitional violence. Carl von Clausewitz, the man behind the most notorious incursion of the Enlightenment in
the rational explanation of war, served
in the Prussian army during the Rhine
Campaigns of 1793-1794, went through
defeat and humiliation at the hands of
the French army in Jena (1806), fought
alongside the Russians in Borodino
(1812) after Prussia's surrender, and
paved the way for the Sixth Coalition
that would bring down the Grande
Armée and its allies in 1814. His wartime reflections and experiences gave
birth to a treatise on modern warfare
published posthumously in 1832,
named Vom Kriege (On War), that
influenced world leaders like Bismarck, Moltke, Lenin, Eisenhower,

and Mao Zedong among others. On
War became the cornerstone of military strategic thinking in the twentieth century and is still praised as one
of the most important works on the
subject. Of all topics addressed by
Clausewitz, the idea that warfare is a
rational endeavor caught the attention of many critics, especially after
the carnage of two world wars. Naturally, Clausewitz was not trying to
sugarcoat the nature of his métier,
and in spite of the fact that he spent
most of his military career away from
the frontline, he was very aware of the
fact that real combat is engulfed in a
storm of emotions, instincts, and somatization. So, what On War teaches
is that coalitional violence is chaotic
and dreadful but is nevertheless a rational instrument in the hands of human collectives (modern states, in this
case) in their dispute over scarce resources. When conflict resolution
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fails, Clausewitz says, a state is able to
employ organized violence as a technique, as social engineering, a means
to obtain desired ends. From the viewpoint of the strategist, war is just like
chess, and that is the way it should be
if it is to be conducted in a “civilized”
and “rational” manner (different from
the “savages” overwhelmed by the lack
of organization and primitive motives
and methods). In the Clausewitzian
tradition, war is a continuation of politics, and that is the point where a
long debate begins.
John Keegan, a British military
historian who never faced live
rounds—actually, he was considered
unfit for duty in the armed forces due
to a medical condition in 1952—was
brave enough to dig deeper into the
nature of warfare. He dismisses all
“well-behaved” and historically shallow concepts of organized violence in
favor of a framework that shows the

lines of continuation between warfare
among non-state and state actors.
Evoking the idea of a “warrior culture”
ubiquitous to all mankind, Keegan
emphasizes the social function of warfare in terms of group cohesion, coordination, and identity and stratification, rather than the instrumental aspects so dear to the Clausewitzians. A
conceptual debate was formed around
these positions, but the aim of this
article is not to take sides. Instead, our
purpose is to suggest that this debate
is tainted by its inability to grasp with
the “play of scales” as conceived by
David Christian (2005, 2018); if we
“scale up” our look into human experience employing critical insights obtained from primatological, ethological, and archaeological studies, we can
find enough common ground between
Keeganian and Clausewitizian traditions.
In A History of Warfare (1994),
Keegan argues that warfare should not
be understood as a continuation of
politics, as stated in the Clausewitzian
tradition, but rather as a cultural phenomenon, a product of the collective
practices adopted by a particular
group or society. Thinking of warfare
as a cultural product would open the
possibility, according to Keegan, of
escaping the artificial restrictions imposed by Clausewitz that bound warfare to human rational mind and particularly to state rationality. In this
way, to formulate a theory of warfare
that would explain its existence
throughout the history of humankind
would be possible. Although the concept of culture is broader than the
concept of politics and although Keegan’s assertion gives us a wider understanding of warfare, it is still necessary
to consider the ideas of Clausewitz
about what constitutes the political
phenomenon and contrast them with
the definition given by Keegan since
the controversy between these two
authors is substantial enough to demand caution in the use of their concepts.
Keegan's concept of culture is
interchangeable with a loose concept
of human nature. He claims that the
major cause of warfare is “warrior culture” and recognizes its universality

among societies (Keegan 1994); in other words, there seems to be more than
enough space for us to identify a possible overlap between that object
(culture) and an innate behavioral
framework in Homo sapiens.
Warfare is almost as old as man
himself, and reaches into the
most secret places of the human
heart, places where self dissolves
rational purpose, where pride
reigns, where emotion is paramount, where instinct is king.
(Keegan 1994, 3)
Keegan's assertion is quite interesting as it situates warfare as a phenomenon present in the very beginning of human natural history and,
therefore, as a structural component
of the social history of all human
groups since Paleolithic times. In doing so, Keegan must determine a main
cause for warfare that must also be
transcendent in time; this procedure
puts his ideas on a collision course
with the Clausewitzian tradition,
which places politics (and warfare, by
definition) in the list of phenomena
determined by human “rationality.” By
stating that “instinct is king” and invoking its biological dimension, Keegan conceives culture as something
beyond or even opposed to politics (in
its state and formal dimensions). Nevertheless, Keegan does not insist upon
bringing up the concept of instinct in
its plain colors, opting for a more generic element, easier accepted by his
interlocutors: something like a
“human warrior culture” with local
tones but a universal hue (Keegan
1994, xvi), in opposition to a supposed
misuse of the Clausewitzian “war as
politics” assertion. Keegan suggests
that Clausewitz's original statement
tends to be inaccurately translated.
Better than affirming that warfare is
the continuation of politics by other
means would be saying that warfare is
the continuation of political interactions with the participation of other
means (Keegan 1994, 3). Consequentially, a duality emerges in a Keeganian reading of Clausewitz: on the
one hand, politics, and on the other,
the so called ‘other means’; the unde5

fined second element in the dyad definitely paves the way for theoretical
exploration.
Warfare, therefore, is not a monolithic phenomenon since it carries a
fundamental opposition in its core; if,
in broad terms, this opposition is
formed by a well-defined element
(politics) and a somewhat amorphous
element (the “other means”), it happens to transcend its very object
(warfare), enabling us to bring into
the debate the general ontological
structure of the human psyche. This
structure also consists in an opposition between elements with different
levels of definability (conscious vs.
unconscious mind), and we are convinced that it is not a mere product of
analogy. In short, warfare appears as a
holistic phenomenon, integrating not
only the dimensions of conscious decision and rational action as a means
to an end but also of the complex interaction between culture, society,
and deep psychology.
That Keegan tries to break the
duality that lies in his theoretical and
interpretative framework by replacing
the causes of warfare with a general
notion of culture is true. The ‘military
culture’, in particular, would be that
privileged environment in which the
“tribal spell” would happen and where
the contingencies of civilization would
be dissolved in a so-called ‘ancestral
urgency’ (Herberg-Rothe 2001, 183184). The most interesting aspect in
this formulation is in the fact that it
comes to us as essentially misleading
in its definitional roots.
Keegan defends the primacy of
“culture” from an analytical and theoretical standpoint where the very notion of culture should be dissolved.
Instinctive urgency (“where instinct is
king”) and the “tribal spell” are not
specific cultural elements; actually,
they refer to a set of ancient psychic
mobilizations present in all human
groups. The “culture of the warriors,”
which is the key element of Keegan's
argument, is not properly cultural; on
the contrary, it is clearly a pre-cultural
element, which must precede the
symbolic, representational, idiosyncratic and historical dimensions. In
his eagerness to overcome the notion

of warfare as policy, Keegan not only
ends up entering the minefield of the
“natural” explanation of the collective
and organized intersocietal violence
but also offers an understanding of
“politics” in Clausewitz that flirts intensely with contradictions.
Keegan’s
understanding
of
“politics” in Clausewitz’s work is quite
controversial because it tends to
equate “politics” with “policy,” the
latter referring to a rational construction, an adequacy of means to ends,
particularly the improvement of human wellbeing. On the other hand,
Clausewitz used the German term
Politik with a two-fold meaning, invoking simultaneously the notion of
policy and of politics. “Politics” in this
sense involves a degree of conflict and
non-rationality that is absent from
Keegan's construction. Warfare, then,
can be violent, barbaric, and cruel and
still be “political” to the extent that it
deals with divergences between distinct political groups (Bassford 1994,
326-327). Certainly the conversation
between Clausewitz and Keegan is
disturbed by the simple reason that
they both name distinct processes (in
whole or in part) the same. In spite of
that, two important notions seem to
survive this struggle: (1) that the universal character of the warrior culture
feedbacks with (Keegan would say,
“determines”) politics as a social organizational phenomenon, as Bassford (1994, 333) suggests; and (2) that,
in Keegan's work, the warrior culture
as a concept refers to a phenomenon
that does not behave as a manifestation of the social and intellectual history, but rather as an aspect of human
cognitive dynamics that informs every
kind of culture.
C. S. Gray takes the theme of
human nature to criticize Keegan and
defend Clausewitz, bringing up the
idea of the “common thread of the
human factor” (Gray 1999, 164). That
common thread would represent a
problematic
and
controversial
“proclivity to combat” and a “will to
fight” (Gray 1999, 176, 181). If it is true
that something like a “human nature”
exists, sustained across the evolutionary time in spite of technical and cul-

tural changes, then we could be able
to formulate questions beyond shortterm transformations. The fundamental problem would be to recognize
what nature is in order to formulate
the theory with the best possible result. Clausewitz's hypothesis of
“structuring rationality”, i.e., the notion that every war has or must have a
political purpose (Gray 1999, 169), is
not enough though it seems to be true
in its own way. The strength of the
structuring rationality hypothesis lies
in the notion that politics (in all its
dimensions) is steady enough to function as a catalyst to the congregation
of individuals with different and
(most of the time) colliding agendas,
leading to the cooperation necessary
to make warfare possible. In essence,
politics, as behavior, is related to major structuring myths in the core of
our social and cultural life as H. sapiens:
Any large-scale human cooperation—whether a modern state, a
medieval church, an ancient city
or an archaic tribe—is rooted in
common myths that exist only in
people’s collective imagination (.
. .). States are rooted in common
national myths (. . .). Yet none of
these things exists outside the
stories that people invent and
tell one another (Harari 2015, 36).
The existence of different myths
is such a problem that a complete theory must investigate the birth of
myths and macro-narratives rather
than the social consequences of a particular narrative. To accomplish this,
we have to venture into the Big History of human evolution to de-authorize
unilateral readings of Clausewitz and
of Keegan. A Big History of warfare
that seeks to recognize the dialectical
interaction between phenomena occurring at different timescales, from
the événementielle to the evolutionary, would consider pointless the opposition between the instinctive
“warrior culture” and the “rational
enterprise.” Rather, the conceptual
dyad formed by the “instinctual” and
the “rational” aspects of warfare be-
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havior sheds light on the very nature
of the mind of H. sapiens.
Keegan's belief that warfare belongs to a set of social phenomena
endowed with a certain universality
finds macro-historical support, albeit
not without controversy. If some contemporary hunter-gatherer societies
that do not undertake intersocietal
coalitional violence exist, it is not uncommon to identify in their past
(when this is ethnologically possible)
evidence of engagement in conflicts
with neighboring groups or with regular military forces, which ultimately
resulted in demographic, political,
and economic fragility (so that much
of the hunter-gatherer pacifism can be
associated with “defeated societies”)
(Keeley 1996, 31-32). All other societies
display some sort of military cultural
practices that interact dialectically
with religious, ideological, mythological, and political representations.
Thus, the existence of something like
“warrior tendencies” in a transcivilizational level seems plausible. Nevertheless, as we shall see, the notion that
intersocietal violence is the result of
some innate psychological impulse
dedicated exclusively to this purpose
(i.e., lethal action against other social
groups) is based on very fragile evolutionary foundations, often associated
with discussions about human nature
that are tributary to the western political philosophy of the 17th and 18th
centuries (Hobbes vs. Rousseau, especially). In the same tune, Keegan’s
proposition that the “warrior culture”
is the ultimate reason why warfare
exists does not lead us farther from
the clash between doves and hawks
since Keegan suggests that intersocietal coalitional violence is the product
of some “active principle” of human
cognition, whose nature and function
are to promote conflict.
Prosocial cognition: construction
of the ingroup
The cognitive foundations of intersocietal coalition violence belong
not to any active ethological complex
in favor of warfare but to the failure of
the dedicated and highly specialized
modular social intelligence, built by

natural selection in a very long evolutionary history that traces back to the
last common ancestor between
chimpanzees and modern humans six
million years in the past. Intersocietal
coalitional violence, i.e., the result of
processes and phenomena related to
the organization of social sub-units
dedicated to the exercise of power
over other groups, based on the imposition (or threat) of lethal action, is
quite rare in primatological terms.
Among extant great apes, only modern humans and common chimpanzees have a behavioral portfolio consistent with the practice of warfare.
We have no reason to reject the hypothesis that all the species that descended from the last common ancestor of Homo and Pan also engaged in
intersocietal coalitional violence, even
though our ability to trace evidence of
this type of practice in the fossil record is restricted by taphonomic reasons and by the dubiousness in the
identification of osteological markers
of lethal violence
We have no evidence of warfare—in a broad sense—in any other
primate lineages, extant or extinct,
and in this respect, we should not be
surprised. Organized lethal aggression toward other social groups
emerged as a functional byproduct of
the specific form assumed by socioethological structures emerged six
million years in the past among species split from the LCA social structure that, in its more specific aspects,
was another very rare condition in the
primatological universe.
Two were the most likely conditions of sociability among the many
species of great apes by the time of
the LCA speciation. The first, older
and more common, consisted of permanent kin-related female matrilineal
collectives, accompanied by unstable
and uncooperative non-kin groups of
males (migrant individuals in volatile
groups). The second one also relied
on kin-related female cooperation,
but associated with the exercise of
strict dominance in male-male relations, with the formation of harems
(with vast inequality in the distribution of copulatory opportunities
among males). To think of social or-

ganization on a macro-historical scale
and beyond modern human societies
requires taking into account the challenges represented by the energetic
needs of females in eutherian and
mammal species. Females suffer a
great amount of ethological pressure
for accessing food resources with the
highest possible nutritional value,
since the costs of lactation and of a
relatively long intrauterine pregnancy
are far from negligible. From this evolutionary standpoint, we understand
the formation (behaviorally innate) of
permanent kin-related female matrilineal collectives, based on cooperative relations aimed at guaranteeing
mutual energy needs in the genetic
community
(Foley
2003,
220;
Nordhausen and Oliveira Filho 2015,
36).
Territoriality is shaped by the
foraging strategies of female collectives, so males follow female groups
and compete for reproductive opportunities among themselves, with intense interpersonal agonistic behavior. In species that ethologically form
one-male groups, an alpha-male will
strive to deny copulatory opportunities to his rivals through violence and
intimidation; these primate societies
are more prone to agonism and show
higher levels of sexual dimorphism
(morphological and behavioral differences between males and females,
including body mass, temperament
and behavior, canine morphology,
and muscle mass) and fewer opportunities for male cooperation. In cognitive terms, intricate forms of social
intelligence, with innate modules
dedicated to conflict management,
manifest among many of these species in both of the situations. Nevertheless, given that social relations in
male groups are mostly transient,
fight-or-flight behavior is highly functional and relevant so that retreat and
migration to other groups can be a
sufficient strategy for a male eventually confronted by an overwhelming
force (Foley 2003, 223-224; Wrangham
and Peterson 1996, 131).
An ecological change in habitats
occupied by certain species of great
apes may have led some populations
to large scale migrations and others to
7

a slow adaptation to the new context.
The gradual savannization of East
Africa and part of Central Africa advanced along the Cenozoic and met a
critical point in the Late Miocene for
most of the great apes around eight to
six million years in the past. For the
species that resisted in these savannized habitats, heterogeneity in
the distribution of natural resources
and the decrease in its average nutritional value began to take its toll, requiring adaptive responses. The rarefaction of resources in the territory
would have jeopardized the strategy
of kin-related female cooperation; the
dispersion of resources and the lower
energy value stored in each patch of
bushland or woods would have led
these kin-related groups to be threatened by internal competition, rendering most of the win-win strategies
replicated ethologically up to that
point ineffective. Avoiding internal
competition would mean, to these
female apes, spreading through the
landscape, driving cooperative behavior to sub-optimal levels of efficiency.
In this evolutionary context, kinrelated matrilineal sociability is disfavored, and female migration to other
groups as they reach sexual maturity
becomes a pattern of behavior gradually fixed by natural selection in these
species. This means, for females, that
disputing resources that are more
distant as possible from one’s maternal genetic community renders more
reproductive gains (in the evolutionary long run) than staying in natal
groups. For males, this ethological
change in female behavior could have
led to the emergence of patrilineal kin
-related cooperation, an exotic type of
sociability (Aureli et al. 2008, 629630; Foley 2008, 230).
Male patrilineal collectives, in
association with non-kin female
groups, would potentially create a
problem: how the access to reproductive opportunities could be regulated
and how a win-win strategy could be
sustained in order to keep permanent
cooperation behavior among males in
the genetic community. As we have
seen, the most common ethological
strategies in other contexts were either the intensification of interper-

sonal male conflict with high lethality
risks or the migration to other groups.
Patrilineal male cooperation denies
these two strategies since the former
jeopardizes a more balanced distribution of gains in terms of evolutionary
fitness, and the latter dissolves male
stable sociability itself. Of course,
there is no reason to disregard the fact
that climatic aggravation and its impacts on African ecosystems could
have made, hypothetically (other factors excluded), permanent societies of
great apes in the arid zones unlikely.
However, gregariousness and cooperation are evolutionary assets that, once
conquered, have the tendency to survive even major evolutionary bottlenecks (Shultz, Opie and Atkinson 2011,
222; Wrangham and Peterson 1996,
128; 186).
Speaking of environmental pressure, for the great apes, savannization
resulted in the fragmentation of resources (and females) across the territory, making one-male social groups
quite difficult to maintain, if not impossible to exist. Broadly speaking,
surveillance by an alpha male in order
to hinder the incursion of rival males
had become unlikely, and the evolutionary opportunity was open for the
cooperation
between
kin-related
males in the control of the territory
and its resources. These coalitions act
to prevent access to the group females
by any outsider male. For cooperation
to work, so that the dispute between
individual reproductive agendas does
not produce fractures in the kin collective, a specialized and ethological
social intelligence emerges, exclusively
devoted to process social information,
in order to operate a dynamic hierarchy of status. This socio-cognitive domain should operate the norms and
forms of dispute for higher ranks and
produce prosocial limits that buffer
against lethal outcomes in internal
conflict.
Social intelligence, differently
from general intelligence, is not based
on the application of simple and
standardized learning rules, generating cumulative and modified content
based on interaction with the environment, but on trial and error. Social
cognition has the following character-

istics: (1) an increased dedication and
speed of processing information that
allow for the prediction of the status
rank actually possessed by others
through the analysis of sensorial cues
and through the recall of past interactions; (2) the formulation of hypotheses about the behavior of conspecifics
in a given social interaction, involving
or not the observer; and (3) the designing of strategies for climbing status ranks or preserving a current rank,
employing alliances and coalitions
with conspecifics dedicated to the
same objective. Social cognition forms,
thus, an innate political ethology, present in common chimpanzees and also
in the evolutionary lineage of H. sapiens (Aureli et al. 2008, 632; Mithen
2002, 129-131; Wrangham and Peterson
1996, 128, 186).
The ethological rite in the struggle for status among common chimpanzees in a social group follows some
elementary principles, identified and
thus interpreted from the observation
of these primates in their natural environment (Mithen 2002; Wrangham
and Peterson 1996):
The prospect of a stable dominance
maintained basically through force,
as occurs with gorillas, is discarded
so that status relations are organized into fluid networks of power
with unstable alliances between
males and between females (more
intense among the first); the rise
and fall in hierarchy indicate that
social mobility is a very important
ethological aspect in the species
split from the LCA, six million years
in the past.
The rise and fall in the status pyramid,
although part of a win-win strategy
in the long run (as a prosocial
mechanism that helps to prevent
the dissolution of the society), in
the short run results in a zero-sum
game in which the gain of one is
the loss of another.
Males will confront other males in an
intricate dynamic of coalition formation, involving the intimidation
of adversaries and their allies, and
the conquest of crescent support
from the group members. This
growing support is expressed by the
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longer social time spent by a contestant
with
his
supporters
(involving grooming and other
forms
of
recreation
and/or
strengthening of social bonds). In
this case, the ascension of a competitor brings non-linear status
gains to all members of his coalition;
The “ritualistic” dimension (lato sensu,
devoid of the symbolic nature present in the culture of modern humans) is a crucial aspect of disputes
of status because it provides rapid
sensorial information to the social
cognitive mechanisms. The cycles
of dispute involve precisely the violation of expected social behaviors
that, when in practice, indicate the
recognition of the status of a third
party. A common chimpanzee
bends down before a higher rank
conspecific, permits being touched
on the shoulder, etc., as forms of
status signaling. Denying these
‘courtesies’ on a regular basis
means conflict.
Status disputes indirectly involve most
of the group, and their cycles are
concluded through the establishment of a “consensus”, insofar as
the majority of the members of the
social group converge in support of
a certain competitor and his allies.
From this point, gains and losses
are
recognized,
submission/
dominance signaling in form of
gesticulations and vocalizations are
performed, and life goes on until a
new contest begins.
Outgroups and coalitional violence
The prosocial ethology in chimpanzees (and presumably in the LCA)
is not fail-safe. Fluid but effective limits persist in the average volume of
social information that can be processed cumulatively. Thus, although
composed of dedicated and specialized mental modules, social cognitive
activity has a significant correlation
with the neocortical volume, and both
have as proxy the time spent in
grooming and other forms of recreation necessary for the renewal of social
bonds and for the reaffirmation of hierarchies. This means that when the
number of relationships to be pro-

cessed exceeds a certain limit
(variable according to encephalization, in each species), the volume of
sensory
information to be detected and analyzed, as well as the number of possible combinations of relationships involving two or more individuals, surpasses the power of mental processing, making cooperation
and coordination less viable. In this
context, the identification of the status rank of a growing number of conspecifics becomes increasingly vague,
which makes the operation of prosocial mechanisms less effective. Thus,
by virtue of demography or environmental factors, the operation of the
prosocial ethology may be impaired,
leading to the intensification of internal conflict between individual agendas; in these situations, permanent
group fission tends to be the answer,
leading the operation of social cognition back to manageable levels
(Aiello and Dunbar 1993, 184-185;
Aureli et al. 2008, 637; Ferguson and
Beaver 2009, 291).
What about intersocietal relations? No prosocial ethological restraints present as capable of preventing lethal violence from being
imposed on individuals about whom
little or no social information is available. The unloading of excessive social information, enabled by group
fission, results in framing the
“foreign” as an entity external to the
hierarchy pyramid and, therefore, as
someone not eligible to be included
in prosocial mechanisms; intersocietal relations are thus restricted to
violent contacts. The logic underneath the “wars” among common
chimpanzees lies in the physical
elimination of “opposing” males, in
the disarticulation of neighboring
communities, and in the abduction
of their females. This is attempted
during many raids into the foraging
territory belonging to neighboring
groups, promoted by male raiding
parties, eventually accompanied by a
few nulliparous females (Roscoe
2007, 485-486; Wrangham and Peterson 1996, 6-7, 162-165).
From the process of mobilization of a raiding party to the return
to their home territory, some themes

are relevant:

Mobilization is triggered by a highranking male through vocalizations and bodily displays with
strong somatic and sensorial
content. Once successful, mobilization results in the formation of
temporary parties organized with
the sole purpose of inflicting lethal violence to the “enemy.” It is
not a defensive action, or the
result of any need of patrolling
the territory boundaries.
During the advance toward the
neighboring territory, the sensorial attention for the presence of
“enemy” chimpanzees is intense.
The perception of features on the
landscape that suggest the proximity with the border between
the two territories reduces the
number of vocalizations emitted
and widens the attention even
more. If a vocalization is responded by an enemy chimpanzee, signs of anxiety in the raiding party become visible, and
prosocial ethology enters the
scene: the group members most
often perform gestures and specific actions, which are employed
to calm and renew mutual trust
under
normal
conditions
(touches and hugs as examples).
The strategy of violence between
groups of common chimpanzees
seeks to exploit asymmetry of
power to the maximum. An attack on an isolated opponent is
the main objective; in the ecological niches explored by these primates, and probably also by our
common ancestor (savannah,
open woodland, or bushland),
the rarefaction of resources in
the territory leads to frequent
dispersion in their already deconcentrated
social
macrogroups, creating opportunity for
the engagement of a lone opponent. During a raid, if a decisive
numerical advantage is not identified, the attacking group retreats. In case of contact with
more than one “enemy” and if
the conditions of numerical
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asymmetry are still favorable, the
aggressors will seek to isolate
their opponents to prevent them
from cooperating in their defense.
There are no observed acts of nonlethal violence and intimidation
performed by an aggressive coalition against male members of an
outgroup. Lethality seems to be
always sought, and there are records of ethological demonstrations of intriguing content, such
as the emasculation of dying opponents and the sharing of body
parts and the blood of dead
“enemies.” The association between intersocietal violence and
cannibalism is of particular interest, since common chimpanzees
exhibit different somatic displays
and vocalizations when dealing
with ingroup and outgroup individuals: in the first case, all ritualistic and lethality prevention
mechanisms are in place, while
in the second case, raiders show
body language and make vocalizations normally related to hunting activities (chimpanzees often
feed on small vertebrates and
even on smaller monkeys like the
red colobus, Piliocolobus badius).
Therefore, “foreigner” chimpanzees are behaviorally treated as
prey. The re-signification of the
enemy's
nature
is
called
“dechimpizing”, clearly analogous to “dehumanization” processes (Roscoe 2007; Mithen
2002).
Raids may also be associated with
attempts to coerce females from
neighboring groups through intimidation and non-lethal violence so that they desert and join
the aggressor’s side. In case of
success, the first offspring born
of newly incorporated females
are almost always victims of infanticide by adult males. This
type of behavior is not uncommon among social mammals and
has the effect of minimizing the
impact of paternity uncertainty
on a polygynandric mating system:
since there is no sexual exclusivity
among common chimpanzees,

infanticide in these cases operates
as a guarantee that the offspring
does not belong to males unrelated to the ingroup. This is an important factor (the absence of
marked inequality in reproductive
opportunities) that makes engaging in intersocietal violence a potentially rewarding strategy for all
males involved.
The balance of power is an ethologically relevant strategy for the prevention of intersocietal violence
among common chimpanzees.
This is because lethal aggression,
although not a rare ethological
phenomenon among mammals,
occurs more frequently at interpersonal levels, in asymmetric
conditions, and between adults
and infants (Roscoe 2007, 485-486;
Wrangham and Peterson 1996, 67, 162-165). Lethal aggression
among adults is a high-risk behavior, with the potential for killing
aggressors and/or victims. What
makes intersocietal violence possible in the way it occurs among
chimpanzees is precisely the presence of an advanced social cognition, acting to produce intense
male cooperation and coordination. The coalitional strategy has
the potential for breaking the balance of power, for delivering lethal
violence against the enemy with
minimal risks to the aggressors,
and for maximizing individual returns resulting from the expansion
of foraging territory (as a consequence of the demographic decline of neighboring groups), and
from the abduction of females in a
polygynandrous mating system.
Warfare and the modern human
mind: between Clausewitz and Keegan
Of course, all this relates to our
closest evolutionary relatives, with
whom we share almost 99% of the
genes. In this context, anyone could
quite rightly claim that human societies function in another framework,
that modern humans are rational and
conscious, and that they are cultural
animals; thus, wars between human

societies should illustrate a phenomenon of another kind, incurring another
dynamic and logic. In fact, human evolution lead us through other paths; in
spite of this, the evolutionary dynamics should never be confused with the
drawing board of the Creator, in which
drawings are erased to give space to
others, traced from scratch; the evolutionary process is a collage that takes
place over millennia, with overlapping
images, some visible, others almost
imperceptible, but still present. The
human mind, though distinct as a result of its metarepresentational and
transdominial format, carries in its
ontology and phylogeny all the evolutionary content of the deep past, substantially situated in the opacity of the
collective unconscious (Stevens 2002).
In modern humans, specialized
intelligences of high performance and
energetic cost operate together, with
their algorithms, innate and learned
contents circulating freely, generating
knowledge of a creative and transversal nature. As a result of this transdominiality, for modern humans a forest
can contain a universe of naturalistic
information regarding foraging (for
the resources it contains), but, at the
same time, a forest represents a socially constructed space (the “dwelling of
the ancestors,” for example); for modern humans, a forest can be imbued
with sentience, can talk and listen, so
it must be respected as a social being.
By this transversality between naturalistic and social intelligences, it is highly likely that the food resources provided by a forest can also be a “gift” of
the ancestors, satisfying not only energetic needs but also renewing social
bonds through symbolical and mythical representations. Automobile enthusiasts in modern industrial societies know that their cars are much
more than a tool, a product of technology and capitalism; a vehicle can be
treated as a social entity, an object of
trust and affection, and can send powerful social messages about its owner. I
believe that only a few SUV owners in
the capitalist world consider of more
importance the technical aspect that
gives the thing a name – ‘utility’ – than
the strident social message it sends to
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economy car drivers; although this
message is also “useful” in its own way.
The articulation between cognitive domains with strong presence of
innate algorithms is made by a master
domain, the metarepresentation module, which gains this name by producing simultaneous images of the same
object in different specialized intelligences. Moreover, it is in the module
of metarepresentation that holistic
representations about knowledge are
expressed—in the form of something
like a “consciousness of the consciousness.” Evidence suggests that chimpanzees are aware of themselves and
aware of others only in the realm of
social relations but nowhere else.
Chimpanzees do not use tools (which
they produce) to convey social messages and help in their status disputes,
nor do they seem to be able to use
their social algorithms in their relationship with the natural world
(Mithen 2002, 139). Human capacity to
employ consciously or unconsciously
deep-rooted ethological algorithms in
tasks for which they were not
evolved—a capacity for a “creative
confusion”—can make the aftermath
of the clash between Keegan’s “warrior
culture” and Clausewitz’s “rationality
of war” less trivial than it may seem.
We will insist here on the inexistence of a real opposition between
these two propositions and on the fact
that they emerge at different instances
of the complex phenomenology of social cognition. In the first place, the
question does not seem to involve a
problem of rationality vs. irrationality.
If the war for Clausewitz is fundamentally rational because it is a means to
an end, the results of the intersocietal
coalitional violence in Pan troglodytes
also have a solid rational dimension; as
a means to an end, warfare contributes
to the expansion of the foraging territory of a social group and to increase
the number of sexual opportunities for
all males (albeit unevenly) as a result
of the polygynandric mating system. It
is evident that wars between modern
human societies, and especially interstate conflicts, often involve different
purposes. We do not need, for any reason,
to postulate that modern wars, being

impacted by the constant presence of
“ancestral impulses,” have to result in
the expansion of male reproductive
fitness and in the expansion of a society’s “vital space.” This is not the way
these “ancestral impulses” comes to
us. The ethological algorithms that
echo in the metarepresentational
mind and the symbols produced by it
are not the cause of war, either among
humans or among chimpanzees.
These algorithms are ultimately one
of the means to make warfare happen,
even though they arise as an indispensable condition.
What modern humans do, in the
mobilization and in the strategy of
war, is to resort consciously or unconsciously to the ethology contained in
deep layers of specialized intelligences, to combine them with hundreds of
other pieces of knowledge, and to
change the values of the variables in
the algorithms so that they serve the
expected ‘rational means’ that some
cultural, institutional, or political context demands. In other words, we
must consider that, in the minds of
women and men in modern war offices, the prospecting of geopolitical scenarios and the setting up of strategies—rational actions, by definition—
become credible and trustworthy only
by resorting to deep ethological complexes that make some courses of action familiar and self-explanatory to
the detriment of others. So, in every
pursuit of a rational goal involving
strategy, evolutionary algorithms are
frankly present; their echoes in the
metarepresentational mind reduce, at
the cognitive level, the degree of estrangement and uncertainty about
decisions that, at the limit, can involve the lives of hundreds of thousands of people. In preparation for
modern warfare, indoctrination and
training of the combatants (as well as
the mobilization of public opinion)
involve a large dose of massive and
programmed activation of unconscious ethological complexes through
the use of cultural and symbolic categories that reinforce the construction
of imagined ingroups (‘homeland’,
‘nation’, ‘class’ , ‘brothers in arms’,
and the like). The Hobbesian warre

involves also the use of cultural contents capable of triggering dehumanizing behavior through the use of concepts that outlines the enemy outgroup
(‘barbarian’,
‘immoral’,
‘impure’,
‘pagan’,
‘imperialist’,
‘communist’, among others ).
War among modern humans, if
reduced to its innate behavioral components, would result in an irrational
phenomenon: the potential gains in
reproductive fitness brought by intersocietal violence, fixed by natural selection since the LCA, do not appear
as the result of engagement in modern warfare. In this way, if the expansion of the male evolutionary fitness is
supposedly the purpose for which
men (and women!) march toward the
battlefield and something that makes
strategists a living, modern warfare
would be an irrational phenomenon
since, in theory, it fails to contribute
to this goal either in victory or in defeat. The rationality of interstate warfare is a product of transdominiality
and metarepresentation; it is a means
for purposes that are transversal to
the economic, political, and cultural
realms, using strategic or incidental
activation of ethological complexes on
the collective unconscious. These
complexes, selected over millions of
years of the natural history of the Primates order, are employed by modern
humans as instruments for understanding, significance, mobilization,
and acceptance of lethal intersocietal
violence, devoted to objectives most
distinct from ancestral ones.
Pride, emotion, and instinct, the
affective triumvirate of warfare in
Keeganian terms, produces a false
contradiction with rational purpose.
This provocation against Clausewitzian principles seems to slip between
two distinct dyads: rationality x irrationality, by one side, consciousness x
unconsciousness, by the other. The so
-called “irrational dimensions” in Keegan should be so because of the eventual inadequacy of warfare in achieving certain goals, and it does not appear that intersocietal coalitional violence has been constituted as a mere
set of frivolities, distempers, or periodic tragedies. If there is a conflict
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between categories, it happens not in
the circumstances of an “unconsciousrational” dyad but in an “unconsciousconscious” one although the notion of
conflict does not fit the complex dialectical game between these two instances of the metarepresentational
mind. “Irrational” belongs to behavior
and courses of action seeking or resulting in sub-optimal consequences.
Those that result in optimal outcomes
are rational by definition, regardless
of their conscious or unconscious origins. In this way, the “warrior culture”
can be a mechanism for the discharge
of primal impulses without ceasing to
be a means to an end.
Final considerations
Keegan is captured by the contradiction between his intuitions
about a “human condition” directed
toward warfare and his theoretical
need to define it as “culture”. Considering the mechanisms of intersocietal
violence we have described, a “warrior
instinct” seems devoid of evidence; in
spite of this, Keegan contributes decisively in bringing the longue durée to
the debate, something that paves the
way to the interaction between the
collective unconscious with evolutionary origins (Jung 2015) and particular cultural systems. We can overcome this conceptual confusion by
unfolding the “warrior culture” in two
separate and interlocked aspects: (a)
one that requires a deep comprehension of warfare, requiring our attention to “ancestral psychic mobilizations” based on ethological projections (the observance and the violation of prosocial complexes) over the
metarepresentational mind; or (b)
another one that evaluates genuine
“warrior cultures” in their condition
of conscious and unconscious practices specific to particular societies. The
“warrior culture” in Keegan is definitely not what it seems, and we believe that Clausewitzian rationality is
not what it seems either if it is considered as synonym of “consciousness.”
Keegan resorts to a universal dimension,
and thus ends up postulating his object
of analysis as something pre-cultural
and innate, ubiquitous to all societies.

Such universality places the “warrior
culture” in the ethological realm, but,
as we have seen, the existence of a
warfare ethology is very unlikely; no
unconscious complexes dedicated to
bringing lethal violence to outsiders
are identified. Ethologically speaking,
intersocietal violence seems to be the
result of the exhaustion of social cognition with the eventual inability to
recognize the rank and status of an
increasing number of individuals. For
these “unidentified” conspecifics, prosocial mechanisms are off limits, which
means that further contacts may be
mediated by hunting ethological complexes—the behavioral basis for intersocietal violence.
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Abstract: What if humans continue to pursue “more and better”? What if we continue living within our safe anthropocentric boundaries? What if we ignore the question of when too much is too much? Margaret Atwood’s “speculative fiction”
presents no new worlds, as Atwood’s world resembles our own; her novels present, on the other hand, what-if realities. By
extrapolating trends, Oryx and Crake poses the afore-mentioned questions within Modernity’s framework. Atwood’s novel
revisits key concepts such as time and subjectivity and brings progression to a halt. What may the wish to stop time, our
human condition, result in, after all? Modernity and its concepts are under scrutiny in a novel in which climate change
and nature seem to have been surpassed. The present paper aims, therefore, at investigating what this “us without a world”
story, which becomes a “world without us” one, can tell us about the pursuits of Modernity and their repercussions: that is,
ecological awareness and the good Anthropocene.
Global warming might just as
well continue what Freud called the
great humiliation of the human. Being
added to a list of humiliators, which
includes, according to Timothy Morton, Copernicus, Darwin, Derrida,
Marx, and Heidegger, just to name a
few, global warming brings human
displacement to a new level since it
forces us to acknowledge that “we are
always inside an object” (Morton 2013,
17). Global warming, as a hyperobject,
as something that is massively
“distributed in time and space relative
to humans” (Morton 2013, 1), makes
humans grapple with the painful realization that there is no away. Global
warming is nonlocal; it is everywhere:
in the bodies, oceans, forests, and
buildings, yet nowhere to be found. It
is viscous, as it clings itself to everything. In the time of hyperobjects we
discover “ourselves on the inside of
some big objects (bigger than us, that
is): Earth, global warming, evolution” (Morton, 2013, 118). Our human
scale is proven insufficient to rule it

all. The split between nature and culture, subject and object, human and
planetary history was just a fallacy.
Human and nonhuman temporalities
are more enmeshed than previously
thought: “Now we must concede what
seemed impossible to contemplate —
humans as agents changing the course
of the deep history of the Earth, or
rather of the Earth’s deep future, an
event giving rise to what might be
called “post-history.” (Hamilton 2017,
13) Accepting human’s geological
agency, Timothy Clark would go on,
“is to revise strongly notions of what is
or is not historically significant” (Clark
2015, 52). Not only human history is
historically significant, after all.
Margaret Atwood’s world in Oryx
and Crake is a human-altered environment in which a newly created race,
the Crakers, and the narrator, Jimmy,
a remnant of human race, survive the
harsh conditions of an altered planet.
Through Jimmy’s faltering memory
the story of the creation of this new
race is told, along with the collapse of
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human race, its decimation by a lethal
virus. Even though climate change as a
reality exists since the beginning of
the novel, all the scientific discoveries
in the walled communities, the socalled compounds, seem to address
this new reality: the Earth is getting
warmer, nothing is changed in human
behavior. Climate change does not
play a role in Jimmy’s life. If on the
one hand, animals are becoming extinct; on the other hand, more animals
are being bioengineered. If plants outside the compounds cannot survive
the harsh reality of a warmer planet,
inside, new plants, bioengineered
ones, thrive and keep the temperature
under control. Climate is under control within the walls of the compounds
and life goes on as though nothing
had happened. The compounds,
therefore, as an attempt to go away, to
escape the viscosity and nonlocality of
global warming, may help shed some
light on our modern constitution. This
novel, obsessed with binaries as it is,
the split between humanities and

sciences, is a speculative exercise on
how modernity conceives knowledge
and its consequences. But mostly on
how the split—nature and culture,
humanities and sciences, object and
subject—may prevent us from addressing the reality of climate
change. Accepting its reality means
going beyond the split, beyond the
sovereignty of the subject; it means,
in a nutshell, rethinking our cherished modern concepts, such as time,
progress, and subjectivity.
Snowman/Jimmy lets us know
right from the beginning of Margaret
Atwood’s Oryx and Crake that it is
zero hour. As he looks at his watch,
out of habit, he is overtaken by a
feeling of desperation: “A blank face
is what it shows him: zero hour. It
causes a jolt of terror to run through
him, this absence of official time.
Nobody nowhere knows what time it
is” (Atwood 2003, 3). Zero hour, as
though time had been suspended, as
though all progression had come to a
halt and Snowman, formerly Jimmy,
was stuck in this limbo, stuck between a past he cannot regain, a past
that keeps slipping through his fingers, and a present with no future:
“He doesn’t know which is worse, a
past he can’t regain or a present that
will destroy him if he looks at it too
clearly. Then there’s the future.
Sheer vertigo” (Atwood 2003, 147).
When did it happen, anyway? Snowman keeps asking himself. “He must
have been five, maybe six” (Atwood
2003, 15). Remember the bonfire,
Snowman? Remember that once upon a time you were called Jimmy?
That once you had a mother and a
father and then a stepmother and a
friend and lovers, so many lovers?
Remember when it was? “Several
years passed. They must have passed,
thinks Snowman” (Atwood 2003, 59).
At this zero hour, this empty space
Snowman seems to inhabit, his experience of time is reduced to “must
haves.” He must have been six, several years must have passed, but who
can be sure of when it all happened?
“There are a lot of blank spaces in his
stub of a brain, where memory used
to be” (Atwood 2003, 4).

Snowman’s present is constantly interrupted by his past’s replays,
by flashbacks he cannot turn off, by
voices that come out of nowhere, by
sentences on fridge magnets, by
words out of context, and even
though the reader is presented with
at least two different storylines,
Snowman’s present and past; all
sense of progression is denied. The
novel comes full circle when it ends
with the same idea with which it had
begun: “Zero hour, Snowman thinks.
Time to go” (Atwood 2003, 372). Zero
hour, once again. Is it the beginning
or the end? A beginning and an end?
One and the same?
Snowman’s broken watch identifies the negation of time as a
consequence of catastrophe in
two different senses: first, the
ending of the mechanical and
social commodification of experience through the imposition
of clock time and, second, an
ending to history through the
violent disruption of human
memory
and
civilization.
(Dodds 2015, 121)
There is no arguing against the
sense of ending throughout the novel, against a post-apocalyptic last
man experience that Snowman personifies. Until the very last minute,
Snowman believes himself to be the
only one alive: “Everything is so empty. Water, sand, sky, trees, fragments
of past time. Nobody to hear
him” (Atwood 2003, 11). Until the
very last minute the narrative unfolds as a “world without us” experience, as Snowman, the last man alive
after a virus destroys mankind, tries
to survive by becoming a scavenger
as he looks for and holds on to the
last remnants of human experience.
At the last minute, however, Snowman learns he is not alone; there are
others, human beings, just like him,
human beings still driven by the imagination Crake tried to destroy. The
“world without us” narrative is about
to become “us without a world” when
it comes to an end: Time to go,
Snowman announces. Time to go
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where? The lack of closure it presents seems to add just another layer
to the ambiguities present in the
novel as a whole. “End or beginning?” I ask.
Atwood’s recovery of the zerohour expression at the end, her insistence on the stillness of the chronological time, in spite of the different
stories presented in the novel, points
to a puzzle to be solved: What is the
relevance of time, or the framing of
time, for the different levels of experience in Oryx and Crake? Since time
is one of the guiding principles of our
modern experience, our new experience as moderns, the novel as a
whole, as “speculative fiction,” keeps
Modernity under scrutiny.
Hegel was, according to Habermas, the philosopher who inaugurated the discourse of Modernity. Hegel
perceives Modernity’s need for selfcertification since the models of the
past would not be enough to grasp
what modernity entails. Modernity’s
criteria should, therefore, be extracted from itself. It should be certified
by its own norms, owing nothing to
the pre-modern view of the world.
Modernity’s self-certification would
be taken by Hegel as the guidepost of
his philosophical concerns. Its guiding principle, subjectivity, guarantees
Modernity’s superiority (when compared to the pre-modern world) and
is illuminated by the ideas of
“freedom” and “reflection” (Habermas
2002, 25). The subjective freedom of
the individual permeates modern
culture and gains full expression,
according to Hegel, in romantic art
due to its absolute interiority. Subjectivity, however, is not restricted to
the arts and, as a principle, organizes
religious life, the State, and society as
a whole.
Certain historical events were,
nonetheless, crucial to the establishment of subjectivity, namely: the
Reformation, the Enlightenment and
the French Revolution. The Reformation led to the reflectiveness of
the faith, inasmuch as tradition lost
its authority to the sovereignty of the
individual. The Declaration of the
Rights of Man and Citizen and the

Napoleonic Code, by focusing on the
freedom of the will as the substantial
foundation of the State, similarly,
made the historical right lose its importance—as rights and ethics were
no longer imposed from the outside,
as God’s commandments, but founded on man’s will.
The expression “subjectivity”
could have four different connotations, Habermas goes on: individualism—infinitely particular singularity;
the right to criticism—that which is
acknowledged by everyone should
prove itself legitimate; autonomy of
action —the possibility of answering
for what we do; idealist philosophy—
philosophy should ascertain that it
knows what it is (Habermas 2002,
121). Modernity, therefore, by breaking away from the pre-modern
world’s parameters, by being established by means of “freedom” and
“reflection,” entailed a rupture in
time. The term Modernity is not free
from controversy, however.
For Marshall Berman, the history of Modernity has three different
stages. The first one, when people
start to experience modern life without being aware of what has hit
them, begins in the sixteenth century
and continues to the end of the
eighteenth century. The second stage
began in 1790, when a sense of living
in a revolutionary time provoked profound changes. In its third stage, the
twentieth century, Modernity loses
its capacity to make sense of things,
an era that has lost touch with its
roots. (Berman 2007, 25-26).
Kumar, however, does not understand the seventeenth century as
the beginning of Modernity. Except
for Descartes, who, in Discourse on
the Method, rejects older modes of
thinking in order to establish a new
way of thinking based on human reason, developing, this way, a new
method to search for truth; as a
whole, the accomplishments of the
moderns were related to the idea of
decadence (Kumar 1997, 89). For progress and growth, mankind had to
pay a price, that is, moral and spiritual decadence.

Throughout the seventeenth
century persists the return of an
apocalyptic thought that limits the
interest in the present. The present
becomes a moment of preparation
and waiting for a future that will be
the result of a divine intervention.
Human action plays no role in it. Only in the second half of the eighteenth century would this perception
of time and history gradually give
way to a new concept of Modernity
(Kumar 1997, 91). In order for the
idea of Modernity to be fully developed, there was the need to exorcize
the apocalyptic view of the world, a
condition that was fulfilled through
only the secularization of Christian
time in the eighteenth century. Modernity was no longer a degenerate
copy of the ancient times; quite the
contrary, it begins to mean an opening of pathways, a rupture with the
past, an opening up to a time of unprecedented progress (Kumar 1997,
91). The moderns are, thus, those
who live in a whole new world and
should rely on themselves to discover
new ways of acting and thinking. The
“new” is a value, or “time’s irreversible arrow,” in Latour’s terms (1993,
10).
The human condition, Crake
would counter argue, is the “wish to
stop time” (Atwood 2003, 292). In the
face of death, human beings, as opposed to other species, will procreate
as a last attempt to cheat death, to
live on, to reach for immortality—to
stop time as though reversing the
arrow that points to the grand finale
of us all: death. Crake’s sentence
seems at first a simple response to
Jimmy’s question: “What pays for all
this?” (Atwood 2003, 292), but what
follows this ironic, detached, cynical
response, is Crake’s disclosure of the
BlyssPluss pill, whose justification is
“we’re running out of spacetime” (Atwood 2003, 295). There is
little time, not enough time, before
the whole species is doomed, hence
“grief in the face of inevitable
death” (Atwood 2003, 292). The BlyssPluss pill would provide mankind, at
least the remnants, with a chance for
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a better future. Its benefits, protection against sexually transmitted diseases, unlimited supply of libido, and
a prolonged youth, would be its selling points; what would not be advertised, however, were its birth control
effects. Crake’s interest does not reside in its benefits, though. The benefits would only attract the buyers,
guarantee that it would reach a larger
number of the population by appealing to the so-called human nature:
“The tide of human desire, the desire
for more and for better, would overwhelm them. It would take control
and drive events, as it had in every
large change throughout history” (Atwood 2003, 292). “More and
better,” Crake says, is the guiding
force behind the impulse for newness, for an improved experience of
sex. The pill would, this way, revolutionize human interaction by appealing to their need for newness, for
what seems to drive human beings.
The search for “more and better,” the
same one that had led to the scarcity
of space-time, would, this time, buy
mankind more time, reverse time’s
irreversible arrow, provide a better
chance for human beings. In the face
of the impending death, mankind’s
extinction, Crake attempts to stop
time.
Lara Dodds, in Death and the
‘Paradice within’ in Paradise Lost and
Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and Crake,
places Oryx and Crake within a science fiction tradition that responds
to Milton’s Paradise Lost. In Atwood’s novel, Crake’s plan aims at
reversing the myth of the Fall, according to Dodds. The new race of
men would inhabit a new Eden,
where the consciousness of death
would be inexistent. After eating the
fruit from the tree of knowledge of
good and evil, Adam and Eve become
aware of their mortality. All of a sudden, they realize they are ashamed of
their nude bodies. They are made
aware of the corporeal components
that make them who they are: bodies
that rot, bodies that die. Conversely,
the bioengineered race that Crake
envisions has no consciousness of

death. The physical aspect of death
still exists, though, since their bodies are programmed to die. “The
children of Crake,” however, do not
know they will eventually die and
are kept in this state of innocence,
in a bioengineered Eden in a postapocalyptic world. Crake wishes to
stop time, then, by reversing mankind’s state to that before the consciousness of death, before mankind
was determined by the flux of time:
“To be subject to death, as Adam
and Eve are following the Fall, is to
be subject to the gap between the
duration of one’s life and the shape
of time. It is in this sense that human history can be said to begin
with the Fall [. . .]” (Dodds 2015,
128). Stopping time, in Crake’s
terms, could have at least two meanings. Firstly, it could mean the illusion of immortality. Not knowing
about the existence of death means
not suffering in anticipation, which
would result in not acknowledging
the passing of time. Secondly, it
could prolong the existence of this
newly created race. Fewer individuals who were more adaptable to the
climate change and the hazards
posed by an altered environment
would probably pose fewer threats
to the environment, guaranteeing
both the permanence of the species
and the world. Stopping the time,
however, would be possible only by
modifying the “human nature”
through the stages of his plan. First
the pills, as Crake points out, “The
BlyssPluss Pill was designed to take
a set of givens, namely the nature of
human nature, and steer these givens in a more beneficial direction
than the ones hitherto taken” (Atwood 2003, 293). The pill that
would end up killing basically all
human race, except for a couple of
individuals, would do so by
“manipulating” the so-called nature,
by making nature work in favor of a
previously designed plan. After massive extinction, a newly improved
race would take over. The Paradice
Project is its name. By altering the
ancient primate brain, destructive

features such as racism, hierarchy,
territoriality, and torments due to
sexuality would be eliminated, and
these perfected beings would repopulate the world in their eco-friendly
way. There is a catch, though, as
Crake warns Jimmy:
Watch out for art, Crake used
to say. As soon as they start
doing art, we’re in trouble. Symbolic thinking of any kind
would signal downfall, in
Crake’s view. Next they’d be
inventing idols, and funerals,
and grave goods, and the afterlife, and sin, and Linear B, and
kings, and then slavery and
war. (Atwood 2003, 361)
Crake’s concerns seem to resonate with that of Raphael’s in Milton’s Paradise Lost. “But apte the
Mind or Fancie is to roave / Uncheckt, and of her roaving is no
end” (Milton 1952, 236), Raphael
warns Adam. Beware of the imagination; soon enough you will be thinking of worlds invisible; you will be
imagining things remote from your
daily life; soon enough you will be
transgressing, I ask, is that so? Curiously, Lucifer, right after being expelled from Heaven for not abiding
by a decree that, logically, offended
the principles by which all the angels had lived until then—equality
and freedom—, realizes that no
matter where he is, Heaven or Hell,
one thing remains inalterable: “A
mind not to be chang'd by Place or
Time” (Milton 1952, 99). His resistance, therefore, against a tyrannical decree is his own mind. Much
better to be free in Hell than to
serve in Heaven since: “[t]he mind is
its own place, and in itself / Can
make a Heaven of Hell, a Hell of
Heaven" (Milton 1952, 99). “A Heaven of Hell, a Hell of Heaven,” says
Lucifer, highlighting, this way, the
mind’s reflective power. The reflection is made visible by means of an
inversion of the word order. The
physical (visible) presentation of the
verse matches its content meaning;
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there is no disjunction between signified and signifier, as both point to
the idea of reflection. Reflection,
mirror, speculation—what does the
mind do? The mind speculates and,
by doing so, changes the reality of
all the things around. Heaven can be
hell and hell can be heaven, as long
as the mind wishes it to be so. The
possibilities are endless, warns
Raphael. Without limits, boundaries, limitations, the roaving has no
end. Men can imagine, Crake would
go on, that there is a life after death,
that there is a soul, that the soul
leaves the body when we die, that
our soul lives on in another dimension, that poetry could reach immortality, that there is a God and
there is a Nature: “I don’t believe in
Nature either,” said Crake. “Or not
with a capital N” (Atwood 2003,
260). What does it mean to believe
in nature with n as opposed to nature with N? What changes when
you think of Nature as a subject or
as an object?
It means that for Crake the
concept of Nature had been surpassed, that we would be living in a
post-nature
world.
Christophe
Bonneuil, in The Geological Turn:
Narratives of the Anthropocene, understands that the term post-nature
may have different meanings. Modernity’s discourse has always been
that of human race freeing itself
from natural determinism. Reflection (consciousness) enabled mankind to gain more and more freedom with the passing of time. Progress was hence the combination of
reflection and freedom. More consciousness meant more freedom and
subjective freedom; according to
Hegel, it permeated the modern
times. The separation between culture and nature is, nonetheless,
questioned whenever the concept of
the Anthropocene is brought into
discussion. Conceiving the entire
species as a geological force that
altered the Earth means that both
realms—human and planetary—are
more enmeshed that previously
thought. What is more, the different

temporalities—planetary and human—are not separated, after all. Climate change, the acidification of the
oceans, earthquakes and tsunamis,
the scarcity of “space-time,” as Crake
mentions, play a role in human history. There is no human history without
its natural counterpart. Nature is not
a backdrop to human history, then,
since nature and culture were never
really separated. The so-called Great
Divide was nothing but a fallacy, in
Latour’s terms, as we have never been
modern. Nature with a capital N is
just a romantic construct, Crake
would say. The acceptance of this post
-nature idea would, on the one hand,
instill humility in our dealings with
the planet, since the human exceptionalism paradigm would be discredited; on the other hand, it would lead
to what is called “the good Anthropocene”:
[T]here will no longer be an environment that is external (read:
hostile) to humankind. Not so
much because man will be transfigured by technology, as Singularitarians dream, but because
the old Nature will be recodified
(or rather re-axiomatized) by the
capitalist machine as merely a
matter of managing resources, of
environmental
governance—
everything according to so-called
"best practice." The anthropic
dream of the Moderns would
thus be finally materialized: a
post-environmentalism in which
man will find himself contextualized and sustained only by himself, surrounded by the immense
accumulation of commodities,
energized by his shiny new and
super-safe nuclear centrals (with
cold-fusion reactors, if possible),
and relaxed by large and pleasant
ecological leisure areas, populated of course by a carefully curated, genetically enhanced flora.
(Danowski and Viveiros de Castro 2017, 49)
Oryx and Crake’s two main storylines, Snowman’s present and past,
take place in different moments of the

good Anthropocene. Jimmy’s life, in
the compounds, in Martha Graham, is
surrounded by technology, bioengineered foods and even pets; a life behind the walls of the compounds
where everything is orderly and controlled, where surveillance is the
norm and people cannot come and go
as they wish. Living in the compounds
is similar to living in a bubble, artificially protected from the harsh environmental change all around. No
wonder do climate change and catastrophes take the form of as a matter of
fact comments, almost as footnotes,
rushed descriptions that seem dislocated from the main action:
Still, as time went on and the
coastal aquifers turned salty and
the northern permafrost melted
and the vast tundra bubbled with
methane, and the drought in the
midcontinental plains regions
went on and on, and the Asian
steppes turned to sand dunes,
and meat became harder to
come by, some people had their
doubts. (Atwood 2003, 24)
According to Adam Trexler, climate
change
is little more than a footnote to
the novel’s concerns. Atwood describes a world where hierarchical, corporate capitalism and
biotechnologies allow the unprecedented exploitation of human
bodies. The world population is
decimated by a virus engineered
in the center of the corporate machine, and a new race of posthumans is positioned to live more
sustainably. (Trexler 2015, 196)
Climate change is not a concern
in the novel. It is, though, the context
in which new technologies emerge. It
is the context that propels more and
more scientific advances. The search
for “more and better” that endowed
mankind with geological agency continues to be the impulse behind the
walls of the compounds. Science responds to environmental change and
the new demands imposed by an al-
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tered environment. Climate change is,
then, a concern in the novel. How
does one live in an altered world, the
novel asks itself. For which humans
do climate change and environmental
disasters beg? How can anyone guarantee the permanence of the human
in this post-nature epoch? The novel
is, therefore, about human agency in
the face of environmental collapse:
human stewardship, living in the
good Anthropocene. When the first
attempt seems to fail, when there is
still scarcity of “space-time” in spite of
it all, Crake puts his plan into action:
a new race, a perfected race, a bioengineered race. Crake wishes to stop
time, to restart the world, to go back
to the basics.
Climate change is beyond the
gates of the compounds. In these
walled spaces, where science and
money are combined, any sea level
alteration, scarcity of meat, animal
extinction and increase in the global
temperature are being mitigated by
new biotechnologies and technologies
that allow for comfortable living spaces. Climate change is, as a reality, almost surpassed, a thing in the past,
being brought up when the past is
evoked: “[. . .] like the beach house
her family had owned when she was
little, the one that got washed away
with the rest of the beaches and quite
a few of the eastern coastal cities
when the sea-level rose so quickly,
and then there was that huge tidal
wave, from the Canary Islands volcano” (Atwood 2003, 63). The compounds are, thus, a post-nature, postclimate change world. The compounds are as well, not only a reality,
spaces of status and power, but also
the great metaphor for a novel obsessed with boundaries, walls, limits,
and binaries.
The Compounds encapsulate corporate “yes” culture in a spatial metaphor of bringing together into one
place all those who have “opted in,”
who have internalized the goals,
truth, and ethics of the company as
their own, and excluding or expelling everything that is threatening to
this homeostasis. (Crooke 2006,

69)
Since the beginning of the novel
we are told that there are two categories
of people: numbers or word people.
Crake fits the numbers person profile,
whereas Jimmy falls under the word
person category. The duality permeates the novel, being recurrently
brought up, and helps understand
both characters’ successes and failures.
Their scientific or rhetoric-linguistic
abilities are key factors determining
not only the colleges they attend and
the job offers they receive but also
where they live. In a techno-scientific
society, where nature has been surpassed and climate change is in a once
-upon-a-time framework, being science-oriented, or a numbers person, in
Atwood’s words, is really profitable.
Since the compounds are sciencedriven spaces, the best scientists have
the best paying jobs and live in the
best compounds.
The search for
“more and better” leads to different
house moves and determines how contingent relationships are: “Kids came
and went, desks filled and emptied,
friendship
was
always
contingent” (Atwood 2003, 71). Underlying all
this scientific talk, however, is the true
catalyst of societal changes: money.
Scientific and research interests
do not exist in themselves, though.
The novel does not present a science
for science’s sake tale; quite the contrary, scientific interests are circumstantial, more based on demands than
investigative nature. Science is just a
commodity, a pretty lucrative one, I
must add.
The split between numbers people and word people, or in broad
terms, between science and the humanities, can be understood as Stephen Dunning does, as a means to extrapolate the fields division and warn
against its consequences. Oryx and
Crake would, thus, be a cautionary tale
about the dangers of conceiving scientific knowledge without taking human
concerns into consideration. The human concerns should mediate scientific knowledge, should put the brakes
on the ambition for “more and better”
as the ambition for more money.
Crake’s character embodies the
clear split between the different fields

of knowledge: “His clothes were dark
in tone, devoid of logos and visuals
and written commentary—a no-name
look.”
(Atwood 2003, 72) Even
through his choice of clothes, Crake
displays his lack of affinity with words.
Crake’s “laconic” look may be read as a
metaphor for his behavior toward the
world. Clothes are supposed to be
clothes and nothing more and should
serve the purpose of covering his body.
Everything exist for a reason, according to Crake: “Crake is a biological determinist, believing also in a logical
biology, a biologic of sense. Art, for
instance, exists for a purely biological
function” (Crooke 2006, 77). Art, as
well as words, serves a purpose and
that is all.
Even though Jimmy is the classic
example of a word person, both friends
are much more alike than expected.
Being a word person or a numbers person does not mean being complete
opposites, it means, nonetheless, occupying different walled spaces: “There
had been something willed about it
though, his ignorance. Or not willed,
exactly: structured. He’d grown up in
walled spaces, and then he had become one. He had shut things
out.” (Atwood 2003, 184) Jimmy shuts
things out, as well as Crake does, as
well as the compounds do. There are
different levels, therefore, of shutting
things out, in the novel. As mentioned
before, through the characters, the
spaces, lines, stories, the novel unfolds
its obsession with boundaries, limits,
limitations. “Watch out for art,” Crake
says, establishing another boundary
for his post-humans, “the children of
Crake”. But why art, Crake, I ask?
Throughout the novel, Snowman
struggles with language. There is a
sense that language is slipping away
from him, that little by little, he is forgetting words, meanings. “Hang on to
the words,” he tells himself. “The odd
words, the old words, the rare ones.
Valence. Norn. Serendipity. Pibroch.
Lubricious. When they’re gone out of
his head, these words, they’ll be gone,
everywhere, forever. As though they
had never been” (Atwood 2003, 68).
Why the old words, Snowman?
Since Snowman believes he is to
be the last of his kind alive, some
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words may only exist in his mind. They
are the remnants of a past type of living, of a past type of human—rare
words, old words, like himself, a rare
human being so different from the
perfected beauty of “the children of
Crake.” When he is gone, human life
as it is, as well as human language,
may disappear forever. Crake’s perfected human beings still use language to
communicate but do not know malice,
“but these people didn’t go in for fancy
language: they hadn’t been taught evasion, euphemism, lily-gilding. In
speech
they
were
plain
and
blunt” (Atwood 2003, 348). Their use
of language was much more practical,
daily, and literal. Why would they
need to resort to a concept such as
serendipity, so far removed from their
daily concerns, so distant from their
new reality? Snowman’s language refers to a long gone type of experience:
“I used to be erudite,” he says out loud.
Erudite. A hopeless word. What are all
those things he once thought he knew,
and where have they gone? (Atwood
2003, 148). Outside the compounds,
however, beyond the walled world, the
walled experiences, the closed-in
world of well-established knowledge,
beyond the sovereignty of the subject,
what was previously known does not
suffice to account for this new world.
Words fade, lose their solidity, and
become, all of a sudden, insufficient;
all of a sudden, wisdom is turned to
folly, as Raphael imagined it would.
Once the boundary is transgressed,
knowledge, words, concepts become
slippery, contingent, empty.
Another dimension to Snowman’s
concerns exists, however. After the
world surrounding him changes, he
tries to hold on to what is still familiar,
as though trying to compensate for the
loss of control. He had always been a
word person, someone who found his
way around the science-driven world
by using his linguistic skill. Publicity
was his way around. Publicity, nonetheless, entails a specific relationship
to the words: “Reading a poem introduces some wiggle room between ideas and ways of having them. Propaganda closes this space down” (Morton
2018, 30). The words would hence be at
Jimmy’s disposal. Jimmy’s attitude,

reaching out and grabbing the words,
making them mean what he wanted
them to, mastering the words, resembles Crake’s attitude toward the
world. Numbers people or word people seem much more alike than expected. As Timothy Morton warns us,
“It’s not what you think but how you
think that starts World War
III” (Morton 2018, 33). It’s not what
you think—scientific or human concerns—but how you think. In Oryx
and Crake, science serves a purpose as
well as the words do. It is thus the
apotheosis of the subject-object dualism, the demise of a world where anything that could was objectified—
commodification, plain and simple.
When the walls between the perfect,
engineered human world and the
world around cracks, when humans
lose control over a world that can no
longer be programmed, predicted,
words falter. Is the experience unimaginable? Does it surpass our too human abilities to conceive the world?
Was wisdom turned to folly?
Just the human wish to stop
time, as Crake warns us, but whose
time, I ask? Crake’s Paradice Project
and his attempt to deny the posthumans, the newly created race, the
consciousness of death is an almost
too literal way to reverse the fall of
men. The newly created race would be
kept in this eternal innocence, leading
a more eco-friendly mode of living. It
is also an attempt to start again with a
clean slate.
“Everything emits time, not just
humans” (Morton 2018, 77). So whose
time should be stopped, I ask? All
experience of time, Crake would say.
In no circumstances do non-humans
enter into Crake’s equation. Their
temporalities are never acknowledged. Even when environmental disasters hit the globe, modifying life as
it was, the non-human world continues to be shut out. Mankind finds a
way to banish the non-humans, to
deny their temporalities, to stop the
time. The compounds, therefore, are a
means to avoid any ecological awareness: “Ecological awareness is shaking
our faith in the anthropocentric idea
that there is one scale to rule them

all—the human one” (Morton 2018,
22). The human scale continues to
rule it all until the scarcity of “spacetime” is such that denial is not a possibility anymore. Space and time, two
a priori conditions of human sensibility prove themselves to be conditioned after all. “This is one of the
ways, and not the least important, in
which it can be said that our world
has ceased to be Kantian” (Danowski
and Viveiros De Castro 2017, 9). Men
were proven unable to rise above the
phenomenal order or causality. They
were not the lawgivers of nature, after
all, but phenomenologically bound to
and conditioned by the human and
non-human world: “You aren’t outside
the biosphere looking in. You are
glued to the biosphere phenomenologically” (Morton 2018, 41). The
boundaries were, this way, not
enough. They are more porous than
anticipated. Crake, nevertheless, instead of accepting the porosity of the
boundaries, instead of acknowledging
the non-human world, decides to put
an end to human life as it was, to go
back to the beginning, but with a
twist. This clean slate is, however, still
conditioned: “Watch out for art,”
Crake used to say. “As soon as they
start doing art, we’re in trouble. Symbolic thinking of any kind would signal
downfall, in Crake’s view” (Atwood 2003,
361).
Art determined whether the project was successful or a failure. Imagination’s rove has no end, Raphael
warned Adam it knows no boundaries, we can infer. Imagination brings
visibility to the invisible realm; it establishes connections that are not
apparent. Raphael equates fancy with
the mind, as though both were one
and the same, as though they shared
similar characteristics. Fancy’s rove
had no end, as well as the mind’s.
Lucifer would agree: the mind is its
own place; it had the power to alter
space and time; it had the power to be
a place of resistance. For Lucifer, the
mind became a symbol of freedom.
How does he free himself from the
divine decree and all its constraints?
Through his mind. Lucifer became a
subject then:
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He is a “subject” in our contemporary theoretical sense (the
“humanist subject”), and certainly his troubled “I” is prominent
in the poem. But he is a “subject”
also in the more literal, root
sense of the term (sub iectus,
thrown under): he discovers at
the moment of his rebellion just
what it means to be subject to
God. Subjection is the origin of
his subjectivity. (Forsyth 2003,
150)
His search for freedom, for the
unconditioned, is the origin of his
subjectivity. So, the new race, “the
children of Crake,” could stand a
chance only if subjectivity would not
emerge—if the principle behind the
idea of Modernity, as Hegel states, did
not guide the progress of mankind?
The problem is not what you think,
Timothy Morton would argue, but
how you think.
Snowman learns that the Crakers, in spite of Crake’s efforts to eliminate any symbolic thinking, the Gspot in the brain as he calls, are curious about their origins, are eager to
create narratives: “They’re up to
something though, something Crake
didn’t anticipate: they’re conversing
with the invisible, they’re developing
reverence” (Atwood 2003, 157); singing and dreaming were not the only
things humans were hard-wired for.
Symbolic thinking seems to be part of
human nature. Human’s demise
again? Zero-hour, Snowman lets us
know.
What if subjectivity allowed for a
new experience, one in which walled
spaces were not a reality and shutting
things out were not the norm? What
if we did not let anything go, anything
pass, as Isabelle Stengers suggests we
do (Stengers 2015, 143)? What if we
took full responsibility for the reality
of our abstractions? What if we loved
our monsters?
“Watch out for art,” Crake says.
There is no denying that symbolic,
abstract thinking allows for appropriation, for eliminating any other scale
rather than the human one; yet isn’t

there another side to it? The aesthetic
experience entails solidarity to what is
non-human, Timothy Morton would
reply, caring for something that is not
another human being. What is more,
beauty is indifferent to the subject.
The aesthetic experience might just as
well, due to its weirdness (Morton
2018, 65), provide us with the hint of
the uncanny necessary to overthrow
the sovereignty of the subject: “this
feeling of openness, this uncanny sensation of finding ourselves somewhere
and not recognizing it, is exactly a
glimpse of living less definitively, in a
world comprised almost entirely not
of ourselves” (Morton 2018, 26). Living
less definitively might be the key,
then?
“It’s Zero-hour,” Snowman says.
It’s time to go.
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Resumo: E se os humanos continuarem em sua busca por “mais e melhor”? E se continuarmos vivendo dentro de nossos
limites antropocêntricos? E se ignorarmos a pergunta de em que ponto muito é muito? A “ficção especulativa” de
Margaret Atwood não apresenta novos mundos, já que o mundo de Atwood se assemelha ao nosso; seus romances
apresentam, no entanto, “e se” realidades. Ao extrapolar tendências, Oryx e Crake retira as questões acima mencionadas
do contexto da Modernidade. O romance de Atwood revisita conceitos-chave tais como tempo e subjetividade e faz a
progressão parar. No que nosso desejo de parar o tempo, nossa condição humana, pode resultar, no fim das contas? A
Modernidade e seus conceitos estão sob escrutínio em um romance no qual a mudança climática e a natureza parecem
ter sido superadas. O presente artigo busca, assim, investigar o que essa estória de um “nós sem um mundo” que se
torna numa estória de um “mundo sem nós” pode nos dizer sobre as buscas da Modernidade e suas repercussões: ou
seja, a consciência ecológica e o bom Antropoceno.
Hora zero, Snowman/Jimmy nos
alerta logo no início de Oryx e Crake
de Margaret Atwood. Ao olhar seu
relógio, por hábito, nos diz, ele é
tomado por um sentimento de
desespero: “A blank face is what it
shows him: zero hour. It causes him a
jolt of terror to run through him, this
absence of official time. Nobody
nowhere knows what time it
is” (Atwood 2003, 3). Hora zero, como
se o tempo estivesse suspenso, como se
toda a progressão houvesse parado e
Snowman, antigo Jimmy, estivesse
preso nesse limbo, preso entre um
passado que não pode retomar, um
passado que continuasse a escorregar
por entre os dedos e um presente sem
futuro: “He doesn’t know which is
worse, a past he can’t regain or a
present that will destroy him if he looks
at it too clearly. Then there’s the future.
Sheer vertigo” (Atwood 2003, 147).
Quando aconteceu mesmo, Snowman
se pergunta. “He must have been five,
maybe six” (Atwood 2003, 15). Lembra

da fogueira, Snowman? Lembra que
você já se chamou Jimmy? Que você
já teve uma mãe e um pai e depois
uma madrasta e um amigo e
amantes, tantas amantes? Lembra
quando foi? “Several years passed.
They must have passed, thinks
Snowman” (Atwood 2003, 59). Nessa
hora, nesse espaço vazio que
Snowman parece habitar, sua
experiência do tempo é reduzida ao
“deve ter sido.” Ele deve ter tido seis
anos, muitos anos devem ter passado,
mas quem pode ter certeza de
quando tudo aconteceu? “There are a
lot of blank spaces in his stub of a
brain, where memory used to
be” (Atwood 2003, 4).
O presente de Snowman é
constantemente interrompido pela
repetição do seu passado, flashbacks
que ele não consegue desligar, por
vozes que aparecem do nada, por
frases de imãs de geladeira, por
palavras fora de contexto, e apesar de
o leitor ser apresentado a pelo menos
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duas narrativas, o presente e passado
de Snowman, qualquer senso de
progressão é negado. O romance faz
uma viagem redonda quando termina
com a mesma ideia que lhe deu
início: “Zero hour, Snowman thinks.
Time to go” (Atwood 2003, 372). Hora
zero, mais uma vez. Mas é um início
ou um final? Início e final? Um e o
mesmo?
Snowman’s broken watch identifies the negation of time as a
consequence of catastrophe in
two different senses: first, the
ending of the mechanical and
social commodification of experience through the imposition of
clock time and, second, an ending to history through the violent disruption of human
memory
and
civilization.
(Dodds 2015, 121)
Não há como negar o sentimento
de fim ao longo do romance, a
experiência pós-apocalíptica do último

homem que Snowman personifica.
Até o último momento, Snowman
acredita ser o único homem vivo:
“Everything is so empty. Water,
sand, sky, trees, fragments of past
time. Nobody to hear him” (Atwood
2003, 11). Até o último momento a
narrativa se desenvolve enquanto
uma experiência de um “mundo sem
nós,” quando Snowman, o último
homem vivo após um vírus destruir
a humanidade, tenta sobreviver ao
se tornar um catador de restos,
procurando e se atendo aos últimos
resquícios da experiência humana.
No último momento, entretanto,
Snowman descobre que não está
sozinho, que há outros, seres
humanos, tais como ele, humanos
ainda movidos pela imaginação que
Crake tentou destruir. A narrativa de
um “mundo sem nós” está prestes a
se transformar em “nós sem um
mundo” quando termina: Hora de ir,
Snowman anuncia. Hora de ir para
onde? A falta de fechamento,
finalização, apenas adiciona outra
camada
às
ambiguidades
do
romance como todo. Fim ou início,
pergunto?
A recuperação da expressão
hora zero no final, a insistência de
Atwood na imobilidade do tempo
cronológico, apesar das diferentes
estórias do romance, aponta a uma
problemática a ser perseguida: a
relevância do tempo ou do
enquadramento do tempo para os
diferentes níveis de experiência em
Oryx e Crake. Ademais, como o
tempo é um dos princípios
norteadores de nossa experiência
moderna, nossa nova experiência
moderna, o romance como um todo,
enquanto
“ficção
especulativa”,
coloca
a
Modernidade
sob
escrutínio.
Hegel foi, de acordo com
Habermas, o filósofo que inaugurou
o discurso da Modernidade. Hegel
apontou para a necessidade de
autocertificação da Modernidade,
uma vez que os modelos antigos não
seriam mais capazes de entender o
que a Modernidade representaria.
Os seus critérios (da Modernidade)

deveriam, assim, ser extraídos de si.
Seria, dessa forma, certificada por
suas próprias normas, não mais
devendo, assim, à visão de mundo
pré-moderna. A autocertificação da
Modernidade seria tomada por
Hegel enquanto norteadora de todas
as suas preocupações filosóficas. Seu
princípio central, a subjetividade,
garantiria a superioridade moderna
(quando comparada ao mundo prémoderno) e seria iluminada pelas
ideias
de
“liberdade”
e
“reflexão” (Habermas 2002, 25). A
liberdade subjetiva do sujeito
permeia a cultura moderna e ganha
total expressão, de acordo com
Hegel, na arte romântica devido a
sua absoluta interioridade. A
subjetividade, no entanto, não estaria
restrita às artes e, enquanto princípio,
organizaria a vida religiosa, o estado e
a sociedade como um todo.
Certos
eventos
históricos
foram, entretanto, cruciais para o
estabelecimento da subjetividade, a
saber: a Reforma, o Iluminismo e a
Revolução Francesa. A Reforma
levou à refletividade da fé, já que a
tradição perdera sua autoridade para
a soberania do individual. A
Declaração dos direitos do Homem e
do Cidadão e o Código Napoleônico,
ao focarem na liberdade da vontade
como o fundamento substancial do
Estado, similarmente, fizeram o
direito histórico perder seu valor—
uma vez que direitos e ética não
seriam mais impostos de fora,
enquanto mandamentos de Deus,
mas fundamentados na vontade
humana.
A
expressão
subjetividade
poderia ter quatro conotações,
Habermas continua: individualismo
—singularidade infinitamente particular; o direito à crítica—aquilo que é
reconhecido por todos deve se mostrar
legítimo; autonomia da ação—a
possibilidade de responder pelo que
fazemos; filosofia idealista—a filosofia
deveria assegurar de que sabe o que é
(Habermas 2002, 121). A Modernidade,
dessa maneira, ao quebrar com os
parâmetros pré-modernos, ao ser
estabelecida a partir da “liberdade” e da
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“reflexão,” implicaria uma ruptura no
tempo. O termo Modernidade não é
aceito sem controvérsias, entretanto.
Para Marshall Berman a
história da Modernidade possuiria
três estágios distintos. O primeiro,
quando as pessoas começam a
experimentar a vida moderna sem
ter ainda consciência do que as
atingiu, iria do século dezesseis ao
dezessete. O segundo estágio
começariam em 1790, quando há a
sensação de se viver em uma época
revolucionária
que
provoca
mudanças profundas. No seu
terceiro estágio, o século vinte, a
Modernidade perde a capacidade de
dar sentido às coisas, uma época
moderna que perdeu o contato com
suas raízes (Berman 2007, 25-26).
Kumar, por outro lado, não entende
ser o século dezessete o início da
Modernidade. Exceto por Descartes
que, no Discurso sobre o Método,
rejeita os modos antigos de
pensamento para estabelecer um
novo modo baseada na razão
humana, desenvolvendo, assim, um
novo método para buscar a verdade;
de um modo geral, as conquistas
modernas eram relacionadas à ideia
de decadência (Kumar 1997, 89).
Pelo progresso e crescimento, a
humanidade tinha que pagar um
preço: a decadência moral e
espiritual.
Ao longo do século dezessete
há o retorno de um pensamento
apocalíptico que limitava o interesse
no presente. O presente se torna um
momento de preparação e espera
por um futuro que era resultado da
intervenção divina. A ação humana
tinha pouca relevância. Somente na
segunda metade do século dezoito a
percepção do tempo e da história
gradualmente cederia a um novo
conceito de Modernidade (Kumar
1997, 91). Para que a ideia de
Modernidade
pudesse
se
desenvolver completamente havia a
necessidade de exorcizar a visão
apocalíptica do mundo, condição
preenchida somente através da
secularização do tempo cristão no
século dezoito. A Modernidade não

era mais cópia degenerada dos
tempos
antigos,
muito
pelo
contrário, começa a significar uma
abertura de caminhos, ruptura com
o passado, uma abertura a um tempo
de progresso sem precedentes
(Kumar 1997, 91). Os modernos são,
dessa forma, aqueles que vivem em
um novo mundo e deveriam confiar
em si próprios para descobrir novos
modos de agir e pensar. O novo
enquanto
valor,
ou
“time’s
irreversible arrow” (Latour 1993, 10),
nos termos de Latour.
Mas a condição humana, Crake
contra-argumentaria é o “wish to
stop time” (Atwood 2003, 292).
Frente à morte, os seres humanos,
ao contrário de outras espécies, irão
procriar, como última tentativa de
driblar a morte, de continuar a viver,
de buscar a imortalidade. Parar o
tempo, como se pudesse reverter a
seta que aponta para o grande final
de todos nós: a morte. A frase de
Crake parece a princípio uma
resposta à pergunta de Jimmy: “what
pays for all this?” (Atwood 2003,
292) mas o que segue à resposta
cínica, irônica, desapegada é a
apresentação da pílula BlyssPluss,
cuja justificação residiria no fato de
“we’re running out of spacetime” (Atwood 2003, 295). Há pouco
tempo, não há tempo suficiente,
antes que toda a espécie esteja
condenada, “Grief in the face of
inevitable death” (Atwood 2003,
292). A pílula BlyssPluss daria à
humanidade, aos remanescentes
pelo menos, a chance de um futuro
melhor. Seus benefícios, proteção
contra
doenças
sexualmente
transmissíveis,
fornecimento
ilimitado de libido e juventude
prolongada, seriam seus atrativos
comerciais;
seus
efeitos
contraceptivos,
entretanto,
não
seriam divulgados. O interesse de
Crake não residiria em seus
benefícios. Os benefícios apenas
atrairiam
os
compradores,
garantiriam que a pílula atingiria
uma parcela maior da população ao
apelar à assim chamada natureza
humana: “The tide of human desire,

the desire for more and for better,
would overwhelm them. It would
take control and drive events, as it
had
in
every
large
change
throughout history” (Atwood 2003,
292). “Mais e melhor,” diz Crake, a
força por trás do impulso por
novidade, por uma experiência
sexual aprimorada. A pílula iria,
dessa maneira, revolucionar as
interações humanas ao apelar à
necessidade por novidade, àquilo
que parece impulsionar os seres
humanos. A busca por “mais e
melhor,” a mesma que havia levado à
escassez de espaço-tempo, faria,
agora, a humanidade ganhar tempo,
ao reverter a seta irreversível do
tempo, garantindo uma melhor
chance aos humanos. Face à
iminente morte, a extinção humana,
Crake tenta parar o tempo.
Lara Dodds, em “Death and the
‘Paradice within’ in Paradise Lost
and Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and
Crake,” posiciona Oryx e Crake
dentro de uma tradição da ficção
científica que responde ao Paraíso
Perdido de Milton. No romance de
Atwood, o plano de Crake busca
reverter o mito da queda, conforme
Dodds. A nova raça de homens
habitaria um novo éden, onde a
consciência
da
morte
seria
inexistente. Após comer o fruto da
árvore do conhecimento do bem e
do mal, Adão e Eva ganham
consciência de sua mortalidade.
Repentinamente, percebem que
sentem vergonha de seus corpos
nus. Tornam-se conscientes dos
componentes corpóreos que fazem o
que são – corpos que apodrecem,
corpos que morrem. Conversamente,
a raça bioconstruída que Crake
vislumbra não possui consciência da
morte. O aspecto físico da morte
ainda existe, já que seus corpos são
programados a morrer. “As crianças
de Crake”, todavia, não sabem que
vão eventualmente morrer e são
mantidas nesse estado de inocência,
em um éden bioconstruído, em um
mundo
pós-apocalíptico.
Crake
deseja parar o tempo, então, ao
retornar a humanidade ao estado
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anterior à consciência da morte,
antes de a humanidade ser
determinada pelo fluxo do tempo:
“To be subject to death, as Adam
and Eve are following the Fall, is to
be subject to the gap between the
duration of one’s life and the shape
of time. It is in this sense that
human history can be said to begin
with the Fall (. . .)” (Dodds 2015, 128).
Parar o tempo, nos termos de Crake,
poderia
ter
dois
sentidos.
Primeiramente, poderia significar a
ilusão da imortalidade. Não ter
consciência da morte implicaria não
sofrer em antecipação, o que poderia
resultar na não percepção da
passagem do tempo. Em segundo
lugar, poderia prolongar a existência
dessa nova raça recém-criada.
Menos indivíduos mais adaptáveis à
mudança climática e aos perigos de
um
meio-ambiente
alterado
provavelmente causariam menos
danos ao meio-ambiente, garantindo
tanto a permanência da espécie e a
do mundo. Parar o tempo, contudo,
somente seria possível ao modificar
a “natureza humana” através dos
estágios do seu plano. Primeiro as
pílulas como Crake explica, “The
BlyssPluss Pill was designed to take a
set of givens, namely the nature of
human nature, and steer these
givens in a more beneficial direction
than
the
ones
hitherto
taken” (Atwood 2003, 293). A pílula
que mataria basicamente toda a raça
humana,
exceto
por
alguns
indivíduos, assim o faria ao
“manipular” a assim chamada
natureza, ao fazer a natureza
trabalhar a favor de um plano
previamente concebido. E após a
extinção massiva, uma nova raça
aprimorada dominaria. Paradice
Project era seu nome. Ao alterar o
antigo
cérebro
primata,
características destrutivas tais como
racismo, hierarquia, territorialidade
e
tormentos
derivados
da
sexualidade seriam eliminados e
esses
seres
aperfeiçoados
repovoariam o mundo no seu modo
ecologicamente amigável. Havia um
porém, no entanto, Crake alerta

Jimmy:
Watch out for art, Crake used to
say. As soon as they start doing
art, we’re in trouble. Symbolic
thinking of any kind would signal downfall, in Crake’s view.
Next they’d be inventing idols,
and funerals, and grave goods,
and the afterlife, and sin, and
Linear B, and kings, and then
slavery and war. (Atwood 2003,
361)
As preocupações de Crake estão
em sintonia com as preocupações de
Raphael em Paraíso Perdido de
Milton. “But apte the Mind or Fancie
is to roave / Uncheckt, and of her
roaving is no end” (Milton 1952, 236),
Raphael alerta Adão. Cuidado com a
imaginação, em breve estará pesando
em mundos invisíveis, imaginando
coisas remotas, distantes da vida
diária,
em
breve
estará
transgredindo, pergunto? É isso?
Curiosamente, Lúcifer, logo após ser
expulso do Paraíso por não
concordar com um decreto que
logicamente ofenderia os princípios
pelos quais os anjos haviam vivido
até então – igualdade e liberdade—
percebe que não importa onde
estivesse, Paraíso ou Inferno, algo se
mantém inalterado: “A mind not to
be chang'd by Place or Time” (Milton
1952, 99). Sua resistência ao decreto
tirânico seria sua própria mente.
Muito melhor ser livre no Inferno
que servir no Paraíso, já que, “The
mind is its own place, and in itself /
Can make a Heaven of Hell, a Hell of
Heaven" (Milton 1952, 99) “a Heaven
of Hell, a Hell of Heaven”, diz
Lúcifer, enfatizando, dessa forma, o
poder reflexivo da mente. A reflexão
se torna visível pela inversão das
palavras. A apresentação física
(visível) do verso se alinha ao seu
conteúdo, não havendo disjunção
entre significante e significado, uma
vez que ambos apontam para a ideia
de reflexão. Reflexão, espelho,
especulação. O que a mente faz? A
mente especula, e ao fazê-lo altera a
realidade do seu entorno. Paraíso

pode ser Inferno e Inferno, Paraíso
basta a mente querer. E as
possibilidades são inúmeras, adverte
Raphael. Sem limites, fronteiras,
limitações, o voo não tem fim. Os
homens
imaginam,
Crake
continuaria, que existe uma vida
após a morte, que há uma alma, que
a alma deixa o corpo quando
morremos, que nossas almas vivem
em outra dimensão, que a poesia
poderia alcançar a imortalidade, que
há um Deus e uma Natureza: “‘I don’t
believe in Nature either’, said Crake.
‘Or not with a capital N’” (Atwood
2003, 260). E o que significaria
acreditar em uma natureza com n ao
invés de uma natureza com N? O que
muda ao pensar na Natureza
enquanto sujeito ou enquanto
objeto?
Significa que para Crake o
conceito de Natureza havia sido
superado, que estaríamos vivendo em
um mundo pós-natureza. Christophe
Bonneuil, em The Geological Turn:
Narratives of the Anthropocene,
entende que o termo pós-natureza
pode adquirir diferentes sentidos. O
discurso da Modernidade sempre
atrelou sentido à libertação humana
do determinismo natural. A reflexão
(consciência) permitiu à humanidade
ganhar mais e mais liberdade com o
passar do tempo. Mais consciência
significava mais liberdade e a
liberdade subjetiva, conforme Hegel,
permearia os tempos modernos. A
separação entre cultura e natureza é,
todavia, questionada quando o
conceito de Antropoceno é trazido à
discussão. Conceber a espécie
humana
enquanto
uma
força
geológica que altera a Terra significa
que ambos domínios—humano e
planetário—estão mais enredados
que previamente pensado. Ademais,
as
diferentes
temporalidades—
planetária e humana—não estão
separadas, no fim das contas. A
mudança climática, a acidificação dos
oceanos, os terremotos e tsunamis, a
escassez de “tempo-espaço” como
Crake menciona, têm um papel na
história humana. Não há história
humana sem o seu contraponto
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natural. A natureza não é mero
cenário para a história humana, uma
vez que cultura e natureza nunca
estiveram separadas.
A assim
chamada Grande Divisão não fora
nada além de uma falácia, nos termos
de Latour, uma vez que nunca fomos
modernos.
Natureza
com
N
maiúsculo
fora
apenas
uma
construção romântica, Crake diria. A
aceitação da ideia de pós-natureza se,
de um lado, incutiria humildade em
nosso trato com o planeta, já que o
paradigma
de
excepcionalismo
humano seria desacreditado; por
outro lado, poderia levar ao chamado
“bom Antropoceno:”
[T]here will no longer be an
environment that is external
(read: hostile) to humankind.
Not so much because man will
be transfigured by technology,
as Singularitarians dream, but
because the old Nature will be
recodified
(or
rather
reaxiomatized) by the capitalist
machine as merely a matter of
managing resources, of environmental governance—everything
according to so-called "best
practice." The anthropic dream
of the Moderns would thus be
finally materialized: a postenvironmentalism in which man
will find himself contextualized
and sustained only by himself,
surrounded by the immense
accumulation of commodities,
energized by his shiny new and
super-safe
nuclear
centrals
(with cold-fusion reactors, if
possible), and relaxed by large
and pleasant ecological leisure
areas, populated of course by a
carefully curated, genetically
enhanced flora. (Danowski and
Viveiros de Castro 2017, 49)
As duas principais estórias de
Oryx e Crake, o passado e o presente
de
Snowman,
acontecem
em
diferentes momentos do bom
Antropoceno. A vida de Jimmy, nos
complexos, em Martha Graham, era
cercada por tecnologia, por comidas

e até animais de estimação bioconstruídos; uma vida atrás dos
muros dos complexos onde tudo era
controlado e ordenado, onde a
vigilância era a norma e as pessoas
não podiam ir e vir como queriam.
Viver nos complexos era viver em
uma bolha, artificialmente protegido
da dura mudança ambiental em
volta. Não é de se admirar que a
mudança climática e as catástrofes
tomem a forma de comentários um
tanto a propósito, quase como notas
de rodapé, descrições apressadas que
parecem
deslocadas
da
ação
principal:
Still, as time went on and the
coastal aquifers turned salty and
the northern permafrost melted
and the vast tundra bubbled
with methane, and the drought
in the midcontinental plains
regions went on and on, and the
Asian steppes turned to sand
dunes, and meat became harder
to come by, some people had
their doubts. (Atwood 2003, 24)
De acordo com Adam Trexler, a
mudança climática
is little more than a footnote to
the novel’s concerns. Atwood
describes a world where hierarchical, corporate capitalism and
biotechnologies allow the unprecedented exploitation of human bodies. The world population is decimated by a virus engineered in the center of the
corporate machine, and a new
race of posthumans is positioned to live more sustainably.
(Trexler 2015, 196)
A mudança climática não é uma
questão no romance. É, entretanto, o
contexto a partir do qual novas
tecnologias emergem. É o contexto
que impulsiona mais e mais avanços
científicos. A busca por “mais e
melhor” que dotou a humanidade de
agência geológica continua a ser o
impulso atrás dos muros dos
complexos. A ciência responde à

mudança ambiental e às novas
demandas impostas por um meio
ambiente alterado. A mudança
climática é, então, uma questão do
romance. Como viver em mundo
alterado, o romance se pergunta? Por
que tipo de humanos a mudança
climática e os desastres ambientais
pedem?
Como
garantir
a
permanência humana em uma época
pós-humana? O romance é, então,
sobre a agência humana face ao
colapse
ambiental:
sobre
o
gerenciamento humano, sobre viver
no bom Antropoceno. E quando a
primeira tentativa parece falhar,
quando há ainda escassez de “espaçotempo” apesar de tudo, Crake coloca
o seu plano em ação: uma nova raça,
uma raça aperfeiçoada, uma raça
bioconstruída. Crake quer parar o
tempo, reiniciá-lo, voltar ao início.
A mudança climática está para
além dos portões dos complexos.
Nesses espaços murados, onde
ciência e dinheiro se combinavam,
qualquer mudança no nível do mar,
escassez de carne, extinção animal e
aumento na temperatura global eram
mitigados por novas tecnologias e
biotecnologias
que
forneceriam
espaços confortáveis para se viver. A
mudança climática estava, enquanto
realidade, basicamente superada,
algo do passado, trazida quando o
passado era evocado: “[. . .] like the
beach house her family had owned
when she was little, the one that got
washed away with the rest of the
beaches and quite a few of the
eastern coastal cities when the sealevel rose so quickly, and then there
was that huge tidal wave, from the
Canary Islands volcano” (Atwood
2003, 63). Os complexos eram, assim,
o mundo pós-natureza e pósmudança climática. Os complexos
eram também, não somente uma
realidade, espaços de status e poder,
mas também a grande metáfora para
um
romance
obcecado
com
fronteiras, muros, limites, binarismos:
The Compounds encapsulate
corporate “yes” culture in a spatial metaphor of bringing together into one place all those
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who have “opted in,” who have
internalized the goals, truth,
and ethics of the company as
their own, and excluding or expelling everything that is threatening to this homeostasis.
(Crooke 2006, 69)
Desde o início sabemos que há
duas categorias de pessoas: a dos
números e a das palavras. Crake se
enquadra no perfil das pessoas “dos
números”, enquanto Jimmy cai na
categoria “das palavras.” A dualidade
permeia
o
romance,
sendo
recorrentemente mencionada e ajuda
a entender os sucessos e fracassos de
ambos. Suas habilidades científicas
ou retórico-linguísticas eram fatores
determinantes não apenas nas
universidades em que eram aceitos e
nas ofertas de emprego que
recebiam, como também onde
viviam. Numa sociedade técnicocientífica, onde a natureza havia sido
superada e a mudança climática era
coisa do passado, ter orientação
científica, ou ser uma pessoa “dos
números”, nas palavras de Atwood,
era realmente rentável. Como os
complexos era espaços movidos pela
ciência, os melhores cientistas
tinham os melhores empregos e
viviam nos melhores complexos. A
busca por “mais e melhor” levava a
diferentes mudanças de casa e
determinava quão contingente as
relações eram: “Kids came and went,
desks filled and emptied, friendship
was always contingent” (Atwood,
2003, 71). Por trás de toda
cientificidade, no entanto, estava o
grande catalista da mudança social:
dinheiro.
Interesses científicos e de pesquisa
não existiam em si próprios, entretanto.
O romance não apresenta um conto da
ciência enquanto um fim em si próprio;
muito pelo contrário, interesses
científicos eram circunstanciais, mais
baseados na demanda que na natureza
investigativa. A ciência era apenas
uma commodity, e uma bem
lucrativa, é necessário acrescentar.
A divisão entre pessoas “dos
números” e “das palavras,” ou em

termos gerais, entre ciência e
humanidades, pode ser entendida
como Stephen Dunning compreendeu
enquanto uma forma de extrapolar a
divisão dos campos de estudos e
alertar contra as suas consequências.
Oryx e Crake seria, assim, um conto
preventivo sobre os perigos de se
conceber o conhecimento cientifico
sem levar em consideração as
preocupações humanas. As questões
humanas
deveriam
mediar
o
conhecimento científico, deveriam
frear a ambição por “mais e melhor.” A
ambição por mais dinheiro?
Crake representa a divisão clara
entre os diferentes campos de saber:
“His clothes were dark in tone, devoid
of logos and visuals and written commentary—a no-name look” (Atwood
2003, 72). Até em sua escolha de
roupas Crake revela sua falta de
afinidade com as palavras. O visual
lacônico de Crake pode ser lido como
uma
metáfora
para
o
seu
comportamento com o mundo. As
roupas deveriam ser roupas e nada
mais, deveriam apenas servir para
cobrir seu corpo. Tudo existia por uma
razão, conforme Crake: “Crake is a
biological determinist, believing also
in a logical biology, a biologic of sense.
Art, for instance, exists for a purely
biological function” (Crooke 2006, 77).
A arte servia um propósito, assim
como as palavras, apenas isso.
Apesar de Jimmy ser o exemplo
clássico de uma pessoa “das palavras,”
ambos amigos era mais parecidos do
que era de se esperar. Ser uma pessoa
“dos números” ou “das palavras” não
implicava serem opostos, significava,
contudo, ocupar diferentes espaços
murados: “There had been something
willed about it though, his ignorance.
Or not willed, exactly: structured. He’d
grown up in walled spaces, and then
he had become one. He had shut
things out” (Atwood 2003, 184). Jimmy
expulsava, calava as coisas, assim
como Crake, ou até mesmo os
complexos. Há diferentes níveis, assim,
de expulsão de coisas no romance.
Conforme mencionado, através dos
personagens, espaços, linhas, estórias,
o romance mostra a sua obsessão com
fronteiras, limites, limitações. Cuidado

com a arte, diz Crake, estabelecendo
outro limite para os pós-humanos, “As
crianças de Crake.” Mas por que a arte,
Crake, pergunto?
Ao longo do romance, Snowman
luta com a linguagem. Há o
sentimento de que a linguagem está
escapando de si, de pouco em pouco.
Ele esquece as palavras, seus sentidos:
“Hang on to the words,” he tells
himself. The odd words, the old words,
the rare ones. Valence. Norn.
Serendipity.
Pibroch.
Lubricious.
When they’re gone out of his head,
these words, they’ll be gone,
everywhere, forever. As if they had
never been” (Atwood 2003, 68). Mas
por que as palavras antigas, Snowman?
Como Snowman acredita ser o
ultimo homem vivo, algumas palavras
existem apenas em sua mente. São os
resquícios de um modo de vida
passado, de um tipo de humano
antigo. Palavras raras, antigas, assim
como ele, um raro ser humano, tão
diferente da beleza aperfeiçoada das
“crianças de Crake.” Assim que morrer,
a vida humana como tal desaparecerá
para sempre, e o mesmo se diz da
linguagem. Os humanos aperfeiçoados
de Crake ainda usam a linguagem para
se comunicar mas não conheciam a
malícia: “but these people didn’t go in
for fancy language: they hadn’t been
taught evasion, euphemism, lilygilding. In speech they were plain and
blunt” (Atwood 2003, 348). Seu uso da
língua era mais prático, diário, literal.
Por que teriam que recorrer a um
conceito tal como acaso, tão distante
de suas preocupações diárias, tão
distante de sua nova realidade? A
linguagem de Snowman referia a um
tipo de experiência passada: “I used to
be erudite,” he says out loud. Erudite.
A hopeless word. What are all those
things he once thought he knew, and
where have they gone? (Atwood 2003,
148). Fora dos complexos, entretanto,
além do mundo murado, das
experiências muradas, do mundo
fechado
do
conhecimento
estabelecido, além da soberania do
sujeito, o saber sabido não dava conta
desse novo mundo. As palavras
esvanecem, perdem sua solidez,
tornam-se, de uma hora para outra,
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insuficientes; de repente, a sabedoria
se transforma em tolice, tal como
Raphael imaginara. Assim que a
fronteira
é
ultrapassada,
o
conhecimento,
as
palavras,
os
conceitos, tornam-se escorregadios,
contingentes, vazios.
Há outra dimensão para as
questões de Snowman. Após o mundo
ao seu redor se alterar, ele tenta ainda
se ater ao familiar, como se tentasse
compensar a perda de controle. Ele
sempre fora uma pessoa “das palavras,”
alguém que achou seu espaço no
mundo científico através de sua
habilidade linguística. A publicidade
fora a sua saída. A publicidade,
entretanto, implicava uma relação
específica com as palavras: “Reading a
poem introduces some wiggle room
between ideas and ways of having
them. Propaganda closes this space
down” (Morton 2018, 30). As palavras,
assim, estariam à disposição de Jimmy.
A atitude de Jimmy, segurando as
palavras, fazendo-as significar o que
queria, mandando nelas (nas palavras),
assemelha-se à atitude de Crake com
relação ao mundo. Pessoas de números
ou de palavras são mais parecidas que
esperado. E conforme Timothy Morton
nos alerta, “It’s not what you think but
how you think that starts World War
III” (Morton 2018, 33). Não o que se
pensa—questões
científicas
ou
humanas—mas como se pensa. Em
Oryx e Crake, a ciência cumpria um
propósito, assim como as palavras. É,
então, a apoteose do dualismo sujeitoobjeto, o desaparecimento de um
mundo onde tudo que podia era
objetivado. Comodificação pura e
simples. E quando os muros entre o
mundo
humano
perfeitamente
construído e o mundo em volta racha,
quando os humanos perdem o
controle de um mundo que não pode
mais ser programado, previsto, as
palavras falham. È a experiência
inimaginável?
Supera
as
nossas
habilidades humanas de compreensão?
Virou a sabedoria tolice?
Somente o desejo humano de
parar o tempo, Crake nos alerta, mas
que tempo, pergunto, de quem?
Paradice Project de Crake e sua
tentativa de negar aos pós-humanos, à

nova raça recém-criada, a consciência
da morte é uma forma quase muito
literal de reverter a queda do homem.
A nova raça seria mantida nessa
inocência eterna, vivendo uma vida
mais ecológica. É também a tentativa
de começar tudo novamente do zero.
Mas “Everything emits time, not
just humans” (Morton 2018, 77). Então
de que tempo se fala, pergunto? Toda
a experiência do tempo, Crake diria.
Em nenhum momento os não
humanos entram na conta de Crake.
Suas temporalidades nunca foram
reconhecidas. E quando os desastres
ambientais
atingiram
o
globo,
modificando a vida tal como era
conhecida, o mundo não humano
continuou
a
ser
excluído.
A
humanidade achou um jeito de banir
os
não
humanos,
negar-lhes
temporalidade, de parar o tempo. Os
complexos, assim, funcionavam como
uma forma de evitar a consciência
ecológica: “Ecological awareness is
shaking our faith in the anthropocentric idea that there is one scale to rule
them all—the human one” (Morton
2018, 22). A medida humana
continuou a ser a regra até que a
escassez de espaço-tempo fora tanta
que a negação não era mais possível.
Espaço e tempo, as duas condições a
priori da sensibilidade humana se
mostraram condicionadas no fim das
contas. “This is one of the ways, and
not the least important, in which it
can be said that our world has ceased
to be Kantian” (Danowski and Viveiros
de Castro 2017, 9). Os homens se
revelaram
incapazes
de
serem
elevados para além da ordem
fenomenológica e da causalidade. Eles
não eram os legisladores da natureza,
no fim das contas, mas estavam sim
presos
fenomenologicamente
e
condicionados tanto pelos mundos
humano quanto não humano: “You
aren’t outside the biosphere looking
in. You are glued to the biosphere phenomenologically” (Morton 2018, 41).
As fronteiras não foram suficientes,
pois. Eram mais porosas que o
esperado. Crake, entretanto, ao invés
de aceitar a porosidade das fronteiras,
ao invés de reconhecer o mundo não
humano, decidiu dar fim à vida

humana tal como conhecida, voltar ao
início, porém, com uma mudança. O
começar
do
zero
era
ainda
condicionado: “Watch out for art,
Crake used to say. As soon as they
start doing art, we’re in trouble. Symbolic thinking of any kind would signal downfall, in Crake’s view” (Atwood
2003, 361).
A arte determinava o sucesso ou
o fracasso do projeto. O voo da
imaginação não tem limites, Raphael
alertou a Adão, não conhece
fronteiras,
podemos
inferir.
A
imaginação
traz
visibilidade
à
dimensão
invisível,
estabelece
conexões não aparentes. Raphael
iguala a mente à imaginação, como se
fossem as duas uma só, como se
compartilhassem de características
similares. O voo da imaginação não
tinha limites, assim como não tinha o
da mente. Lúcifer concordaria: a
mente era seu próprio lugar, tinha o
poder de alterar o espaço e o tempo, o
poder de ser um espaço de resistência.
Para Lúcifer, a mente se tornara
símbolo de liberdade. Como se libertar
do decreto divino? Através da mente.
Lúcifer se tornara, assim, sujeito:
He is a “subject” in our contemporary
theoretical
sense
(the
“humanist subject”), and certainly
his troubled “I” is prominent in
the poem. But he is a “subject”
also in the more literal, root sense
of the term (sub iectus, thrown
under): he discovers at the moment of his rebellion just what it
means to be subject to God. Subjection is the origin of his subjectivity.
(Forsyth
2003,
150)
Sua busca pela liberdade, pelo
incondicionado, é a origem de sua
subjetividade. Então, a nova raça, “as
crianças de Crake” poderia ter chance
apenas se a subjetividade não
emergisse? Se o princípio por trás da
ideia da Modernidade, como Hegel
afirma, não norteasse o progresso da
humanidade? O problema não é o que
se pensa, diria Timothy Morton, mas
como se pensa.
Snowman descobre que os
Crakers, apesar da tentativa de Crake
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de eliminar qualquer pensamento
simbólico, o ponto G do cérebro como
chamava, têm curiosidade de saber
sobre suas origens, são ansiosos por
criar narrativas: “They’re up to
something though, something Crake
didn’t anticipate: they’re conversing
with the invisible, they’re developing
reverence” (Atwood 2003, 157); cantar
e sonhar não eram as únicas
programações
humanas.
O
pensamento simbólico parece ser
parte da natureza humana. A queda
humana novamente? Hora zero,
Snowman nos avisa.
Mas, e se a subjetividade
permitisse uma nova experiência?
Uma na qual espaços murados não
fossem a realidade e a exclusão não
fosse a norma? E se não deixarmos
nada passar, como Isabelle Stengers
sugere que façamos (Stengers 2015,
143)? E se aceitássemos total
responsabilidade pela realidade de
nossas abstrações? E se amássemos
nossos monstros?
Cuidado com a arte, Crake diz.
Não há como negar que o pensamento
abstrato,
simbólico
permite
apropriação, ao eliminar qualquer
escala que não seja a humana. Mas não
haveria outro lado? A experiência
estética implica solidariedade com o
que não é humano, Timothy Morton
responderia, cuidado por algo que não
é um ser humano. Ademais, a beleza é
indiferente ao sujeito. A experiência
estética poderia, devido a sua
estranheza (Morton 2018, 65), nos
prover com um pouco de estranheza
(familiaridade não-familiar) necessária
para destronar a soberania do sujeito:
“this feeling of openness, this uncanny
sensation of finding ourselves somewhere and not recognizing it, is exactly a glimpse of living less definitively,
in a world comprised almost entirely
not of ourselves” (Morton 2018, 26).
Viver menos definitivamente seria a
chave, então?
“É hora zero,” diz Snowman. É
hora de ir.
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This article is based on a workshop I presented at the 2018 Big History International Conference
in Philadelphia, where I addressed findings from my recently completed PhD thesis: An Tairseach (threshold): An exploration of connecting the emerging scientific story of the universe to
authentic Catholic primary school environmental education. My research investigated the extent
to which students’ environmental values could be informed through integrating story, values,
environmental education, personal cultural origins, and Big History into the primary school
curriculum. The methodology focused on employing Big History as a vehicle to achieve a cohesive, wider worldview for young learners, empowering them to engage in transformative thinking for the future. Semi-structured interviews were conducted along with a 17-week Big History
pedagogical program with 8-9 year old students and their teacher. Qualitative analysis of these
interviews indicated that primary students1 could successfully access a shared, evidence-based
and flexible narrative. Five interdependent themes emerged: ‘shared vocabulary and knowledge
of Big History’ were foundational in allowing students to engage in meaningful discussions,
alongside their knowledge of their ‘local cultural origin stories,’ ‘local school values,’
‘transdisciplinary learning’ and ‘environmental values within socioecological learning.’ The findings have wider implications for the Big History collective, providing evidence that Big History
is accessible and relevant to primary students within a transdisciplinary based and critical inquiry-learning structure.

1

Primary education is the term used in Australian schools to describe schooling for 5-11-year-old students.
In this particular article the term more particularly pertains to middle primary years (8-10-year-old students).
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education, linking environmental values

tric thinking could be transcended by Big

to Sterling’s understanding of whole-

History to broader, transdisciplinary so-

systems thinking (2003, 2011, 2016), and

cioecological thinking, thus empowering

curriculum theory (see Pinar 2012; Wraga

students

The emphasis on transdisciplinary
learning is also in keeping with Big History’s storyline that transverses multiple
disciplines. In the words of Christian
(2011),

humani-

& Hlebowitsh 2003). In underpinning

worldview. Further, such thinking trans-

transdisciplinary learning in socioecolog-

modern society that despite having

cends and is inclusive of local cultural

ical education, students in this study

access to more hard information than

norms, which, in the setting of my re-

were empowered to incorporate an un-

any earlier society, those in modern

search, involves Catholic education val-

derstanding of the changing deep-time

educational systems…teach

ues.

universe metanarrative, with the inter-

ments. We seem incapable of offering
a unified account of how things came
to be in the way they are. (2)
The story thread weaves through my
research to converge logic, faith, and
values in both secular and Catholic
writing (Benjamin 2009, 5). In a radio
interview, David Suzuki (ABC Radio
National 2016 at 39.00 mins.) articulated
a similar inclusive view:
I've been an atheist all my life. . .

whole-

our

systems

(our) origins in disconnected frag-

a

of

It is one of the many odd features of

about

with

condition

connected interrelationships of ecologi-

Theoretical framing
Alice replied, rather shyly, "… I knew
who I was when I got up this morning, but I think I must have been
changed

several

times

since

then.” (Carroll 1886, Chapter 5)
Narrative, when viewed from an environmental

education

perspective,

“fundamentally alters our relation to the
world, our relation to others, and our
relation to our humanity. . . . It intertwines the condition of the world with

Laudato Si (Francis I 2015) is a mag-

cal, social, economic, and holistic perspectives of socioecological education
(Berry & Swimme 1992; Bowers 1994;
Catholic Earthcare Australia 2013, 2017;
Johnson & Duberley 2000; Wallette &
Edgren 2013).
Figure 1 below illustrates my
framing, centered on values where
Environmental and Religious Education informed and were informed by
a broader transdisciplinary educational model of curriculum theory

nificent document and I regret
that'we' (environmentalists) didn't
write it first, but what he (Pope Francis 1) has done is take issues of social
justice, hunger and poverty and the
environment and he's never split them
into silos—they're all together.
The above document correlated with
Suzuki’s own vision for the future of the
environment where a whole-systems
approach embraces social justice, hunger, poverty, and the environment, rather
than being viewed in the silos of our own
limited cultural worldviews (Sterling,
2011). Snaza and Weaver (2015) request
that education “call into question the
entirety of the discipline structure” and

Figure 1. An Tairseach: A framework for transforming our story
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and systems theory. In this frame-
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Designing the story: Methodology
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and Method
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whole-systems thinking (see Bur-

Humpty Dumpty advises Alice:

ment of the chosen overarching the-
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It would be just as well if you’d
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al. 2010, 2013). Figure 1 incorporates
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from the perspectives of transdisci-

my framing of opportunities for

next, as I suppose you don’t

plinary and whole-systems thinking

growth in learning. It merges both

mean to stop here all the rest of

(see Lewis & Baudains 2007; Sterling

the Catholic environmental termi-

your life. (Carroll 1872, Chapter

2003).

nology (ecological awareness, eco-

6)

The setting was a third grade

logical consciousness, and possibil-

My next steps revolved around

classroom of thirty students in a

ity for ecological conversion), along-

an action-based methodology, with-

Catholic primary school. It involved

side Sterling’s theory (2011, 25) of

in whole systems thinking, to devel-

fifteen eight to nine-year-old stu-

conformative learning (‘doing things

op a qualitative, interpretative, and

dents and their teacher. The posi-

better’),

learning

participatory research design. The

tive learning environment encour-

(‘doing better things’), and the pos-

action research took place within a

aged child-framed learning opportu-

sibility of transformative learning

child-framed ethnographic and cy-

nities (see Spyrou 2011; Kellett 2010)

to

reformative

Figure 2.
Method: data collection and analysis.
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based on a shared understanding

tions added to the rich data collect-

but rather fed into and informed

with students that both the class-

ed during the visible learning peda-

each other, as represented in an

room teacher and I as researcher

gogical intervention (see Hattie,

adaptation

were lead-learners in the classroom.

2013).

framework (2003, 2011, 2016) in Fig-

The methods consisted of six
semi-structured interviews of three

Analysis of Data
“Alice asked, ‘Would you tell

during, and after the implementa-

me, please, which way I ought to go

tion of a Big History pedagogical

from here?’” “’That depends a good

program.

principally

deal on where you want to get to,’

gathered from the semi-structured

said the Cat.” (Carroll 1872, Chapter

interviews and were inclusive of

6) My research question and data

evidence contained in student writ-

analysis directed me toward five

ing. Researcher journal observa-

themes that were not seen as linear

were

Sterling’s

nesting

ure 3 below.

to four students, conducted before,

Data

of

Figure 3.
Extending the storyline: nesting themes
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Nesting the Findings
I present the following findings
through my own reflective interpretations

of

the

analysis,

along-

side the authenticity of class teacher and students’ voices as my co-researchers.

THEME 1. KNOWLEDGE:
The extent the emerging story of the universe, taught through the vehicle of Big History, contributed to informing students’ critical knowledge
Justification for the emphasis on teaching explicit knowledge and vocabulary of Big History became evident as students’ learning in the pedagogical intervention progressed. The following two interview excerpts were recorded before
students’ Big History learning. As can be noted, students voiced a variation in the depth of knowledge and vocabulary, but
both interview extracts display the lack of a cohesive understanding of the universe timeline.
Researcher:

Do you think you know everything there is about the universe?

Mia:

I reckon a bit more.

Aaron:

A bit more.

Indi:

I know all about it.
(Pre-pedagogical interviews, 29-30 June 2016)

Aidan:

The universe has a lot of planets, all the planets, and it holds stars and no oxygen.

Aidan:

No gravity, no oxygen.

Jack:

Because gravity is oxygen, if there is no gravity, there is no oxygen.

Aidan:

Yup. That’s definitely correct. I agree with him 100%.

Jack:

I think I know what the Big Bang is. I think it is when all the planets were together. I have seen on
some commercial that they said all the planets were like one big planet and maybe the Big Bang was
when they exploded into the planets.
(Pre-pedagogical interviews, 29-30 June 2016)

In comparison, the evidence in the following excerpt, from a post-pedagogical intervention interview, validates students’ growth in knowledge and use of appropriate vocabulary while also enabling student initiated inquiry.
Aidan:

Researcher:

DNA is in many things. It can be in my blood and when the zipper opens, sometimes it can't make
the exact same DNA parts so it's slightly different, but they're not really different. That's how everyone looks different.
Are there any words you now know?

Jack:

Astronomy, astronomer, scientist, archaeologist, … origin story, history

Aaron:

Goldilocks conditions

Researcher:

What does that mean for Big History?

Jack:

Just right. . . . Thresholds [looking very pleased with his answer].

Aidan:

Claim testers . . . to learn about what to ask the experts and knowledge and evidence but in scientific
language.
Intuition, gut feeling

Theo:

Light years

Jack:

Authority
(Fourth pedagogical interview, 17 October 2016)

The latter excerpt shows the students accessing and confidently sharing their common learning. Aaron, in particular, previously had been reticent to join in with routine class discussions, but in this case, was empowered with his newly learnt
Big History knowledge and vocabulary.
The critical importance of informing students’ knowledge created a meaningful platform for informed, child-framed
discussions in student interviews as revealed in the next excerpts.
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Mia:

It's [zipper is] an example where DNA just keeps on splitting and splitting and splitting . . .

Researcher:

What happens every time it splits?

Mia:

It makes more DNA.

Aidan:

DNA is in many things. It can be in my blood and when the zipper opens, sometimes it can't make
the exact same DNA parts so it's slightly different, but they're not really different. That's how everyone looks different.
(Fourth pedagogical interview, 17 October 2016)

Researcher:

Why is DNA part of our human story?

Charlie:

Charlie:

It's like collective learning ... The scientist tells people and then they pass it on and pass it on and
then pass it on.
I used to wonder about stuff. . . . Now I know everything that I wondered about. I wondered when
the world was created: 13.8 billion years ago!
I didn't know that the stars gave elements to us . . .

Georgia:

I didn't even know there were elements.

Georgia:

(Fourth pedagogical interview, 17 October 2016)
As the teaching and learning program progressed, students used their knowledge base to express their understanding
of the evolving universe story. The analysed data verified that students accessed increasingly complex knowledge and common vocabulary through successive Big History thresholds.
Molly:
Gabby:

If we didn’t have Threshold 1, we wouldn't have anything because the world has started up as one
little tiny cell . . . and some elements and the gravity fused them together to make bigger elements.
As Molly said, if we didn't have Threshold 1, there wouldn't be Threshold 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. There
would be no gravity; there would be no space; there would be no time. Nothing would be fusing: no
stars; it would just be all dark, and nothing.
(Post-pedagogical interviews, 15 November 2016)

The synthesis of that knowledge into a wider worldview opened the possibility of transformative environmental education
learning. When comparing the following two excerpts, it is apparent by the second interview that Imogen’s use of ‘we’ has
not only highlighted a growth in knowledge but also transformed her thinking of nature and humans as interrelated.
Excerpt 1:
Researcher:

. . . Are humans animals then?

Imogen:

Yeah, no.

Imogen:

Animals belong with nature, so they’re kind of nature and at the same time they're not. They kind of
blend.

Molly:

In the middle, nature, not nature, in the middle of that.
(Pre-pedagogical interviews, 29-30 June 2016)
Excerpt 2:

Georgia:

. . [W]e started off in the ocean.

Imogen:

Yes and bacteria. And cells . . . started off as one cell—that surprised me. We started off as like
one cell like bacteria in the deep oceans. I thought we started out as like animals. I didn't know.
(Fourth pedagogical interview, 17 October 2016)

Jack likewise, in the last interview, used his Big History knowledge to explain his thinking about the future: “When you
grow up, if there's a new Threshold, you can study it and you can maybe add new information to the other Thresholds.”
The co-researcher teacher emphasised the progression of students’ understanding through the teaching of Big History,
where she noted they were, “. . . applying and using Big History . . . in their writing and responses throughout the Thresholds and in their journals, . . . they’ve got a much deeper understanding.”
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THEME 2. CATHOLIC BELIEF:
The extent that students transferred their prior knowledge of the Catholic teaching on God’s Creation to inform their
emerging knowledge of the story of the universe
The integration of children’s newfound vocabulary into their understanding of the Catholic belief system was integral to embracing the local school culture within the wider worldview interpretation of the emerging Big History narrative.
The limited student perception recorded in pre-pedagogical interviews is in contrast to Catholic literature (Australian Catholic
Social Justice Council (ACSJC) 2002; Francis I 2015; Sydney Catholic Education Office 2012), which calls for the embracing of the
interrelationship of the environment and humans.
Researcher:

. . . Do you know how the Earth began?

Amy:

No. Jesus created it.

Jack:

Yeah, because everything is made up from God.
(Pre-pedagogical interviews, 29-30 June 2016)

The ability of Big History to empower students with a richer worldview within their Catholic traditions was apparent when students’ prior knowledge and appreciation of God’s creation were interpreted within their new knowledge of Big History learning and
environmental education values.
Indi:

How did God get so much power? . . . How did he have such a good idea of building us? I learnt . . .
how God created us and the steps that he used to create us. I think [Threshold one—the big bang] is
important to humans so they know who created them . . . and they understand that God exists.
(First pedagogical interview 1 August 2016)

The growth in students’ Catholic understanding of God as creator was evident in students’ ability to correlate their known Catholic
story and local school’s values framework to the new learning context of the Big History story.
Imogen:
Gabby:

I think Big History is a more amazing story [of God’s creation] . . . . It says what was created, how it
was created, all these big words like agriculture, dioxide ribonucleic acid, and all of that.
God's creation, it's not like it made itself. God made them, and it's like each of the Thresholds is each
of the days. I'm saying that they're both like, both together. . . .

It was reassuring to observe, as the excerpts demonstrate, that students were not disturbed by the scientific evidence that was
presented; rather they readily correlated the evidence into a greater sense of awe and wonder at the grander and more complex
unfolding of God’s creation through the Big History story.
Gabby:

When it was the beginning, it was just black, and there was nothing there except God. Then, everything started to get more complex, and then the stars came, and the planets came, and then they
were all orbiting the sun, and then animals evolved.

Emma:

Researcher:

[The universe] is more complex. I've always been wondering how we were here; since I was really
little, I've been wondering what will happen in the future. Will there be robots or something? How
are we here? How were we made? Who is God?
And did Big History help answer that?

Emma:

Yes (other students agreed)
(Post-pedagogical interviews, 15 November 2016)

The co-researcher teacher commented on students’ ready acceptance of the Big History narrative within their Catholic understanding of God’s creation: that God is essential to the unfolding story.
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THEME 3. VALUES:
The extent that environmental education values, particularly in the context of local school values, were interpreted by
students through the lenses of Big History
The importance of analysing values at the local school level, as discussed by Somekh and Zeichner (2009) and Podger et al.
(2013), was appropriate to apply to the child-framed methodological basis of my research. The students at the research school
were immersed daily in the local values of their school: peace, respect, honesty, justice, empathy, compassion and tolerance. As
evidenced in the following excerpt, they voluntarily connected those values to Big History learning, whilst also including the term
‘sustainable’ in their discussions within the context of student appropriate understanding.
Gabby:
Jack:

Aidan:

I think sustainable is also part of our values, because sustainable . . . we have to be fair, justice, and
it could be like . . . It's like sustainable means like all of our [local school] values.
You might need PRhOJECT LOVE—Love because you need love to take care; you need to respect everyone's ways. ( PRhOJECT LOVE is an acronym for the local school values of the research school—Peace, Respect, hOnesty, Justice, Empathy, Compassion, Tolerance LOVE.)
I think all of the [local school] values because if you have all of them you have a stronger heart and
you can help the environment. . . . You should only use what you need. I would like to make the
world sustainable.
(Post-pedagogical interviews, 15 November 2016)

The data represented the local school values as a pivotal point around which students centred their discussions because the
values were already so deeply embedded in all classes’ daily routines.
Gabby:

We need a sustainable future, and we need all the [local school] values. Big History helped me think
about the future and people.

Both co-researcher teacher’s observations and my journal notes concurred with the advantage of students’ previous knowledge of
local school values and the ensuing enrichment of interpreting those values through the lens of the Big History universe story.
Co-researcherteacher

Now through the Big History programme, [students are] more articulate and they're more able to see
[local school] values apply to the world and the universe . . . how something that happened so long
ago is still something to respect and to value and to love . . . something that's going to happen in the
future.

The above comment validates Dahl’s appeal (2012) to incorporate local vocabulary in articulating values, where the important
learning of the children corroborates applying values to the past, present, and future from the perspective of the cohesive Big History learning story.

THEME 4. TRANSDISCIPLINARY LEARNING:
The extent of impacts on students’ environmental education values
Transdisciplinary learning enriched students’ understanding of environmental education values when nested in the emerging
Big History narrative, their Catholic understanding of God’s Creation, and local school values. In the following child-framed dialogue the children named the limits of learning subjects in ‘silos’ and highlighted their move away from an anthropocentric
worldview.
Jack:

[We are learning Big History] new words . . . so we can speak more like scientists and astronomers

Aidan:

You can learn lots more and it’s part of different subjects—like religion, maths, history, science and
all the other subjects that we know … because you can’t just learn one subject because if you just
learn one subject, when you do a test or when something comes to light that you need to do with
other subjects, you won’t know it and so you should know lots of subjects so then you’ll be ready for
life’s challenges.
(First pedagogical interview, 1 August 2016)

The students’ conversation validates the significance of transdisciplinary skills in Big History learning, leading to the
ability to articulate a wider worldview.
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Students’ broadening worldview away from anthropocentric thinking unfolded through the teaching of a universal story, language, and Big History learning framework. This became apparent as other students also articulated the need for the interconnection of subjects to enable a deep understanding across subject areas.
Molly:

Gabby:

I’m surprised that we have learnt all these difficult science things that a lot of us didn’t really know at
the beginning. . . .
I’m wondering why we are learning, doing this—shouldn’t we do it at Year 6 or university because it’s
really hard stuff to do and maybe we can’t get it all—but we can!
(First pedagogical interview, 1 August 2016)

The co-researcher teacher, likewise, remarked on the learning across disciplines and the opportunities for children of varying academic abilities to engage in inquiry learning at their own level of understanding, where they were empowered to see themselves as
co-learners with the teachers. This is in keeping with cyclical and reflective components of action research as “part of the joy is in
the doing” (McNiff, 2002, p. 17; Mertler 2008, 25).
The nesting of diverse knowledge and transdisciplinary skills of the Big History course were powerful in allowing students to
interconnect and to apply their understanding to the wonder of the universe’s increasing complexity. The extent of the impacts on
students’ environmental education values was discernible in students’ enriched observations, their use of their newly learnt
knowledge from Big History and their known local school values and Catholic teaching.

THEME 5. SOCIOECOLOGICAL LEARNER:
The evidence for conformative, reformative, and transformative socioecological learning process
The fifth interrelated theme from my analysis, the socioecological learner, demonstrated the extent that students’ values were
informed within the conformative, reformative, and transformative socioecological learning process of the emerging Big History
narrative, as illustrated previously in Figure 1. The data representation I collated as central to my research, revolved around the
nesting of the first four themes within this final theme of the socioecological learner. I continued to view each theme not merely as
linear, but as nested in and informing each other. Theo expresses it as “If you would know any [only one] subject then you won’t be
that smart to do anything in science or history or any subjects.”
The lack of a wider worldview, in how we interact with society and the environment, as noted by Snaza and Weaver (2015),
calls into question limited learning that is structured around the human. The evidence I collected is in keeping with the stance Big
History Project promotes (2019), which empowers children to integrate a wide range of academic disciplines that aligns with socioecological learning (Gruenewald 2004; Hart 2012; Kyburz-Graber 2012).
The learning journey began as teacher initiated, but by the end of the intervention children had taken ownership as active
learners with numerous references to themselves as ‘big historians’ during interviews and class activities. Aidan commented on the
last day of school:
Oh, my Big History journal: Big History was my most favourite subject this year. It was awesome and my Mum is going to be
amazed at what I have learnt when I show her this book. She’s going to say, “Good job Aidan. You’ve learnt so much.” I’ve already
told her so much about Big History. I loved Big History. I learnt so much because I didn’t know anything about how the world
was created and how it was so complex.
Aidan’s comments are in keeping with the concept of the socioecological learner and the report of the Australian Education
for Sustainability Alliance Project (2014), which calls for learning that embraces comprehension, complexity, uncertainty, and risk
that can be applied to future sustainability. An empathetic deeper level of learning was expressed by Imogen and Gabby:
Imogen:

Imagine if you were nature, and people were building things on you, and cutting you down. How would
you feel?

Gabby:

I think we should treat the earth as what we want to be treated because if we treat the earth (how) we
want to be treated then we can help the earth and all the animals because the earth is like a human being, it's like us except it doesn't walk. We want to keep the Earth safe so we have to treat the earth how
we want to be treated as well.

An overall finding from the analysis of this theme was that a cohesive deep time story empowered students to embrace past,
present, and future within a shared language and critical inquiry evaluation techniques. They evaluated the implications of our
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past, present, and future, moving away from anthropocentric thinking to critically examining the inclusiveness of all that is human
and nonhuman in the universe. The following excerpt encapsulates the sense that socioecological learning can happen for any student. The insightful response below comes from a child who initially showed little awareness of the interconnectedness of human
and non-human. His simple words echo the Delors Report’s four pillars of learning (1996): learning to know, learning to do, learning to live together, and learning to be.
Aaron:

Big History tells us about stuff that we can't see.

Researcher:

So do we need nature?

Aaron:

We need nature, but nature doesn't need us.

Researcher:

Did you understand why we need nature but nature doesn't need us?

Aaron:

Yeah, because if nature faults, we fault, and if it all collapsed, we collapse.
(Post-pedagogical interviews, 15 November 2016)

Aaron’s observation is in keeping with Sterling’s call (2003, 2008) that conformative and reformative learning, may lead to the possibility of transforming how we perceive whole systems and worldviews (also see Wattchow et al. 2014).
The final rich data feedback from both co-researcher teacher and students is affirmation for the rich and emerging Big History
story that encourages socioecological learners to be informed, and in turn to interpret, local school environmental education values
within a Catholic school setting.
The co-researcher teacher’s observations are significant; as lead–learner she naturally incorporated the newly learnt Big History
terminology and the local school values to express her opinion:
[Students developed] a very good understanding of—you just can't get some more oxygen; you can't get more helium or hydrogen. What happened in the beginning created what we have now, and if we don't care for it now, and if it's not just and fair, and if
we don't respect the environment, then it's going to be gone for the people in the future. If we don't respect each other and respect
the environment, then parts of the environment will disappear.
She believes Big History gives children a more powerful voice to articulate the socioecological aspect of learning in their own childappropriate language, that humans’ relationship with the environment is fragile, and, as such, humans need to play our part for
future sustainability.
Socioecological learning became increasingly evident throughout student interviews in their intertwining of deep-time
knowledge through the lenses of local school values, their learnt Catholic traditions, and transdisciplinary skills and concepts
aligned to the Big History Project.
Conclusion
I conclude with words of wisdom
toward a bigger worldview future from
Alice, students involved in the action
research, Big History, and my research
findings:
Firstly, the Queen’s advice to Alice:
‘‘I can’t believe that!’ said Alice.
‘Can’t you?’ the Queen said in a
pitying voice. ‘Try again: draw a
long breath, and shut your eyes.’
Alice laughed. ‘There’s no use
trying,’ she said: ‘one can’t believe
impossible things.’
‘I daresay you haven’t had much
practice,’ said the Queen. ‘When I
was your age, I always did it for
half-an-hour
a
day.
Why,
sometimes I’ve believed as many as
six impossible things before
breakfast.’ (Carroll 1872 Chapter 5)

Synthesising the five theme
Like Alice, I needed to take the
Queen’s advice to correlate the extensive
findings from my data analysis. Among
the most pertinent was the verification
that environmental education is all the
richer when teachers and students are
empowered with a narrative that embraces a wider worldview, encompassing
sociological learning. Most importantly
the cohesive Big History story enables
students to understand the interconnectedness of the evolution of human
life within the history of the universe.
This knowledge allows them to critique
environmental actions being discussed,
alongside an underlying joint responsibility to take care of the Earth and the
understanding that everything AND everyone is interconnected from a rich values perspective.
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Big History learning empowers
students to reflect critically on and evaluate their worldviews from a childframed perspective, which relates to my
methods reference to Spyrou (2011) and
Kellett (2010), who promote the place of
children in education as critical reflective
thinkers. The students’ immersion in the
cohesive story of Big History learning
enables them to express confidence in
their new, shared knowledge and to articulate a growing sensitivity to and awe
of their own interconnection and interdependence as socioecological learners.
My research shows that 8-9 year old students easily transferred the emerging
scientific story of the universe of the past
and present to inform both their local
school and environmental values for
deeper future thinking. The following
written student comments at the conclusion of the pedagogical intervention

school and environmental values for
deeper future thinking. The following
written student comments at the conclusion of the pedagogical intervention uphold my conclusion:
I can tell my family things they didn’t
know. . . . I’m a Big Historian now! :)
[sic]. . . . It’s fun and interesting! We
need to know about evolution and
elements because we need to know
where we came from.
I know all the thresholds now and
some people can’t learn Big History,
so I am very grateful; and I think we
should now teach everyone. . . . and
we should use these thresholds to care
for our future environment to make a
better universe.
Employing Big History as a teaching
vehicle for the scientific universe story
achieves a cohesive, wider worldview for
primary-aged learners, empowering them
to engage in transformative, socioecological thinking for the future. These significant findings have wider implications for
systems-wide education and curricula
development, providing evidence that
Big History is accessible and relevant to
primary-aged students where environmental education is not taught as a silo
discipline but as a transdisciplinary-based
and socioecological learning structure.
The child-framed pedagogical intervention empowered students with a
common learning platform to connect
the new knowledge they had gained from
Big History within the lenses of their embedded Catholic traditions and local
school values. Building on this substantial foundation the transdisciplinary and
socioecological learning inspired students to critically reflect on their environmental values and query their previous
assumptions of sustainability.
In light of the findings presented,
there is clear evidence of students’ sharing story and knowledge of the universe
to inquire critically and evaluate their
learning, not merely to promote a cause
(see Scott 2009). The evidence presented
is heartening at a crucial time when we
need our students’ learning to incorporate informed and shared values within a
post-humanist environment for a better
future for everyone and everything.

Limitations
A clear benefit of my research
demonstrates that knowledge of a cohesive and interconnected history of our
universe empowers primary-aged socioecological learners to inquire critically
beyond anthropocentric models of learning and to embrace an emerging postanthropocentric future.
The lack of a recognised, evidencebased, and systemic educational framework and affirmation of Big History as a
valued learning framework in the primary school made it difficult for me to have
my research acknowledged by both Catholic education and state education authorities. I approached many schools
before my research was seen in the light
of authentic and relevant education. The
reticence of some schools was articulated
as not wanting to counter the perceived,
conservative beliefs of school communities. In the case of Catholic schooling, I
produced official Catholic documentation to counteract that concern, particularly Pope Francis I’s latest official document on caring for our Earth (Francis I
2015). In hindsight this may have been
overcome by holding a pre-research
whole-staff discussion to validate the
educational worth of my project. No objections from parents arose to teaching
the Big History course to the class before
or during the intervention, which was a
positive sign.
Recommendations for future
research
Once more Alice found herself in the
long hall and close to the little glass
table. Taking the little golden key, she
unlocked the door that led (back) into
the garden. (Carroll, 1886 Chapter 3)
The findings from my research are
an initial validation that teaching Big
History to primary-aged students empowers socioecological learning, informs
known values, and invites the possibility
of transforming student worldviews to an
understanding of human and nonhuman
interrelationships and interdependence.
As this is an initial study at a doctoral level into teaching the cohesive Big
History story in primary education, the
holistic and nested nature of the inquiry
alludes to a breadth of future directions;
however, I outline below the areas that I
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have identified as significant.
Implications from this research indicate that researchers and educators in
teacher education and primary schooling
need to be provided with educational
models to empower them to use Big History effectively, in line with transdisciplinary learning that is already embedded in
contemporary curricula. Future research
requires further qualitative and quantitative studies into teaching the universe
story that examine how success is managed and maintained throughout a student’s primary schooling years, alongside
the extent that children’s environmental
values are transient or long lasting. Macquarie University Big History School Project (2019) is worthy of ongoing postgraduate research as it promotes a supportive and holistic primary and secondary education curriculum. Such embedded support networks that are authentic
to critical enquiry learning would ensure
that the socioecological learner, not the
Anthropocene, is at the heart of the
teaching and learning.
Significantly, I address unfounded
concerns that Catholic schools may not
be mandated to teach within a Big History-based scientific model. Student responses from my research provide evidence that students were empowered to
further their understanding of sustainability threaded throughout the curriculum. They learnt an enriched worldview
of amazing awe and wonder of what God
has created, alongside the values needed
for a sustainable world.
My research has broken new
ground into adding original, significant
literature to environmental education
research beyond Catholic education.
Clear evidence exists that my study raises
significant issues requiring innovative
address by all primary schooling systems.
Environmental education is significantly
enriched when viewed from the perspective of a shared universe story, inclusive
of transdisciplinary socioecological learning perspectives.
The emerging scientific story of the
universe is a story of the past and present
informing the future through socioecological learning where action requires
love, understanding and, equally as important, cohesively taught critical

knowledge as emphasised in the following quotation:
It is essential to seek comprehensive
solutions which consider the interactions within natural systems themselves and with social systems. . . .
We lack an awareness of our common origin, of our mutual belonging,
and of a future to be shared. A great
cultural, spiritual and educational
challenge stands before us, and it will
demand that we set out on the long
path of renewal. (Francis I 2015, 139 202)
The words of Pope Francis summarise my new-found hopes stemming from
this research: that Catholic primary
school education systems, and education
broadly, take up the challenge to evaluate
critically the teaching of a cohesive and
interconnected history of our universe.
Wider implications from this research open up opportunities for critical
inquiry beyond anthropocentric models
of learning. The evidence clearly indicates that the deep-time framework of
Big History is accessible and relevant to
primary-aged students. The research
findings were significant in the context of
child-framed deep learning pedagogy
that informs environmental values for
current and future learning. If educators
are truly to comprehend the importance
that values play in transdisciplinary, socioecological learning, then our universal
deep-time story needs to be embedded at
all levels of the education continuum,
inclusive of primary-aged students. Figure 4 captures my post-anthropocentric
vision, where all education encompasses
our learning toward the many questions
of our unknown future.
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Abstract: Big History involves a variety of sizes from the atomic nucleus to the size of the universe. How can we make
sense of this? A popular video (Eames 1977) about the power of 10 took a “picture” for every factor of 10 in distance with
over 40 “stops” from a nucleus (not even the smallest distance we can talk about) to the edge of the universe. Instead, we
will explore just nine steps in distances of things we know about: the atomic nucleus, the atom, a bacterium, a human, the
Earth, the distance to the sun, the distance to the closest star, the size of the galaxy, and the size of the universe. Quite
amazingly, many of these distances can be estimated with only a few fundamental physics constants. Also, the ratio of the
distances of the larger to the next smaller is about the same (with some exceptions): about 150,000. How can this factor of
150,000 be visualized? It is about the ratio of a commercial jet’s height compared to your palm, or, using the American
standard unit of a football field, the smaller distance would be about 1/32 of an inch.
Introduction
Besides the different time scales
in Big History, quite a range also exists
in sizes of objects involved in Big History. The time range includes the billions of years of the universe, stars, and
planets; millions of years for species;
thousands of years for historical processes; generations for humans and
technology development; and seconds
for DNA replication, thoughts, and
computer calculations. The size scales
cover the range of the universe as a
whole to the atomic nucleus.
While one might think that there
are so many physical phenomena involved in determining these sizes, any
systematic discussion about this range
would involve innumerous details and
inputs from a range of fields. Instead,
many in the late 1970s (e.g., Carr and
Rees 1979; Press and Lightman 1983)
explored these size relationships to
uncover estimates that were based surprisingly on just a few constants and a
few physical phenomena constraining

the environments in which the objects
would occur. Here those relationships
are reviewed, and actual distances are
compared: nine of the fundamental
distances in Big History follow a pattern with a ratio of the sizes being
about 150,000.
The path starts with the relationship between the atom and the size of
the universe. Then intermediate sizes
follow along with the smaller size of
the proton.
Size of an Atom
The first distance to discuss is the
size of an atom. While quantum mechanics may give details, the size can
be estimated based on the need to balance the attraction between the charges of the electron and proton with the
energy caused by the uncertainty principle. That is, as the negatively charged
electron attempts to move closer to the
positively charged proton, its velocity
and momentum increase, but the
product of uncertainty in distance and
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momentum remains constant (related
to the Planck constant, P). This leads
to a simple estimate of the size of an
atom, which is denoted as ‘a’. With the
mass of the electron being m, and the
charge of the electron C, then balancing the energy leads to the estimate of
(PC)2/m, which gives about 10-10 meters
(about a tenth of a nanometer). For
reference, DNA is about one nanometer wide and the transistors in your
computer or smartphone are about
fifteen nanometers wide.
Many of the remaining distances
can then be expressed as the product
of this fundamental distance and some
powers of two unitless parameters, G
and A. The first (G) is just the ratio of
the electromagnetic and gravitational
forces between two protons (any distance). This has a numerical value of
about 5x10-39. The second (A) is called
the electromagnetic fine structure constant (C2/(Pc), where c is the speed of
light), which is numerically equal to
about 1/137, or 0.0073. This is related to

the maximum charge of 137 protons in
an atomic nucleus. (So far the highest
charged nucleus has 118 protons and
the highest natural nucleus is uranium
with 92 protons.) The square of this
parameter is the fraction of energy in
the bound hydrogen atom compared
to the mass-energy of the electron,
mc2. This energy can be estimated in a
way similar to how the distance was
derived in the paragraph above.
Size of the Universe
Now jump to consider the other
end of the size spectrum, the size of
the universe. To simplify matters, let B
represent the ratio A/G, which is
about 1.5x1036. Then, the size of the
universe is about this many atomic
distances (‘a’ from above), i.e., size of
the universe (U) = Ba, which is about
15 billion light years, i.e., the distance
light would travel from the beginning
of the universe. However, since the
universe has been expanding, the true
size of the observable universe is
about six times this distance. How is
this simple formula derived, especially
since the size of the universe changes
with time (from a point in the Big
Bang to the current size)? The derivation of this relationship requires an
additional assumption that enough
time had passed for the universe to
generate enough carbon (and other
elements) to make planets and life.
Hence, this is really an estimate of the
size of the universe when conditions
are ready for life with many generations of stars.
Size of Galaxies
Making
other
assumptions
(discussed below) about the conditions necessary for the formation of
galaxies and planets leads to an estimated typical galaxy size of about A2U.
This shows that the size of galaxies
relative to the universe is about the
same fraction (0.005%) of the energy
in the hydrogen atom compared to the
electron mass-energy. This estimated
galactic size is about four times larger
than the size of the Milky Way (150,000
light-years), which is quite accurate, considering the simplicity of the estimate
and the variability in galactic sizes.
The necessary assumptions con-

sider the relative rates of cooling and
gravitational condensation of a cloud
of mostly hydrogen and helium gases
that existed about a billion years after
the Big Bang. As these clouds begin to
condense because of gravity, this gravitational energy is converted to heat,
which must be expelled from the
clouds to maintain the condensation.
If it is not expelled quickly enough,
the pressure builds up and the gravitational force is canceled by the pressure. Much of the cooling is done
through ionization of hydrogen, which
is dependent on the energy of ionization that can be estimated from the
size of the atom (as above). The largest
mass at which this cooling mechanism
works gives a galactic mass of about a
trillion solar masses. Further discussion of this process and its relationships to other Big History eras can be
found in a recent paper by Grinin and
Grinin (2019).
Distance to Nearest Star
As these galaxies form from cloud
collapse and merging of smaller galaxies, a net rotation of the stars around a
common center can occur. The rotation tends to flatten out a galaxy just
as a clump of pizza dough takes its
shape as the baker throws it in the air
with a good spin (similar to the way
planets orbit around the sun in a disk).
The mass of a typical star can be estimated based on the physics of nuclear
reactions. This is done by balancing
the thermal pressure from the nuclear
fusion reactions in the star’s core with
the weight of the outer part of the star
pushing in because of gravity. This
estimation requires knowledge of very
many fundamental aspects of physics
including gravity, electromagnetism,
both the strong and weak force, along
with thermodynamics and quantum
mechanics (as protons react through
quantum “tunneling”).
By knowing the mass of a typical
star and galaxy, the number of stars
can be estimated. Combining this
with the disk size of the galaxy (as
found above), an estimate for a typical
distance between stars in a galaxy can
be found. Note that in nature are
many different types of galaxies and
within each galaxy are different types
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of stellar environments such as the
crowded central hub and the less
dense spiral arms (like we are in) with
fewer stars between the arms. This
consideration of galactic size and
number of stars can be used to find
the average distance between stars,
which is similar to the distance from
the sun to its nearest star, Proxima
Centauri, of 4.2 light years away.
Distance from Earth to Sun
The Earth is in the “Goldilocks”
zone, better known as the habitable
zone around the sun where the temperature is such that liquid water
might form. While some supercomputers might be able to calculate some
properties of water from first principles, it is unlikely that all the special
and unique properties of this substance could easily be explained. The
electrons around hydrogen and oxygen do their dance to create an unusual substance that floats when it freezes, can dissolve both salts and organic
compounds, can easily evaporate, and
can be moved around the world in
clouds while occasionally condensing
to water the planet.
The distance from the sun that
this habitable zone incorporates depends mostly on the energy output
from the sun. The paragraphs above
mentioned that many aspects of physics were combined to estimate the
mass of stars. With this mass, the rate
of nuclear reactions in the core can be
estimated and with that the energy
output of typical stars. The energy per
area falls off as the square of the distance from the sun. Some assumption
needs to be made concerning how
much energy would be absorbed by a
planet while that remaining is reflected out into space. This absorption can be
used to find the temperature by assuming
that the planet comes into a balance
between the energy being absorbed
from the sun and the amount of energy being radiated back out into space
at the planet’s lower temperature.
(This radiation is similar to the orange
glow coming from a heated stove or
toaster.) Knowing the mass and luminosity of a star leads to an estimate of
a planet’s temperature. This estimated
distance is again close to the actual

distance from the sun to Earth of 150
million kilometers.
Size of a Habitable Planet
Rocky planets are large enough
that gravity tends to pull the rocky material into near spherical shapes. Gravity also helps hold atmospheres. The
gases in the atmosphere might escape
if gravity is too weak since the molecules move at fast speeds. The estimated rocky planet’s radius that can hold
an atmosphere at temperatures comfortable for life comes to about 4,000
km, which is about 60% of the Earth’s
radius but within 15% of the size of
Mars.
To grasp an idea of the magnitude
of the gravity needed, the average
speed of a typical atmospheric molecule, N2, can be easily found (about 500
m/s), whereas the speed of anything
(rockets or molecules) to escape the
Earth’s gravity is about 11 km/s, that is,
about twenty-two times the average
velocity of molecules.
However, many other factors
should be considered. For example,
Mars currently has about 1% of the
Earth’s atmospheric pressure at its surface, and it is still losing it. On the other hand, Venus has a mass and a radius
more similar to Earth but contains an
atmosphere with a pressure nearly one
hundred times larger. The atmospheres
of Venus and Mars might have been
more similar to the Earth long ago
(Way 2019).

mated with slightly less simple models
than considered earlier, while the gravity is based on a planet that can maintain its atmosphere (as above). Considering material of lengthy polymers
gives an estimated size close to human
-sized scale.
Size of a Cell
The basic unit of life is a cell. Bacteria are 0.2 to 10 microns but the common bacterium, E.coli, is a rod two
microns long by one micron in diameter. Animal cells are between ten and a
hundred microns. While these cells
have membranes to separate the cellular interior from the outside, the smallest natural size of a water droplet (in
fog, for example) is about ten microns.
At this size the surface tension forces
of the water molecules at the boundary
are equal to the evaporative forces.
This can be estimated with the intermolecular forces of hydrogen bonding
(weaker than a covalent chemical
bond) and the temperature of liquid
water on Earth.
Size of an Atomic Nucleus
Finally, we consider the proton
size (smallest atomic nucleus). A few
approaches to estimating this size can

be taken. One approach is to consider
the range of the strong force keeping
the three quarks in the proton together, but this strength is not included in
the parameters considered so far. Another approach is to find the
(Compton) wavelength of light, which
has the same energy contained in a
particle’s mass. Then the proton size
compared to the ‘classical’ electron size
would be scaled by the ratio of electron
and proton masses. However, this mass
ratio (approximately 1/2000) is currently not explained. Despite no direct theory for this ratio, certain relationships
between the electromagnetic and
strong forces are needed for the existence of complex elements that are
needed for life. This results in the conclusion that the proton size is much
(about 100,000 times) smaller than the
size of an atom.
Other properties (like mass) can
also be estimated with these methods.
The figure from Carr and Rees’s (1979)
paper shows the range of sizes (x-axis)
and mass (y-axis) from the proton to
the universe. Note that an additional
item is labeled in the lower left of
Figure 1. This is the “Instanton” at the

Figure 1. Estimates of relative sizes from mostly first principles (Source: Carr & Rees 1979)

Size of a Human
Since we are looking for only an
estimate for the size of a human, we
will consider in general how big animals can grow on land. Many criteria,
such as heat management, might be
considered, but a significant aspect is
that animals would not survive long if
they were easily severely injured when
they fell. Even at our size it is relatively
common to break a bone or sprain a
muscle, but a fall is usually not fatal
until the height is about fifteen meters,
i.e., about ten times a human’s size. A
key factor in this estimate is the
strength of the material that might
break compared to the planet’s gravity.
Some material properties can be esti-
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Planck scale, which is the smallest
size anything can be, considering
gravity and quantum physics. It occurs at quite a qualitatively different
location on the diagram, i.e., the vertex of the quantum and black hole
regions. The size is about 10-35 m or
twenty orders of magnitude smaller
than the atomic nucleus.
Comparison to Real Sizes
Now we can take a look at the
real numbers and ratios of these distances and sizes (Table 1 and Figure
2). Not only can they be estimated

with the few parameters used above,
but the ratios from one item to the
next in the sequence are somewhat
constant, about 150,000. (One item in
the list stands out as being a bit out of
place. Using 10% of the radius of the
Earth rather than the full radius is
better.) This number makes sense
because remember that we started
with estimates of the sizes of an atom
and the universe as being the ratio of
Alpha to Alpha-G, which is about
1.5x1036. Since there are seven factors
between these two, we can see that a
factor of 150,000 applied seven times
would lead to a factor of 1.7x1036. The

Table 1. Actual Ratios of Distances and Sizes

Planck scale mentioned above would
be another four of these scaling factors smaller than a nucleus.
Another way of looking at this
reveals some connections among the
sizes. An item’s size is the geometric
average of the two items equally
spaced above and below. For example,
the size of a person should be about
the geometric average of the size of an
atom (two steps smaller) and the distance to the sun (two steps larger),
i.e., the square root of 150 million kilometers x 0.1 nm. After making sure
the units are the same, we end up
with a size of about 4 m. This is about
a factor of 2 too large, but it is quite
amazing it is this close.
How, then, can we relate to a
factor of 150,000? We definitely know
the difference between $1 and
$150,000, but are there some sizes to
which we can relate? There seem to
be. Commercial jets fly at about 6.5
miles, which is a bit over 10 km
(equivalent to a million centimeters);
1/150,000 of this distance is about 7
cm (3 inches), a bit less than the
width of a hand. The next time you
are in an airplane at cruising altitude,
look down and try to visualize
someone’s hand. (It is easier to see
cars and then imagine the people in
them). That ratio of sizes and distance, the size of a hand to the altitude is about the same as the ratio
among these nine sizes and distances
in Big History, i.e., nucleus to atom,
atom to bacterium, bacterium to human, human to (smaller) Earth, Earth
to sun, distance to sun compared to
distance to the nearest star, distance
of the nearest star to galactic size, and
finally galactic size to the (observable)
universe. Alternatively, using the
American standard unit of a football
field, the smaller distance would be
about 1/32 of an inch.

Figure 2. Plotting data of Table 1 (Source of images: Wikipedia)
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Abstract
Sixty-five years ago, A. L. Basham highlighted the making of India in his book, The Wonder that was India (1954). It
acknowledged human presence 100,000 years ago; the dawn of agriculture around 10,000 BC; the rise of the first villages;
ancient goddess figurines; the Indus Valley civilizations; and the great discovery by Sir William Jones of India’s languages
linked to the languages of Europe. Basham also emphasized the importance of the Himalayas and the great fertile plains
watered by the multiple tributaries of the Ganges—the spiritual and cultural center of ancient India. With intensely economic and political perspectives today, we are likely to adopt the narrower focus of Ranbir Vohra’s The Making of India: A
Political History (2013), which leads us through British colonialism to India’s emergence as an independent democracy of
over a billion people. In recent years a broader perspective has emerged that extends far beyond the beginnings of Indian
civilization or even beyond the first nomadic migrants. Discoveries of geology, biology, and paleontology define the making
of India as a vast narrative, the creation of a stage with ancient roots upon which modern humans have only recently commenced their walk-on drama. This perspective impels us to think historically, sequentially, and diachronically rather than
topically or synchronically. India turns out to be a dramatic example of continental migration culminating in a collision
that has shaped Asia far beyond India’s borders. The making of India emerges as a dynamic, moving sequence where the
most ancient planetary and biological events are seen as contingencies of the present world and human existence. This perspective is more than history; it is big history; more than narrative, it is a grand narrative.

Introduction
The central discovery of twentieth
-century geology in India and elsewhere has been a recognition of slow
but constant planetary change that put
an end to the notion of a world as fixed
and finished. “Change,” however, is an
abstract term without precise parameters. This was clear when geologist
James Hutton (1726-1797) put forth his
“theory of the Earth.” Hutton saw a
continual process of mountain erosion,
settlement of water-borne erosional
materials on ocean bottoms, their
hardening into fossil-laden sedimentary rock, and subsequent upthrust of
sea bottom that formed new mountains. This was change—a rock cycle—
that by definition must have occurred
everywhere that mountains tower and
rivers flow to the sea. Hutton’s conclu-

sion was that this cycle went on
“without end”; he could not define a
beginning. Hutton was the first to recognize
what
we
call
“deep
time” (Wood 2019a). To this, the eminent geologist, Charles Lyell (18301832), added regional specificity. From
his study of geological change at
Mount Etna, the Joggins Fossil Cliffs
on the Canadian coast, and the Grand
Canyon, Lyell documented change at
specific sites: ninety eruptions on Etna,
millions of years of fossiliferous layers
at Joggins, and mile-deep sedimentary
layers at the Grand Canyon. Their crucial recognition was that the Earth had
an immeasurably long history; such
vast changes could not have occurred
within any restricted time frame. To
this insight, Charles Darwin (1859)
added a biological dimension: fossilif-
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erous rocks revealed an equally immeasurable sequence of life forms
from primitive to modern with many
dead-end pathways to extinction. As
the nineteenth century came to an
end, these various kinds of change had
provided multiple perspectives, but
they hung together with impenetrable
complexity.
A new view of change began with
Alfred Wegener’s theory of a supercontinent which he called Pangea (All
Earth) which he sketched in his book,
The Origin of Continents and Oceans
(1912), that went through several editions until 1929. His evidence included
the obvious “fit” of continents on each
side of the Atlantic Ocean and samespecies megafauna fossils occurring on
landmasses separated by thousands of
miles of ocean. His solution was the

theory of a supercontinent he called
Pangea (All Earth) where all the landmasses of the planet were once joined
(Illustration No. 1).
Wegener’s theory of an ancient
continent he called Pangea along with
drifting continents, which accounted
for the widely separate locations of
lands once joined, became “a theory
that most academics quickly branded
eccentric, preposterous, and improbable . . . a classic example of wild, overreaching supposition” (Ballard 2000,
117-119). His theory thus made little
headway and was largely ignored for
decades. How continents supposedly
rooted into the rocky surface of the
Earth could possibly move challenged
the geological imagination. But oceanbottom exploration during IGY, the
International Geophysical Year (19571958), led to the discovery of midocean undersea mountain ridges, seafloor spreading (Dietz 1961), a systematic creation of seafloor, and thus a
“history of ocean basins” (Hess 1962).
The evidence confirmed that continents did move, and a rapid assessment of the evidence led to the master
theory of modern geology: “plate tectonics” (Takeuchi 1970; Sullivan 1974).
Within two decades, instrumentation
capable of measuring continental
movement had developed. This was
refined enough to show that North
and South America were moving away
from Europe and Africa at approximately one centimeter per year. Wegener’s continental drift was no longer
a theory; it was a fact.
Verification
that
continents
moved brought astonishment and it
remains astonishing for anyone first
encountering it. This, however, can
momentarily conceal its significance.
The various kinds of “change” Hutton,
Lyell, and Darwin had recognized
lacked direction. Lyell’s observations
confirmed local change; Hutton’s flow
of erosional material to form ocean
bottoms and their subsequent upthrust to form mountains was vertical
change. But the movement of continents involved change “that played
itself out far more in the horizontal
than in the vertical direction” (Ballard
2000, 125). Moreover, this was directional change: continents were mov-

ing, but this movement could be
tracked backward in time. One could
see not only where continents were
headed, but where they had been. Geological change suddenly acquired
pattern and structure. It signified a
history.
Once the reality of Wegener’s
Pangea was established, geologists
began the complex task of working
out the earlier history of the planet.
One approach was to trace out the
precise configuration of Pangea by
exploring continental shelves and continuities between geographical features on opposite sides of the oceans.
Discoveries included identical chemical signatures on facing coastline rock
outcrops originally together during
the Pangea era. Working out details of
Pangean configuration was soon extended to the daunting task of tracing
the history of plate movement before
the assembly of Pangea. Bit by bit,

clues led to evidence and the pieces of
narrative stretching over billions of
years began to emerge. As the search
went forward, outcrops of very ancient
rocks were located and dated. Rocks
that indicated formation 3.5 billion
(3500 million) years ago were found in
Africa, Australia, Greenland, and
Northern Canada. Gradually their origins and movements were traced to
construct a chronology of plate tectonic events. The ancient narratives of
Earth’s continents are all of great interest, but the making of India is
unique.
Craton
What geologists have learned is
that India is the most dramatic example of continental migration, initially
moving faster than any other terrane
and colliding so forcefully that it
altered the geography of Asia far beyond the site of the original collision.

Illustration 1: Pangea. Alfred Wegener proposed an ancient supercontinent called
Pangea to account for similar megafauna fossils on continents separated by thousands
of miles of ocean. In The Origin of Continents and Oceans (1912) he provided sketches
of how Pangea might have been configured. His theory of “continental drift” was necessary to account for the locations of today’s continents. Source: commons@wikimedia.com.
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In the process, India has rafted a history of ancient cratons and the rise of
life hundreds of miles from where
these originated, relocating this landmass where it became a coastal route
traversed by early humans and a place
congenial for others who decided to
stay and settle.
The prehistoric history of India
began to emerge around the midtwentieth century. In his early work
on cratons the oldest foundational
crustal underlying Peninsular India, B.
Rama Rao (1945, 16) remarked on Archaean rocks in general that they
“constitute a complex of highly crumpled crystalline schists and gneisses
massed into a confused jumble.” These
are metamorphic rocks formed from
earlier sedimentary or igneous rocks.
Rao’s description of a “jumble” refers
to gneisses formed at high temperatures mixed with schist formed at lower temperatures, a combination not
easy to explain. From their conglomerate composition, Rao concluded that
the oldest Archean rocks were formed
from preexisting rocks that had eroded and been subject to subsequent
igneous and metamorphic processes.
Rao’s explorations identified dozens of
components of these cratonic rocks
that were laced with recrystallized
sediments rich with magnesium and
iron. Half a century later, University of
North Carolina professor of geology,
John J. Rogers (1993), established an
age of 3.1 billion (3100 million) years
for cratonic rocks, not only in India
but also in West Australia and East
Africa. The predecessor rocks suggested by Rao may thus have formed as
much as 600 to 900 million years earlier, toward the end of the Hadean
Era. This estimate pushed the earliest
chapter of the making of India as far
back as four billion years ago.
From similarities between rocks
from widely separated landmasses,
Rogers surmised that the cratonic
foundations must have formed together in the Archean Era after which they
remained crowded together for more
than 3 billion years until they drifted
apart during the breakup of Pangea.
Rogers provided the name Ur
(German: Motherland) for the earliest
stage of these conjoined cratons which

he inferred had made up an earlier
supercontinent. Further explorations
of continental movement soon opened
up further reaches of prehistory: intermediate cratonic conjunctions were
recognized, and a series of supercontinents were understood as assembling
and breaking up between Ur and Pangea.
In a boldly titled article, “History
of Continents in the Last Three Billion
Years,” which expanded his observations from India, Rogers (1996), laid
the groundwork for an extended geological narrative. Some of his conjectures have since been modified, but
his emphasis on a chronological sequence of events has become a foundation for diachronic geology. Piecing
together what has been observed
about other cratonic assemblies, we
can work out a supercontinent timetable: 2.5 billion-year-old Laurentia, 2billion-year-old Baltica, and most of
northern Asia collided around 1.5 billion years ago to form Laurasia; then a
billion years ago these collided with
Ur and Atlantica to form Rodinia, the
predecessor of Pangea. Rodinia lasted
about 300 million years, and then fragmented around 700 million years ago.
Laurasia remained somewhat intact
while a great southern continent was
assembled from most of the southern
hemisphere cratons. Once this and
Laurasia drifted together around half a
billion years ago, the familiar supercontinent of Pangea was formed.
Through these various combinings
and separations, the Indian basement
cratons remained intact.
Rogers’ initial speculations about
Ur and subsequent supercontinents
began with the rocks of the Dharwar
craton of southern India where less
overlying sediment has left outcrops of
the underlying craton exposed. The
crustal foundation of India includes
four other cratons that were sutured
together during the late Pre-Cambrian
Era: from these earlier dates have
emerged. Basu et al. (1981) have dated
remnant Archaean granitic rocks from
the Singbhum craton in northeastern
India at 3.8 billion (3800 million) years
old. In light of Rao’s intuition that
these preserve components from earlier rocks, the first chapter of the mak51

ing of India must begin somewhat earlier. The rocks of all five cratonic outcrops display a suite of igneous-origin
metamorphic gneisses and schists that
appear to have formed around 500
million years after Earth formation 4.5
billion years ago; that is, around four
billion years BP. Whatever rocks hardened toward the end of the Hadean
were then subject to subsequent erosion and breakdown. Subsequent continental cratons worldwide are thus
conglomerates of erosional components from these pre-existing rocks
that finally hardened and survived
without further meltdown. Today they
make up the basement foundations of
continental cratons and the Indian
Shield.
Plate tectonics was understood as
a phenomenon explaining hitherto
unexplained geological events. Once
the fact of seafloor spreading and subduction was recognized, mechanisms
for earthquakes and volcanoes came
into focus. But the driving force of
plate tectonics was only vaguely understood. Now we infer that continental movement most likely originates
with plumes of superheated lava deep
in the Earth which rise toward the
surface, split, spread, and flow off in
different directions. This sets up convection currents near the surface of
the Earth’s mantle immediately beneath the crust which is of lighter density and thus “floats” on the heavier
mantle. Crust thickness varies: under
the Indian Ocean, it averages 100 kilometers (62 miles) in contrast with the
crust under the cratons of Africa, Antarctica, and Australia which runs to
180 kilometers (110 miles) in thickness
(Kumar et al. 2007). Continents supported by huge crustal slabs ride on
mantle currents like rafts on a river.
Here we see the fundamentals of the
entire theory of plate tectonics. In addition, some plumatic material finds
its way into cracks and crevices in the
Earth’s crust as lava intrusions which
slowly force crustal plates apart, thus
aiding their convectional flow.
Through all of these breakups
and reassembles, the India cluster of
cratonic fragments seem to have
remained intact. Unlike the African
craton, which was located at the center

of supercontinents and thus surrounded by other cratons, India generally occupied the periphery. Thus,
when Pangea broke up—eventually
birthing the seven continents we
know today—India was positioned for
a separate departure, a migration
north from Pangea at what in geological terms was breakneck speed, and
an eventual collision with Asia. Calculations indicate that India may have
commenced its travels at 20 centimeters (12 inches) per year (Kumar et al.
2007). But as Jonathan Aitchison et al.
(2007) have shown, its movement varied over its 100-million-year journey
north. Moreover, even though it collided with Asia 40 million years ago, it
is still moving at 5 centimeters (3
inches) annually, the result being a
continuous crushing and compression
of the South Asian landmass and the
still-rising peaks of the highest mountains in the world, the Himalayas.
Life
While geological changes were
occurring, a parallel narrative was unfolding. The evidence in India consists
of stromatolite fossils marking the
advent of bacterial colonies more than
3 billion years ago (Sharma 2008). But
the broader story has several earlier
chapters; the first is planktonic and
microscopic. Evidence for the origin of
life, or abiogenesis, is found in the
oldest cratonic rocks on most of today’s continents. Matthew Dodd et al.
(2017) have found microfossil evidence
of primitive bacterial life dating to the
early Archean Era in the Canadian
province of Quebec; undoubtedly,
these were not unlike today’s plankton which make up over ninety percent of Earth’s present biomass
(Sardet 2015). These Canadian microfossils were found within precipitates
from hydrothermal vents which occur
on ocean floors and date from 3.77 to
4.28 billion years BP. Hydrothermal
vents or “black smokers” several kilometers below the ocean surface which
occur along mid-ocean ridges provide
an environment isolated from solar
radiation, meteoric bombardment,
and the intense heat at the Earth’s
surface during the Hadean Era. Robert
D. Ballard (2000), who was among the

first to explore mid-ocean ridges and
black smokers has provided a riveting
account of their discovery along with
the varied environments occupied by
these “chemosynthesizing organisms,”
that are powered by the constant flow
of metals, gases, and sulphur compounds spewing out of the vents.
As the ocean surface cooled following the Hadean Era, new forms of
solar-tolerant plankton evolved: autotrophic bacteria capable of separating
hydrogen from H2O and retaining the
hydrogen while releasing the oxygen
into the atmosphere and harvesting
solar energy to create sugars. This
photosynthesizing process defines
these as ancestral to the entire kingdom of plants. Cyanobacteria that
collected in “mats” or “colonies”
formed
stromatolites—mushroomlike structures several feet high in
shallow water where tides brought a
continual supply of nutrients. Leis and
Stinchcomb (2015) have assembled a
gallery of evidence showing that stromatolites were a dominant form of life
for two billion years in every part of
the world. Examples from Pilbara
Rock in Australia date to 3.4 to 3.5
billion years BP (Walter 1983); from
South Africa, 3.5 to 3.6 billion years BP
(Knoll and Barghoorn 1977). Stephen
Jay Gould (1989) remarked that stromatolites were “the highest form of
macroscopic complexity” in the Precambrian world 3.5 billion years ago.
But around 500 million years ago they
waned under competition from other
life forms, and they are rare today,
though some still thrive in a few remote locations, most notably in
Sharks Bay in Western Australia
where they are exposed at low tide. In
addition, a variety of open-ocean stromatolites are found at Carbia in Western Australia and Exuma Sound in the
Bahamas where subtidal currents provide a constant nutrient flow. However, the fossil evidence is ubiquitous,
revealing that stromatolites colonized
ancient shorelines everywhere and
thus were subject to tectonic movement, coastal mountain building, seafloor uplift, and terrane additions to
ancient coasts that moved stromatolite fossils far inland and often to high
elevations. There are numerous exam52

ples from the 510+ million-year-old
Burgess Shale hundreds of miles from
the Pacific at an elevation of 8,000
feet in the Canadian Rockies.
In India, Schopf and Prasad
(1978) located a conjunction of stromatolites and microfossils dating to
1.4 billion years ago in the Cuddapah
Basin of South Central India. A rather
spectacular outcrop of stromatolites of
similar age was discovered far removed from their original oceanic
location in the Uttar Pradesh province
of Northern India, now protected in
the Salkhan Fossils Park (Leis and
Stinchcomb, 60). Based on geochronology, these may have formed originally around the coastal regions of
Atlantica to which the Indian cratons
were attached in the Archean Era. But
these are not the earliest fossils in India. Geologist Naresh Ghose (Ians
2017) has reported locating microfossils, probably formed during the time
of the original Ur supercontinent, dating to more than 2 billion years BP in
the Gwalioer Basin of the Bundelkhand region. Fossil microbiota from
2.4 to 2.6 billion years ago have been
located in Precambrian rocks in various locations in India (Lopuchin and
Moralev 1973; Lopuchin and Gowda
1983). In all cases these fossils were
carried by the India cratons from their
places of origin in earlier supercontinents.
Toward the end of the Precambrian Period around 750 million years
ago, a new form of marine life appeared that provided a new biological
chapter.
Multi-celled
organisms
emerged, probably from cooperative
assemblies of planktonic bacteria, eukaryotes, and the like. The earliest
were soft-bodied invertebrates resembling jellyfish. Lacking either bones or
shells, invertebrates are poorly recorded in the fossil record, though the
Burgess Shale of the Canadian Rockies
has preserved some (Briggs et al.
1994). During the Cambrian Era (542
to 488 million years ago) the fossil
record reveals an astonishing proliferation of species with hard parts—
bones and shells. This occurred as
Laurasia—North America, Europe,
and northern Asia—was drifting
toward the clumped cratons of southern

continents: “At this time,” writes M. S.
Krishnan (1982, 239), “there existed a
great Southern Continent or a series of
land masses which were connected
closely enough to permit the free distribution of terrestrial fauna and flora.
This continent, which included India,
Australia, South America, Antarctica,
South Africa and Madagascar, has
been called Gondwanaland.” But since
wana means “land,” Gondwana-land is
redundant and so has been officially
shortened to “Gondwana” (Illustration
2). The name goes back to the nineteenth century: the geologist Otokar
Feistmantel (1876), who was studying
fossils in the north central provinces
of India, named this region Gondwana
after the ancient tribe of Gond who
still occupied it.
Shortly after Laurasia collided
with Gondwana to form Pangea
around 500 million BP, the Cambrian
Explosion of proliferating genera and
species set in, resulting in a biodiversity of millions of life forms across the
supercontinent. Despite the relatively
brief duration (50 million years) of the
Cambrian Era, 20 to 35 of the major
phyla known today emerged. This includes an array of marine phyla, including invertebrate, three-lobed trilobites, with over 50,000 separate species identified. As Riccardo Levi-Setti
(2014) illustrates, they have been
found in Bohemia, China, Morocco,
Newfoundland, North America, Russia, and the United Kingdom; they are
also found in the Devonian Era
Hunsrück Slate west of the Rhine Valley in western Germany along with
numerous other highly evolved invertebrates (Kühl et al. 2012). Among fossils, trilobites have inspired more fossil hunters than any other form of life,
with spectacular museum collections
in Boston, Cancun, Glasgow, London,
New York, Prague, Toronto, and
Washington DC. Some, like the Houston Museum of Natural Science, have
benefited from donations of superlative private collections (Wessman and
Eberle 1999). This proliferating form of
exoskeletal life, which evolved eyes
long before mammals and primates
(Clarkson et al. 2006), dominated the
world’s oceans for 300 million years.
Cambrian fossils in India from

rich fossiliferous beds in Kashmir and
the Spiti regions consist primarily of
brachiopod valves and trilobites
(Krishnan, 217). As we trace the fossil
record of India from the Cambrian
(544-488 mya) through the Ordovician (488-444 mya), and Silurian (444400 mya), trilobite fossils are plentiful
(Sharma 2008), but they decline
through the Devonian (400- 359 mya)
and Carboniferous (359-300 mya) periods with their extinction complete by
the end of the Permian (250 mya). As
the Indian record of trilobite fossils
gradually decreases, brachiopod valves
remain, along with a multitude of
shells of many shapes and designs—
fans, spirals, cones, and pyramids
(Krishnan, 217, 224, 229, 233, 297)—
which continue to modern times.
The supercontinent of Gondwana
of which India was a part existed from
550 until approximately 180 million

years ago. Chronicling events through
vast prehistoric eras of India is almost
indistinguishable from narrating the
history of Gondwana itself. To appreciate this geological and biological
history, we need to adopt a double
vision for which Mary White has provided suggestive terminology. Her
Flowering of Gondwana focuses on
Australia, but her emphasis on a geohistorical
term,
“Australia-inGondwana” (1990, 34), prompts us to
adopt the parallel “India-in Gondwana.” Thus evolutionary development
and detail belongs not simply to India
but to India-in-Gondwana. While the
trilobites came and went, thousands of
species originated in India-in Gondwana, then continued far beyond the
breakup of Gondwana. According to
Mora et al. (2011), the approximate
number of species worldwide today is
5.5 million land species, 2.2 million

Illustration 2: Gondwana. Before Laurasia (North America and Eurasia) collided with
the southern continents and, subsequently, after Laurasia had separated, the gathering of southern continents known as Gondwana persisted as the longest-lasting supercontinent. These southern continents were then clustered with present-day Antarctica. Evidence of glaciation is thus found on all the landmasses that surrounded
Antarctica, including southern India. Source: www@wikimedia.com.
53

marine species, for a total of 8.7 million, though some estimates have suggested as many as 100 million. Since
most have very ancient histories, the
story of life on Gondwana has several
additional chapters, for this is where
today’s faunal and floral species of
India originate.
Creatures now considered ancestors of vertebrates—bilaterally organized around a stiffened dorsal rodlike structure known as a notochord—
have shown up in Laurasian sites. The
tiny fish-like Pikaia in the Burgess
Shale of British Columbia first described by Charles Walcott (1911), photographically illustrated by Briggs et
al. (1994), and thoroughly analyzed by
Morris and Caron (2012) swam the
world’s oceans twenty million years
before true vertebrates. A cephalochordate in southern China called
Yunnanozoon, “Animal of Yunnan
[province],” appears to be morphologically related to Pikaia, which dates to
the mid-Cambrian Era approximately
520 million BP when life existed entirely in the oceans. Since these were
without any hard parts, the surprising
survival of their fossils is due to the
rare way they were preserved: for
Pikaia, an undersea mudslide isolated
and preserved an entire ecosystem
from deterioration of soft body parts
(Gould 1989, 69-70).
Since we have no evidence that
larger predators had yet evolved, it is
likely that these finned Pikaia would
soon have numbered in the billions as
they spread to every part of the planet. By the time they emerged, three
billion years of planktonic marine life
had developed not unlike today’s: “a
bewildering swirl of tiny creatures . . .
more numerous than the stars in the
universe . . . unseen marine communities of viruses, bacteria, archaea, single-celled eukaryotes, and small
planktonic animals” (Armbrust and
Palumbi 2015). Plankton form the
foundation of a food chain that has
nourished marine life throughout
Earth’s history. The direct vertebrate
descendants of Pikaia with major speciation occurring from the MidCambrian through the Silurian and
Devonian Eras (520 to 360 million
years BP) eventually populated every

corner of the planet with approximately half occupying oceans and the
other half adapting to freshwater environs. Conway Morris and H. B. Whittington (1979) point to the importance
of the Pikaia discovery: “The superb
preservation of this Middle Cambrian
organism makes it a landmark in the
history of the phylum to which all
vertebrates, including man, belong.”
All vertebrates. Since new species of
fish are still being discovered, the total number is unknown, though it is
certainly in the hundreds of thousands. Based on the exhaustive worldwide FishBase data, fish species of India alone number 250, with subspecies
numbering in the hundreds (Froese
and Pauly 2018), a proliferation that
began during the India-in-Gondwana
Era and the supercontinent Pangea.
This astonishing diversity of the most
basic vertebrate—a precursor for millions of more diverse species brings
the significance of these unassuming
fossils into the clear light of day.
Gould’s observation (1989, 322) that
Pikaia is a “final link in our story of
contingency” summarizes how a single species may be ancestral to a
whole range of descendants which, in
this instance, includes Homo sapiens.
Fish speciation of India-inGondwana Era may be surprising, but
this is still an early chapter in the story of life. A momentous shift occurred
in the late Silurian and early Devonian
Era from 420 to 385 million years BP.
The initial movement onto land of
floral species began as the necessary
precursor for faunal life ashore. It is
generally thought that autotrophic
green algae, most likely descended
from cyanobacteria, were pioneers in
occupying land, probably along
beaches where tidal nutrients were
available, but eventually evolving to
draw nutrients directly from rocks
and soil. Lichens, which grow in hostile environments worldwide and on
rock, provide a suggestive model. The
change of the reproduction process
from releasing spores in water may
have taken millions of years to evolve
spore-retention on land, seed reproduction, and utilization of wind to
scatter
seed-spores.
Moisture
transport channels within floral stems,
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along with retention cells and waterproof skins evolved to retain water
within vine-like creeping branches,
gradually restructuring plant life as
“vascular,” a description that now applies to all plant life. Meanwhile, specialization of parts like roots in the
ground, stiffened stems, and reaction
wood to support heavy angled branches were precursors of today’s solidly
rooted trees, wide-spreading crowns,
and tree tops towering hundreds of
feet above the ground. Referring to
this greening of the Earth, Loren Eiseley (1957, 62) called it “the epic march
of life from the tidal oozes upward
across the raw and unclothed continents.”
Once established, forests and
jungles became the constant cover of
tropical and temperate lands, with
thousands of species developing in
lowlands, wetlands, and river valleys
and hardier species adapting to drylands and upland slopes. Thousands
of generations of lowland vegetation
lived, matured, fell, and decayed on
the forest floor. The resulting deposits
of coal establish India as fifth in the
world in coal reserves and fourth in
the world in coal production, though,
as geologist Krishnan (1982, 283)
notes, many coal seams in India are
“of small extent and thickness and
generally of inferior quality” (Krishnan
283), forcing importation of high quality coal for steel production. On a
different note, the fossil record includes an India version of what is well
known in America—a collection of
petrified trees. The National Fossil
Wood Park at Santhanur in Perambalur, approximately 35 km (20 miles)
from Puducherry, displays a collection
of two hundred petrified trees, dating
to the early Cretaceous Era 120 million
years BP.
Working in India, the geologist
and paleontologist Otokar Feistmantel (1876) provided the first description of Glossopteris, which means
“tongue” (Glosso) “fern” (pteris); it
referred to a plant with tongueshaped leaves up to a meter in length,
a pronounced midrib, and veins
linked together appearing like a net.
Glossoptera indica and its variations
(Gangamopteris, Gondwanidium) are

widespread in coal deposits in India
from the Permian and Carboniferous
Eras; seventy species have been identified in India (Chandra and Surange
1979). Feistmantel recognized that the
plant
group
now
known
as
“Glossoptera flora” extended across all
of
the
southern
landmasses
(Illustration 3).
Feistmantel found this species in
a region of northeast India inhabited
by the Gond people, and chose to call
its extra-India locations “Gondwana,” a
metaphorical leap that suggests India
as the heartland of the earlier supercontinent. Mary White (1990, 34)
brings this into focus: “It would seem
that the observations of early explorer
scientists, who noted the similarities
of vegetation in isolated southern
lands, started the modern theorizing
about moving continents and former
supercontinents”—thirty years before
Alfred Wegener’s suggestion of a
southern supercontinent and almost
eighty years before its existence was
verified.
Eventually
Feistmantel’s
“Gondwana” was officially adopted for
the Great Southern Continent where
these regions once cohered. The importance of glossopteris in India as a
key to the Great Southern Supercontinent has been recognized in the 1997
issuance of a stamp (Illustration 4).
Long before the greening of the
landscape was complete, its coloration
began. Some seventy years ago, Loren
Eiseley published a series of essays
which he eventually drew together in a
book called The Immense Journey
(1957). His chapter, “How Flowers
Changed the World” is an evocative
account of the reproductive innovations of plant life. “The flowers
bloomed and bloomed in ever larger
and more spectacular varieties. Some
were pale unearthly night flowers intended to lure moths in the evening
twilight, some among the orchids even
took the shape of female spiders in
order to attract wandering males,
some flamed redly in the light of noon
or twinkled modestly in the meadow
grasses” (1957, 73). Some may hesitate
at Eiseley’s attribution of intention to
flower blossoms; their decorative coloration may be the result of thousands
of mutational experiments, most of

Illustration 3: Glossoptera Range. Glossoptera appeared early in the Permian Era (c.
300 million BP). While Glossoptera was first identified in India, fossil varieties were
recognized as common in South America (1), Africa (2), Madagascar (3), India (4) the
temperate rim of Antarctica (5), and Australia (6), thus providing evidence for an ancient gathering of landmasses in a supercontinent now known as Gondwana. Glossoptera thrived for 50 million years; most species fell victim to the mass extinction at the
end of the Permian (c. 250 BP), with a few survivors evident in India from the early
Triassic (Pant and Pant 1987).

them failures, until the most effective
variety emerged. Despite remarkable
designs that emerge in nature, evolution is a hit-and-miss affair with plenty
of loose ends and runny edges. But
effective varieties eventually prevailed
in the flowering; these included lures
and strategies that bound faunal life to
floral. No matter how one frames the
meandering road to cooperative floralfaunal ecosystems, the flowering
plants that produced nectar in order
to spread their seeds, cone-seeds that
are spread by foraging mammals, and
hanging fruit that serve as attractive
forms of nutrition—all these provided
new sources of food for new species of
life. And all these innovations occurred while India was still India-inGondwana.
With the land prepared as a habitat that included thousands of varieties of plant life, vertebrate invasions
of land were inevitable. India experienced it as fully as every other part of
the supercontinent. The transitional
creatures were amphibians: tetrapodal
creatures evolved from fish that are
capable of living in water or on land. A
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Illustration 4: Fossil Glossoptera. On the
fiftieth anniversary of the Birbal Sahni
Institute of Paleobotany, Lucknow, India
issued a series of stamps picturing significant fossils. Glossopteris, the largest genus of seed ferns, is known only from its
leaves which grew up to one meter (3.3
feet) in length. Since no fossils of woody
parts have survived, its configuration as a
plant, bush, or tree is unknown. Source:
www.paleophilatelie.eu.

huge data bank, Darrel Frost’s Amphibian Species of the World (2006),
lists hundreds; Ranjit Daniels’s Amphibians of Peninsular India (2005)
describes and pictures seventy-two,
about one-third of the India total.
Their proliferation and survival to the
present is surprising since their navigation on land is often poor. With
awkwardly placed limbs evolved from
side-located fish fins, amphibians such
as alligators and turtles experience a
muscular challenge and are often poor
travelers, walking on wide-spaced
limbs and dragging a low, horizontal
body along the ground.
In general, correction of this awkward limb placement had to await the
emergence of reptiles. The legs of
these cold-blooded, egg-laying tetrapods migrated under the body to provide vertical support. Having developed lungs, they no longer lived in
water, though they often waded and
hunted in it, immersing themselves
only as short-term swimmers, never
full-time residents. Three orders of
reptiles have been identified in Indiain-Gondwana, including sixteen Families, with hundreds of species extant
today: A Naturalist’s Guide to the Reptiles of India (Das and Das 2018) provides a rich photographic survey of
280 species; R. Aengel’s Checklist of
Reptiles in India (2018) lists five hundred seventy-two.
The most dramatic reptiles were
the dinosaurs that achieved faunal
prominence in the mid-Triassic Era
and dominated the planet for 165 million years (230 to 65 million years BP).
P. C. Sereno et al. (1993) suggest that a
small bipedal reptile about a meter in
length called Eoraptor, “Dawn predator,” that inhabited Western Gondwana (Argentina) 231-228 million years
BP may be the ancestor that eventually bifurcated into 500 genera and
1000+ species. Many, perhaps the majority, were small—the size of terrestrial birds or our familiar mammal
species—with one well-known line
experimenting with gigantism. The
Tyrannosaur (‘tyrant lizard”) line,
evolved a separate genealogy around
60 million years after Eoraptor, around
170 million BP. Tyrannosaurs were
bipedal predators, but, as Stephen

Brusatte (2010, 2015) has shown, the 20
or so earliest varieties uncovered since
2000 from the Arctic, Russia, Mongolia, and North America were of modest
size—some small, some not much bigger than domestic mammals. They
tended to be overshadowed by the
larger allosaurs and ceratosaurs, but
ever since the largest Tyrannosaur,
Tyrannosaurus rex (“tyrant king of
lizards”) was discovered in Montana in
1902, it has held center stage. However, the Tyrannosaur experiments with
gigantism appear to have commenced
with the extinction of allosaurs and
ceratosaurs around 100 million years
BP, with Tyrannosaurus rex achieving
enormous size during the last 10 million years before the extinction of all
the dinosaurs in 66 million BP.
Some 25 genera of dinosaur fossils are known from India-inGondwana. Their dates run from the
earliest Mid-Triassic varieties to the
modest-size predators of the Jurassic
and Cretaceous Eras (230-66 million
years BP). Like dinosaurs worldwide,
these include bipedal and quadrupedal
varieties that range in size from small
to mid-size. Tyrannosaurus rex is absent from India and in fact from the
southern continents; this enormous
species evolved on the northern continents of Laurasia after it had separated
from Gondwana. Thus dinosaur remains in India are confined to species
that had evolved on the southern continents before the Laurasian separation from Gondwana. The iconic variety, with a symbolic Indian name, Rajasaurus (“king, sovereign, or royal lizard”), was roughly twenty feet in
length (Wilson et al. 2003), half the
length of Tyrannosaurus rex.
Collision
When Laurentia and Eurasia
(= Laurasia) broke away from Pangea
(200 to 180 million years BP), the
Great Southern Continent of Gondwana remained intact; its southern continents dispersed at various later times.
Prior to this breakup, during the Late
Paleozoic Era (330 to 240 million years
BP), the Gondwana landmasses were
subject to approximately 90 million
years of glaciation—a result of supercontinent movement over a wandering
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South Pole (Crowell and Frakes 1970,
1975; Crowell 1978). Geological effects
of glaciation are evident in southeastern South America, Africa south of the
Sahara, southern India, Madagascar,
and Southern Australia. Around 100
million years ago India and Madagascar detached from Gondwana (Powell
1988), probably because of crustal rifting that separated them from the vast
land mass of Antarctica. Today the
Southwest Indian Ridge on the floor of
the Indian Ocean marks the rift
where, in all likelihood, an upwelling
plume from deep in the Earth’s mantle
powered the separation, the opening
of the southwest Indian Ocean, and
the movement of the India plate
north. Its estimated velocity was the
fastest of any plate movement on the
planet—twenty centimeters (7.9 inches) per year. Kumar et al. (2007) note
that five seismographic stations on
Archaean rock of the Indian Shield
indicate a thickness of 80 to 100 kilometers (50 to 62 miles), about half the
180-kilometer thickness of the other
Gondwana shields. It is thought that
the base of the Indian Shield may have
been eroded by passage over plumes
or hotspots; in any case, its thinness
may account for its unusually rapid
migration. How much of the ocean
bottom in advance of (to the north of)
the India Plate was actually part of it is
unknown for it exists now as deeplysubducted crustal fragments sinking
into the mantle beneath Eurasia.
Ocean bottom that trailed the India
craton undoubtedly accumulated from
upwelling along the Southwest Indian
Ridge and consequent seafloor spreading.
When India began its migration
north, the Indian subcontinent rafted
a rock-and-fossil record that had accumulated over more than 3000 million
years. An interwoven chronology of
geotemporal, petrotemporal, and biotemporal events includes microfossils
from Archean rocks, autotrophic bacteria, stromatolites, trilobites, vertebrates
from fish to amphibians, and reptiles up
to the great age of the dinosaurs. Some of
these fossil remains indicate that parts of
the India craton were periodically flooded during its migration, creating abovewater fossilization of undersea life.

(Illustration 5)
As this cratonic raft moved away
from Gondwana, existing species lived
on. For perhaps 30 million years (96 to
66 million BP) late Cretaceous dinosaurs coexisted with diminutive mammalian species not much larger than a
cat or dog that had long coexisted with
dinosaurs since they had diverged
from reptiles 225 to 200 million years
ago. This India raft had moved far beyond its beginning point where it was
attached to Antarctica and was halfway to Asia when a dramatic volcanism set in. The drifting subcontinent
evidently ran over a deep mantle
plume of enormous power that broke
through the underlying crust and
poured out massive quantities of lava
which spread over a huge territory in
western, central, and southern India.
The resulting formation is known as
the Deccan Traps, the latter a Scandinavian word that refers to a step or
stair structure that was most likely
formed from layers of lava overspreading earlier layers. The Deccan Traps
today are up to 2000 meters (6600
feet) thick in the coastal region near
Mumbai, tapering off to the east to
less than 60 meters (under 200 feet).
Upwelling lava was evidently superheated, resulting in an extended horizontal rather than vertical accumulation; virtually level lava flows have
been traced for 100 kilometers (60
miles). The whole expanse is now
spread over 500,000 km2 (200,000
miles2), with a volume of 1,000,000
km3 (200,000 miles3). However, nowseparated outliers indicate that extensive erosion has reduced both the
thickness and area of the original
Traps, which is estimated at three
times its present size, making it one of
the largest geological features on the
planet. Fossils located between layers
of lava indicate that eruptions were
discontinuous, possibly recurring sporadically with pauses of tens of thousands of years, and coming to an end
when the Indian subcontinent had
moved clear of the underlying hotspot,
which now lies under Réunion Island
in the Indian Ocean.
A worldwide catastrophe occurred 66 million years BP when an
asteroid struck Earth with an epicenter

Illustration 5: Migration of India. Plate
tectonics carried India north from Gondwana to its collision with South Asia. This
illustration shows rapid movement (c. 20
cm. per years) following departure from
Gondwana gradually slowing to 5 cm. per
year as it approached South Asia. Source:
en.wikipedia.com.
on the Yucatan Peninsula. The story of
the Chicxulub impact can be traced
through the geological work of the
father-and-son, Luis and Walter Alvarez (1980, 1992, 2017). Whether there is
some connection between this impact
and the eruption of the Deccan Traps
has been put forward as tenuous theory but has not been demonstrated. The
effect of the asteroid strike, however,
was a worldwide mass extinction that
eliminated 90% of terrestrial life, with
dinosaurs in India and elsewhere driven to extinction. The Indian subcontinent thus became a graveyard for the
last Cretaceous Era dinosaurs, including Rajasaurus. The inventory of dinosaur remains in India, however, does
not include the enormous Tyrannosaurus rex or its smaller ancestors, for
the Tyrannosaur line seems to have
developed on Laurasia after separation
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from Gondwana; it is thus found in
northern regions—China and North
America (Brusatte et al. 2010; 2015).
Among the mid-sized dinosaur remains in India, the extensive collection of bones near Balasinor in the
western province of Gujarat ranks as
one of the most prominent fossil sites
in the world. Here dinosaur bones are
spread over 70+ acres, littering the
surface of the ground; fossilized dinosaur eggs have been located; and
scores of skeletal remains of numerous
species have been preserved. The Suketi Fossil Park on the bank of the River Markanda, in Nahan, preserves a
different era of prehistoric life—
primarily vertebrate fossils and skeletons.
The striking uniqueness of India
is its collision with South Asia and the
profound geographical effect this impact had. Recent studies (von Hinsbergen et al. 2012; Jagoutz et al. 2015) have
placed the collision of the Indian craton with offshore islands of Eurasia at
50 million years BP and collision with
the Eurasian landmass 10 million years
later. If this chronology is accurate,
the extinction of late Cretaceous dinosaurs happened approximately 26 million years before India became part of
Asia. Species that survived the mass
extinction included smaller amphibians, reptiles, avian dinosaurs (birds),
and mammals that now emerged as
the dominant species. While some
evolutionary development of surviving
species undoubtedly occurred in India
between its separation from Gondwana and suturing to South Asia, the
subsequent 40-million-year movement
of species between Asia and the Indian
subcontinent has rendered these less
significant today. Within a few million
years, India’s animal population included species originating in the immense landmass of Eurasia.
The migration of India north
from Gondwana to the south coast of
Eurasia was largely marked by the
preservation of lifeforms along with an
immensely long fossil record of their
history. Meanwhile, the collision of
the Indian craton with Southern Asia
began one of the most dramatic events
of planetary history. With the collision
of the subcontinent with offshore

islands (c. 50 million BP), the collection of island terranes began, though
they were subsequently crushed or
subducted. With the full-bodied meeting of India with the Asian mainland, a
slow-motion 40-million-year collision
was set in motion which is still going
on. Prior to the collision, the India
plate set a tectonic speed record, moving at 20 centimeters (7.9 inches) per
year (Kumar 2007). Since the collision,
movement has gradually slowed to the
present 5 centimeters (2 inches) per
year. One way of observing the effect
of India’s continuing collision suggested by Krishnan (1982, 73) is the distortion of the Tethyan Basin (the last
remnant of the Tethys Sea, which separated Laurasia from Gondwana in the
pre-Cretaceous Period). This basin can
be traced from Turkey through Iraq
and Iran and it may have run as a
straight line into the Indonesian Archipelago. This suggestive calculation
indicates that the collisional mass of
India has pushed the basin north by
approximately 1300 kilometers (780
miles). The result was a progressive
crushing of landmasses that reduced
the area of land along the line of collision. Krishnan, who has written extensively on Indian tectonics (1953; 1967),
concludes that “the estimate of the
crustal shortening of about 1300 km . .
. would therefore seem to be quite a
modest estimate for the numerous
folds, overthrusts and nappes present
in the Himalayan-Karakorum belt”
which indicates that “a region of great
width was involved in the Tertiary
mountain building movements” (1982,
74). While the precise reduction in
area may remain beyond precise determination, the impact region is highly
visible (Illustration 6), and the volume
of rock and sediment affected is incalculable, though the result is obvious.
The entire region north of India, including both the Himalayas and the
Tibet Plateau, has been forced upward
by this landmass collision. What is
visible, however, is a partial picture.
When continental crust attains elevation through orogeny (mountain
building), it also gains depth or thickness that displaces some of the underlying mantle, thus maintaining its
buoyancy, like a loaded ship settling

Illustration 6: Collision with South Asia. The crushing and collision of landmasses is
visible in the distorted lines of the Himalayas and the complex mountainous ripples at
both ends of the range. The raising of the mountains outpaces erosion caused by wind,
rain, snow, avalanches, and rock slides. The area of Asia affected is several hundred
miles in width and more than 1500 miles from east to west. Source: www.usgs.com.
deeper into the water.
The present location of India today presents some striking facts of
chronology. During its extensive prehistory, India was elsewhere. Its history of stromatolites and trilobites, fish
and amphibians, reptiles and dinosaurs and early mammals occurred
while it was part of a sequence of supercontinents extending far back in
time: Pangea, Gondwana, Atlantica,
Rodinia, and Ur. The whole time span
since verifiable life began is 3500 million years while the time India has
been a part of Asia is 50 million years.
In a scale we can understand, 97.7% of
India’s geological and biological past
occurred elsewhere with the time India was part of Asia calculating to 1.3%
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of her history. In the final phase of its
history, India provides a unique example of continental migration with a
collision more momentous than others
around the planet. In addition, India
reminds us that every craton, terrane,
region, and nation has an equally vast
prehistory that unfolded elsewhere
from where it is now. It has been estimated that most of the continental
landmasses of the world have moved
at least 10,000 miles. Alfred Wegener
would be amazed.
At less than 50 million years of
age, the Himalayas make up the newest mountain range on Earth. Their
peaks are craggy and jagged and constructed of huge slabs of obducted crust
and sedimentary rock. Observation

confirms that the direct impact of convergent plates slowly folded, rippled,
crumpled, crushed, and buckled huge
slabs of surface crust which have been
steadily thrust upward, adding to the
overall height of the entire range
(Illustration No. 7). Embedded in sedimentary rock, shells, trilobites, and
other fossils mark the rippling and
folding of seabed forced over the Asian
continent. Among these the oldest
whale fossil on the planet was discovered (Bajpai 1998): Himalayacetus subathuensis, a mammal that returned to
the ocean—perhaps to the Tethys Sea.
Dating to the Eocene Era 53.5 million
years ago, it is one of several Eocene
mammal fossils found in the Himalayas (Thewissen 2001).
The highest peak in the world,
Mount Everest, stands at 29,017 feet
(29,029 to the top of the snow), but
the Himalayan range features fifty
mountains over 7,200 meters (23,600
feet). The range varies from 150 kilometers (90 miles) to 350 kilometers

(220 miles) in width and stretches
2400 kilometers (1,500 miles) across
northern India. Immediately north, a
tectonic valley roughly 30 to 35 miles
across—the remnants of the Tethyan
Ocean basin—separates the Himalayas
from the Tibetan Plateau, a 2.5- million-square-kilometer (970,000-square
mile) plateau averaging 4,500 meters
(14,800 feet) above sea level. The volume of all this land displaced and
thrust upwards is unimaginable,
though the collisional history of the
planet suggests immense changes on
this scale have happened many times
in many locations. Meanwhile the increase in elevation outpaces erosion
which began as soon as the first hills
were pushed up 40 million years ago.
The result is the deep, rich, erosionfed lands immediately south of the
range that form a fertile belt across the
north of India. The four greatest rivers
of South Asia—the Indus, Ganges,
Brahmaputra, and Mekong—are fed
by Himalayan ice and snow with mas-

sive flows from mountain elevations.
Culture
When we consider our bipedal
ancestors around five million years
ago, we are confined to the miniscule
fraction of time when India was part of
Asia. If we focus our perspective to the
whole time of Homo sapiens, we are
more confined to 300 thousand years,
a vanishing fraction of the whole. Yet
our day-to-day perspective, in India
and everywhere else is so consumed by
the human concerns of families,
friends, school, work and recreation
that these easily swell to become our
major or even our only perspective.
From this viewpoint, earth and biological history can easily disappear like
the splash of stars in the Milky Way
now mostly out of sight beyond our
dust-laden skies. We need a double
perspective. No matter how consuming
our lives may be, there is a larger story
where the groundwork and possibility
for our existence was laid down over

Illustration 7: The Himalayas. The collision of India with Southern Asia led to a crushing and compression of thousands of square
miles of landmass that subducted, obducted, and rippled, leading to a deep thickening of continental crust while raising the greatest
mountain range on the planet, and creating the Tibetan Plateau. Beginning 50 million years ago, the collision continues today, raising the mountains an average five millimeters a year. Continuing mountain erosion has result in the rich fertile lands of northern
India and the Indus, Ganges, and Brahmaputra River Valleys. Source: www.sciencing.com.
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billions of years on long forgotten
earthscapes. Our significance lies in
our ability to imagine the whole story:
to realize the place of humanity in the
light of this immense prehistory. India
provides one of many landscapes for
exploring our imaginings.
In the past thirty years we have
recognized that Homo sapiens migrated out of Africa some time earlier than
65,000 years BP. A growing list of sites
and artifacts has shown us that the
primary migration route out of Africa
was across the Gate of Grief at the
south end of the Red Sea to the southern coast of Arabia (Armitage 2011)—
now called the Southern Route. In
fact, an extensive sequence of artifacts,
human remains, and relict settlements
along oceanic margins indicates that
the primary route that peopled the
world was coastal—following the
shorelines of South Asia, then beachcombing around the entire Pacific
Ocean from Philippines to Patagonia
(Wood 2019b). Genetic markers
coastal migrants into India, or what
Reich et al. (2009) call Ancestral South
Indians, provided one of the two major
gene pools of India today. Metspalu et
al. (2004) suggest that the fertile ecology of India may have made it a primary stopping point for some coastal
migrants. Undoubtedly, numerous
South Asia rivers—the Indus, Narmada, Sabarmati, Krishna, Godavari,
Brahmani, Ganges, and Brahmaputra—would have invited inland riverine migration. But geological events
constrained the chronology of human
occupation of India. The Mount Toba
explosion in Sumatra that dates to
74,000 BP provides an important milestone. As Stephen Oppenheimer
(2004) notes, the Mount Toba explosion is thought to have caused such
extensive deforestation, ash fall, and
ecological damage in India that humans already there might not have
survived. Tools atop volcanic ash at
Jwalapuram on the Krishna River indicate settlement occurred soon after
the Mount Toba event. In general, Homo sapiens in India over the next
65,000 years were nomadic huntergatherers (Misra 2001), most likely
clustered into tribal units of approximately thirty individuals, which Lee

and DeVore (1968) have suggested was
the “magic number” for prehistoric
band size.
The second gene pool dominant
in India, identified by Reich et al.
(2009) as Ancestral North Indians,
were later migrants from the Iran and
the Middle East, and points farther
north. More than two hundred years
ago, this migration became an inevitable assumption when Sir William
Jones made his presentation in the
Third Discourse to the Asiatic Society
(1786) in Calcutta, identifying Sanskrit
and derivative languages as belonging
to what is now known as the IndoEuropean language family (Cannon
1990). Subsequent research has shown
that this family originated in the region of the Black Sea, near or east of
Ukraine or possibly Anatolia (Ruhlen
1994). Indo-European peoples had
thus migrated, following the east coast
of the Persian Gulf into the Indus River Valley, and mingled with the indigenous nomadic people in the region.
Historically, they called themselves
“Aryans,” a term recording the most
recent leg of their migration route—
out of Iran. Genetic evidence of lactose
tolerance among these migrants suggests they arrived after the Agricultural Revolution in the Middle East which
dates from 12,000 to 10,000 BP
(Maisels 1990, 65-77). Their arrival
with agricultural skills in what is now
Pakistan is typically placed around
5000 BCE. By 3000 the Indus River
Valley was cultivated extensively
enough to support numerous permanent settlements; by 2700 BCE the
dominant cities of Harappa and Mohenjo-daro represented the high point
of Indus Valley culture (Kenoyer 1998).
Asko Parpola (2015) confirms the longstanding theory that these migrants
established the roots of Hinduism. Sir
William Jones had concluded as much
in the 1780s: the Hindu Vedas and
Upanishads were written in Sanskrit,
the earliest extant Indo-European language—a clear indication that these
northern migrants provided not only
the language but also the fundamental
concepts and beliefs that evolved into
Hinduism (Basham 1954; 1991).
The history of India over the past
3000 to 4000 years is encyclopedic in
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complexity and detail; it began with
the decline of the Indus Valley Civilization between 2500 and 1900 BCE
(Possehi 1997) and a demographic shift
to the upper Ganges-Yamuna River
Valleys. Here the Hindu religion matured, though its roots had been established millennia earlier. The nexus of
the
Hindu-Buddhist
civilization,
which was primarily mythic, laid out
broad parameters that underlie the
subsequent cultural history of India.
The earliest spiritual texts were the
Vedas; of four collections, the Rig Veda
is the oldest, having been transmitted
orally and musically for almost 3,000
years until it was given written form in
ancient Sanskrit between 1500 and 900
BCE (Basham 1991). The Rig Veda consists of 1,028 hymns that are addressed
to early deities (250 celebrated Brahma, the god of creation) and appear to
be musical accompaniments to ritual
originating in the Indus Valley Civilization.
It is rare that a single text can
capture the essence of an entire culture, but Rig Veda x.90 manages just
that. According to this hymn, creation
began by the sacrifice of Purusha Sukta, the Cosmic Man, who had a thousand heads and equally prolific number of arms and legs. His sacrifice,
which resembles an “Indo-European
corpus of myths of dismemberment” (O’Flaherty 1981, 19), transforms
him into the world, sky, Sun, and
Moon; all the wild and domesticated
animals of the Earth; the four seasons;
the entire hierarchy of human society
from Brahmins to warriors to farmers,
and servants. From his sacrifice even
the Vedas were created, including the
Rig Veda where this hymn appears.
From the various parts of his body,
too, the gods are born—the supreme
deities, Indra and Agni, from his
mouth—a remarkable detail that suggests that the gods themselves come
from the mind and words of man himself. The symbolism of this hymn and
its connection to other Hindu writings
deserves the attention of anyone
seeking to understand the roots of
Indian culture (Wood 2017). The overall structure of this narrative says that
the multiple heads and limbs of the
Cosmic Man are in fact the heads and

limbs of all humankind, 7+ billion
heads and double that number of
arms and legs, though they cohere as
a spiritual unity originating in the
creative event itself and evident in the
history of Indian society for the past
thirty centuries.
The unity of humankind in India
earned further confirmation in the
Upanishads. The word means “forest
discourses.” These were one hundred
nine philosophical writings composed
by spiritual philosophers—ascetics
who escaped to isolated forest settings, thus setting themselves apart
from society to pursue the enlightenment known as moksha: the realization that one’s atman (the individual
self) is one with Brahman (the cosmic
self). This ultimate discovery is summarized in the Chandogya Upanishad
as Tat tvam Asi (VII, viii, 7), “That art
Thou,” colloquially, “You are It.” No
matter how many divisions occur, no
matter how many conflicting interests
appear, no matter what other religions, beliefs, philosophies, ideologies
may arise in India, the central truths
of the Rig Veda and the Upanishads
assert the underlying unity of the cosmos, world, society, and humankind.
This realization is the culmination of
the Indian epic, the grand narrative of
the making of India.
There are, however, two other
discoveries in Indian culture. They do
not contradict what these earlier texts
assert; rather they deepen and broaden their truths, and remarkably, they
seem intuitively to recognize the ancient roots of India that extend deep
into the past before civilization and
culture existed. One of these recognitions is that the everyday time, clock
time, the constricted time of mere
decades, centuries, or millennia fails
to do justice to India and its understanding of the Infinite. The bestknown text of India is the Ramayana—most of it available in the Clay
Sanskrit Library (Goldman et al. 20052006)—a magnificent epic of betrayal,
exile, love, rescue, and kingship. As V.
Raghavan (1980) assembled in a landmark conference and forty-four regional essays, the Ramayana influence
has touched nearly every culture in
Asia. It is so powerful, so magnificent,

so cosmic in scope, that it has inspired cultures across what Ptolemy
labeled on his map INDIA EXTRA
GANGEM, “India beyond the Ganges” (Ptolemy 1991) where it has been
translated multiple times in Myanmar, Thailand, and Indonesia and its
episodes have been sculpted on temples from Bangkok’s Grand Palace in
Bangkok, Angkor Wat in Kamboja,
the Prambanan Temple in Central
Java, Majapahit temples in East Java,
and carvings in dramatic relief on the
island of Bali (Illustration No. 8).
The central narrative is the captivity of the princess Sita and her dramatic rescue by prince Rama. The
story is too complex to summarize,
but the narrative unfolds against a
time frame unknown in Western literature. Before Rama was born, his father Dasaratha ruled the kingdom of
Ayodhya for 60,000 years; after Rama
rescues Sita and takes up the kingship, he rules the kingdom for more
than 10,000 years. This, of course, is
literary myth, but intuitively it tells us
that the world and the universe as
conceived in India are much greater,
with a much longer history, than the
mere centuries of present civilization.
A similar mythic temporality is
found in the Buddhist tradition. The
story of Siddhartha, the prince of a
kingdom at Lumbini, now in Nepal, is
well known: having witnessed suffering, he left the kingdom behind,
sought enlightenment among the forest sages, then ultimately attained
enlightenment on his own, from
which point he was known as the
Buddha. His wisdom is summarized
in the Four Noble Truths and the Noble Eightfold Path (Walshe 1995). Following his death a body of legends
known as the Jataka Tales took shape
as one of the earliest literary collections from India. The tales, which
have origins in the fourth century
BCE, appear to be a folkloric collection, many of them animal tales
somewhat like Aesop’s fables that
have migrated into the Buddhist canon. Here they take the form of lives of
former Buddhas (Cowell 1895), each
one “containing the life of Buddha
during some incarnation in one of his
previous existences as a Bodhi61

satta” (Francis and Thomas 1987, 5).
According to the mythology that developed around the Buddha (560-480
BCE), he was the most recent of twenty-five Buddhas born at intervals of
5,000 years. People routinely forget
the message of the Buddha; hence it is
necessary that he regularly return to
renew the Four Noble Truths and the
Eightfold Path. Simple mathematics
shows that this sequence of earlier
Buddhas extends over 125,000 years.
The mythology behind the Jataka Tales “has little to do with the fundamental
teachings
of
Buddhism” (Conze 1951, 97), and has no
part in the profoundly complex philosophy of Buddhism (Guenther 1972).
But the mythology itself constitutes
further evidence that history and prehistory in India is conceptually far
more expansive than other temporal

Illustration 8: Rama and Sita. Although
the Ramayana epic is dominated by
jealousy, betrayal, kidnapping, abuse,
and war, its underlying story is the captivating love between king Rama and
Queen Sita who suffer through exile and
Sita’s captivity to attain their rightful
destiny as king and queen of the kingdom of Ayodha. Episodes from the story
appear in sculptured temple panels
from India to Indonesia. Pictured here is
a woodcarving from the Island of Bali,
recognized worldwide for its painting,
carving, sculpture, music, and drama.
Source: www.Pinterest.com.

traditions. Moreover, it constitutes a
fictional history that adds to the authority and power of Buddha and Buddhism.
While Hinduism has provided a
power culture for India that continues
today, the practice and theory of Buddhism gained its greatest strength
elsewhere: in Sri Lanka, Myanmar,
Thailand, with influence in Malaysia,
Indonesia, China, and Japan. Its greatest monument is Borobudur in Central
Java, now a UNESCO World Heritage
Site (Illustration No. 9).
This Buddhist view of time underlying the Jataka Tales, greatly expanded, informs the Indian Mahabharata, though on a much grander scale.
This ancient epic is the longest literary
work ever composed. The title means
“great”
(maha)
“cherished
one,” (bharat) and refers to the father
of two brothers, Bharat, and thus the
ancestor of the two tribes descended
from these brothers, the Pandavas and
the Kauravas. A disequilibrium in human society occurs when the two
brothers fall into conflict. Subsequently,
their contentious relationship is passed
on to future generations to become a
blood feud between rival clans. A vast
time scheme, which is also described
in the Vishnu Purana, lies behind the
Mahabharata. Its units are yugas and
kalpas. As Troy Wilson Organ (1974)
clarifies, history unfolds through four
yugas, or “great years”: the Satya,
Dvapara, Treta, and Kali Yugas
stretched through 1,728,000, 1,296,000,
864,000, and 432,000 years for a total
of 4,320,000 years, known as a kalpa.
Rama, we learn, lived in the second
age of the world, presumably the
Dvapara Yuga, which situates the story of the Ramayana well over a million
years in the past. The Mahabharata
feud occurred many thousands of
years in the past toward the end of the
Treta Yuga. Indians intuitively understood that present human life occurs
in a minor sliver of time within an
infinitely long history and prehistory.
In his presentation of “India and the
Infinite” (1979) religion historian Huston Smith pointed out that while the
West was still thinking the world
might be no more than 6,000 years
old, India was already envisioning

Illustration 9: Borobudur. The largest Buddhist stupa in the world, Borobudur, a square
pyramidal structure 118 meters (387 feet) per side, is located in Central Java, Indonesia.
It has six square lower levels and three circular upper levels topped by a large central
stupa surrounded by an array of smaller bell-shaped stupas. Built over an estimated 75
years, its completion is estimated at 825 CE. The lower levels display 2,672 relief carvings that stretch for hundreds of yards. Of the 504 statues of Buddha, seventy-one are
seated in bell-shaped stupas on the top levels (shown in the background) and can be
viewed through diamond-shaped openings. In the foreground, one stupa was deliberately left incomplete. Following a 9th or 10th century eruption of nearby Mount Merapi
the monument was covered with volcanic ash and jungle growth; thus the monument
disappeared for several hundred years, known only as hidden ruins by indigenous locals. Rediscovered early in the 19th century, the monument was cleared of trees and
ash by Sir Stanford Raffles. Source: www.unsplash.com.
time stretching into an infinite past
and a universe of endless galaxies so
vast that modern astronomy slips into
its fold without a ripple. The correlation of this mythic temporality with
the geotemporality, petrotemporality,
and biotemporality of India’s past—
most of it in India-in-Gondwana—
unifies science, philosophy, and spirituality in a manner unique to human
civilization.
But lest we seem to overpraise
India’s intuitive grasp of this larger
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reality, we need to emphasize the
massive tragedy also realized and articulated in Indian philosophy. Siddhartha, who became the Buddha, was
motivated by witnessing hunger, sickness, suffering, and death. His Four
Noble Truths include the facts that
“existence is suffering” and “suffering
is caused by selfish craving.” This is
the ongoing fate of every human, but
another great truth is that selfish can
be overcome by following the Noble
Eightfold Path allegedly uttered by

Buddha himself at Benares following
his enlightenment
A variant presentation of human
suffering and selfish craving on a massive scale appears in the Mahabharata
epic. As this enormous story unfolds,
generation after generation, the feuding clans grow in numbers. Eventually,
after millennia of feuding, they number in the hundreds of thousands, but
no one remembers what the original
feud between the brothers was all
about. Moreover, the warring clans
have forgotten the primary truth that
all humans are ultimately brothers—
and sisters, cousins, aunts and uncles,
nephews and nieces. Everyone on
Earth is related, as in fact genetically
we are. The realization of this tragedy
comes in a collection of eighteen chapters in The Mahabharata when the armies of the Pandavas and Kauravas,
descendants of the original feuding
brothers, are drawn up on the battlefield before dawn, ready to begin the
final, decisive war, scenes from which
have been carved in temples across
Southeast Asia (Illustration 10). These
chapters have taken on a life of their
own; they make up the Bhagavad Gita,
the central spiritual text of Hinduism.
The action focuses on a warrior in a
war chariot, Arjuna, and his dialogue
with his charioteer, who happens to be
the god Krishna in disguise. In despair,
Arjuna looks out through the mist of
morning at the vast armies waiting for
the full light of dawn and asks his
charioteer what it all could mean.
The answers Krishna provides to
Arjuna’s questions provide a systematic presentation of Hindu thought and
practice, specifically the many ways
that humans may overcome egotism
and selfish craving and pursue spirituality: the many paths to enlightenment
available to people from different levels of society. There are meditational
paths, paths through learning and wisdom and work, family life, devotion
and love. All of these are different
forms of yoga—“disciplines” that are
equally important in the human quest
for knowledge, wisdom, truth, and unity. With this wisdom understood, the
tragedy of war now fits into the larger
scheme of things, and the war begins.
As we look at Indian culture, we

are likely to think of Hinduism as a
“religion,” but it is so much more. It is
a culture that penetrates ever dimension of Indian life. It is not likely that it
can solve the problem of armies prepared to fight against their own kin;
that is the virtually unsolvable tragedy
of human history, of wars that have
besieged the underlying unity of human life since civilization began, and
they continue today. Amid this tragedy, however, the underlying unity of
life remains, and there are many paths
to that realization. Our understanding
of Hindu culture is too small; seen in
its entirely, it is a final episode in an
epic journey “from atoms to atman,” a
grand narrative tracing out the emergence of infinite spirit (Wood 2017).
The multiple paths confirm that all of
human life—every path, every practice,
every task, every human endeavor—is
central to the task of finding one’s way

within the vast panorama of the universe even as this journey may occur
amidst the tragedy of conflict and war.
These central truths of the Mahabharata and the Bhagavad Gita appear
to have been recognized as fundamental through Indian history until modern times. The ancestor of warring
feuds, Bharat, was idealized as the unifying king before civilization was shattered by division and conflict, war and
destruction, and thus a symbolic union
of opposites, the One behind the
Many. Understood this way, Bharat
has remained the transcendent symbol
for a great ideal. Thus when India
gained independence and framed her
modern constitution in 1950, the symbolism of Maha Bharata, Great Cherished One, was seen and felt as the
unifying power of Indian civilization
and culture. The Indian Constitution
begins, “India, that is Bharat, shall be a
Union of States.”

Illustration 10: The Mahabharata War. A manuscript scene of Arjuna and his charioteer in the thick of the final battle between the Pandavas and Kuravas. Eighteen chapters of the enormous Mahabharata epic that precede this battle make up The Bhagavad Gita, the most sacred of Hindu texts, where Krishna, disguised as Arjuna’s charioteer, explains the multiple ways to moksha (enlightenment)—the many yogas of work,
study, family life, service, meditation. These spiritual truths mitigate the tragedy of
war between two clans descended from feuding bothers, sons of the ancient king,
Bharat. The war led to 1,660,020,000 deaths, approximately 300 million more than
the present (2019) population of India. Source: https://isha.sadhguru.org.
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Christine M. Korsgaard is a renowned philosopher who has taught
at Harvard University for almost three
decades. She works on moral philosophy, interpretations of ethical theory,
the works of Immanuel Kant, and the
ethics surrounding our treatment of
animals. This is her first book that
addresses the treatment of animals.
Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations
to the Other Animals has been brewing since the author became a vegetarian several years ago. This became her
reason, her motivation for writing
about the ethical treatment of animals. Animals have changed the
course of human history. They have
provided food, shelter and clothing,
companionship, and labor; they have
worked for us; they have even fought
for us. Without them our history
would have been far less certain and it
is unlikely that advanced civilization
would have developed. Yet our current
society seems to have forgotten how
much we owe to animals. I fully subscribe to the author's belief that “the
way human beings now treat the other
animals is a moral atrocity of enormous proportions” (p. xi). In clear language, and in a style suitable for nonspecialists, Korsgaard presents her
passionate moral views and her reasoned, objective philosophical arguments, on this controversial topic.
In Fellow Creatures she establishes
her argument in the framework of two
philosophical commitments: 1) Kant’s
ethics, which effectively support the
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notion of animal rights and the concomitant idea that we, therefore, have
obligations toward them; and 2) a particular point of view derived from the
theory of Aristotle about why some
things are good and others bad. She
defends as her core thesis the basic
correctness of Kant’s account of why
we have obligations to animals, although she admits that Kant himself
did not explicitly endorse this idea as
explicitly as she does here. Thus,
Korsgaard argues that the common
understanding of Kant’s general theory—i.e. the notion that animals are
non-rational, unselfconscious beings
(thus giving them no rights) is mistaken, and that Kantian philosophical
terms do not necessarily exclude animals from being ends in themselves.
“Even within the framework of Kant’s
theory,” she writes, “it is possible that
rational beings legislate moral laws
whose protections extend to other
animals. . . . We rational beings
must claim the standing of an ‘end-initself’ not only for ourselves, but for
the other animals as well” (131).
Korsgaard goes on to explain how
she sees Kant’s ethics as leading to the
conclusion that animals are not mere
means to human ends, but ends in
their own right. She does not support
Kant’s notion that our duties to animals are indirect; instead, she believes
that our obligations to other animals—although not exactly the same
as our obligations to other people—
“arise from the relations to ourselves” (XI). She feels that “Valuing”,
with a capital letter, is an original activity of Life, i.e., an important characteristic of a sentient being’s relationship to itself.
Throughout most of the chapters
of this book—parts I and II—the author reels off these ideas and others

derived from them, aiming to defend
her interpretive view of Kant’s ethics.
Although these sections are heavily
theoretical,
they
provide
nonspecialist readers, even those without
a strong background in philosophy,
the opportunity to immerse themselves in Kantian ethics and to acquire
some basic knowledge that will surely
help them to understand debates
about the treatment of animals from
an ethical point of view. Korsgaard
explains in great detail her proposed
terminology, covering all the necessary key concepts, like “creatures,” for
example, which she uses to refer jointly to both humans and other animals,
or the term “companion animal,” instead of “pet,” the latter of which she
considers demeaning.
All together her use of terminology, her ethics, and her general approach are convincing and will cause
any reader to sympathize with her
arguments and her point of view. In
addition, Korsgaard explores evolution, extinction, senescence, and other
topics that are an added value in this
book. She even takes a look at the socalled “immortal jellyfish” (Turritopsis
dohrnii), which is one of the few
known cases of animals capable of
reverting completely to a sexually immature, colonial stage after having
reached sexual maturity as a solitary
individual.
The final part of the book—part
III, the last three chapters—deals with
more practical issues, which, as such,
are far more accessible to the general
reader, as well as those who come
from the natural sciences. Here
Korsgaard offers her insightful vision
on controversial issues like eating
meat and using animal products that
require us to kill animals or make
them suffer; the abolishing the treat-
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ment of animals as pets; and using of
working animals, animals in the military, or the animals in scientific experiments. At this critical juncture, she
argues that one needs a good reason
to kill or harm an animal, and often
we do not have it. She considers that
all situations that involve the treatment of animals as a mere means to
our ends are morally wrong, concluding that the “fundamental wrong is
the system that allows us to view animals as our resources, here for
us” (220). Further topics she addresses
with clever insight and good judgment
are of an ecological nature and have
environmental implications, i.e., the
value of the species, communities, the
habitat loss and the biodiversity crisis.
In her own words, “ecosystems, and
even the world biosphere, nature itself, have intrinsic value, and [. . .] the
value of a species consists in its contribution to those” (192).
This amazing book represents a
great opportunity for a specialized and
non-specialized audience to dive into
animal ethics and the ethical treatment of animals and to ascertain how
the philosophical reflection can help
us to provide a more robust response
to a current, pressing problem in our
society. Hopefully, this book may
serve to raise awareness worldwide
about animal cruelty and presently
neglected animal rights, making us
one step away from ushering in a new
era for our fellow creatures.
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The conquest of the earth, which mostly means the taking it away from those who have a different complexion or slightly
flatter noses than ourselves, is not a pretty thing when you look into it too much. What redeems it is the idea only. An idea
at the back of it; not a sentimental pretense but an idea; and an unselfish belief in the idea—something you can set up, and
bow down before, and offer sacrifice to [. . . .]” —Joseph Conrad (Heart of Darkness)
“The story of human progress is truly heroic. It is glorious. It is uplifting. It is even, I daresay, spiritual.”
—Steven Pinker (Enlightenment Now)
“[I]f you dream of a society in which truth reigns supreme and myths are ignored, you have little to expect from Homo
Sapiens. Better to try your luck with chimps.”—Yuval Noah Harari (21 Lessons for the 21st Century)

At a time when anger and anomie
appear to be the order of the day, and
the ideals of the Enlightenment are
being bombarded from every direction, Yuval Noah Harari and Steven
Pinker have entered the fray once
more to remind us that all is not lost
and to ensure us that reports of the
death of liberalism are greatly exaggerated. Taken together, Pinker and Harari, in their most recent books, offer a
calculated and compelling assessment
of how far humanity has come as a
species and where we should look to
go in the future. In Enlightenment
Now: The Case for Reason, Science,
Humanism, and Progress, Pinker contends that now, more than ever, as the
dominant narrative has become that of
a deepening global crisis and the failure of modernity, classical liberalism
needs a forceful and steadfast defense.
Using a bewildering amount of data
that are neatly broken down into digestible graphs, Pinker is able to argue
convincingly that not only has the En-

lightenment project worked reasonably well but that when properly appreciated, “the ideals of the Enlightenment are, in fact, stirring, inspiring,
noble—a reason to live” (Pinker 6).
Harari's 21 Lessons for the 21st Century
picks up at the point where Pinker
leaves off. After establishing early in
his book that liberalism is (as Pinker
also contends), “the most successful
and most versatile political model humans have so far developed for dealing
with the challenges of the modern
world” (Harari xviii), Harari then looks
to the immediate future and asks
whether the ideals of the Enlightenment will be enough to deal with the
oncoming revolutions in information
technology and biotechnology. He
maintains that in the next few decades
humankind will be confronted with
the most challenging dilemma we
have ever faced. If liberalism wishes to
survive in a world where infotech and
biotech collide, it will have to adjust
and reinvent itself once again.
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Both men agree that we are living
at a time when it is difficult “to find
meaning and purpose if traditional
religious beliefs about an immortal
soul are undermined by our best science” (Pinker 3) and that we are,
therefore, “left with the task of creating an updated story of the
world” (Harari 16). In a world where
many exhibit “an inability to conceive
of a higher purpose in anything other
than religion,” and where “cynicism
about the institutions of modernity” (Pinker xv) has become the norm,
how will this new story go? Is a new,
captivating, and unified narrative even
necessary— or desirable? Harari, for
one, is unequivocal on the matter: “If
this generation lacks a comprehensive
view of the cosmos, the future of life
will be decided at random” (Harari
266). Although Pinker and Harari do
agree on much and more, they also
have their points of disagreement. In
fact, they are somewhat reminiscent of
Pestov and Sergey Ivanovich at one of

Stiva’s parties in Anna Karenina. “Both
[are] men respected for their character
and their intelligence” but are in
marked disagreement on several subjects, “not because they belong to opposite parties, but precisely because they
[are] of the same party,” where “each
has his own special shade of opinion.”
However, at this party, the task of
“jeering without anger” at their
“incorrigible aberrations” will fall to me.
In two early chapters titled
“Counter-Enlightenments”
and
“Progressophobia,” Pinker takes aim at
the academic pessimism that has infiltrated and spread throughout universities—in particular, the Arts and Humanities departments. Pinker venomously attacks everyone from the Romantics and Rousseau to Fanon and
Foucault—with a particular rancor reserved for Nietzsche—and urges us to
abandon these thinkers with their emphasis on the shortcomings of modernity in favor of those who extol the vir-

tues and values of the Enlightenment.
As Pinker rightly asserts, it is these
masters of suspicion, or as he disparagingly calls them, “prophets of doom,”
who have become the rock stars of the
liberal arts curriculum. Where Pinker is
on weaker footing is in his tacit assertion that we would all be better off if
these men never existed. In one passage
(penned with palpable vitriol and bitterness), Pinker defends the Enlightenment project against charges that it is a
Western creation that refuses to account for the great diversity of thought
throughout the world and, therefore, is
unsuited to deal with all the world’s
problems. While refuting the charges
that “the Enlightenment is the guiding
ideal of the West,” Pinker tellingly responds, “If only!” before going on a twochapter tirade against any intellectual
tradition that does not fall within the
purview of the Enlightenment. This line
of thinking is shortsighted and problematic for several reasons—many of
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which Harari directly addresses.
To Pinker’s charge that universities
have become infested with a pessimistic
frame of mind and that there is a dire
need to change this outlook to a more
optimistic one, Harari offers a simple
and straightforward explanation. In the
book’s introduction, while detailing his
reasoning for writing the book in the
manner in which he does (focusing on
the shortcomings of modernity and the
liberal worldview), Harari states that “I
do so not because I believe liberal democracy is uniquely problematic but
rather because I think it is the most
successful and most versatile political
model humans have so far developed [.
. .]” and that, moreover, “[w]ithout criticizing the liberal model, we cannot
repair its faults or move beyond
it” (Harari xviii-xix). Put differently,
progress does not happen and has never happened by praising how great and
perfect the world is but rather by recognizing and criticizing our flaws in order

to improve them. This is an obvious
point that Pinker not so much ignores;
instead, he seems to view as a useful
tool of a bygone era, yet it is no longer
applicable to our modern world ruled
by the self-correcting procedures of
science and reason. In a quite frankly
shocking display of presentism, Pinker
praises the “muckraking journalists
and novelists like Upton Sinclair” (Pinker 186) for propelling progress during the early 20th century
while simultaneously bemoaning the
fact that in recent years works on topics such as genocide, terrorism, cancer, and racism have received major
literary prizes as works on progress
have been given short-shrift. In a book
about progress, this blatant disregard
for how progress continues to work is
troublesome.
Moreover, throughout the book,
Pinker showcases a surprising display
of bad intellectual history that I can
only assume is used intentionally to
bolster his argument. For instance, in
a percipient paragraph discussing
“scientific racism,” which reached peak
popularity in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, Pinker correctly concludes that “[y]et to pin ideological racism on science [. . .] is bad
intellectual history” (Pinker 397). Although his statement is 100% correct,
the problem arises when Pinker then
turns around and participates in this
same bad intellectual history by blaming all of modernity’s ills on the counter-enlightenment thinkers and progressophobes. To display such a concise and cogent understanding in the
one case only to turn around and commit the same errors is a baffling showcase of willful ignorance and intellectual dishonesty.
As perplexing as Pinker’s reasoning is in the matter, it may have its
roots in something Harari directly
confronts in a particularly insightful
chapter titled “Post-Truth: Some Fake
News Lasts Forever.” After succinctly
explaining that humans have always
lived in an age of post-truth because
Homo sapiens is a post-truth species,
Harari moves on to a discussion on
truth vs. power. As he masterfully details, truth and power have always

been mostly incompatible and can
travel only so far together before they
are forced to go their separate ways.
This is not a new discovery but rather
a dilemma that scholars are aware of
and have been wrestling with for hundreds of years. If you want a powerful
story, you have to invent fictions; on
the flip-side of that, if you want a
truthful story at some point, you will
have to renounce power. When sitting
down to write, scholars have to ask
themselves, “Do they serve truth or
power? Should they aim to unite people by making sure everyone believes
in the same story, or should they let
people know the truth even at the
price of disunity?” (Harari 247) Some
of the most successful scholars and all
of the most powerful narratives
throughout history have valued unity
over truth— in part because they understand that humans as a species prefer power to truth. When writing his
book, Pinker was faced with this same
dilemma, and at times (though indeed
not always), he chooses to sacrifice
truth on the altar of power.
Before this runs the risk of reading
as a full-on diatribe against Pinker, it
must be stated that Enlightenment
Now is a thoroughly engaging and invaluable read that gets much more
right than it does wrong. One of the
stronger points of the book comes
when Pinker details how the Optimism Gap combines with the Availability Heuristic to form a bias toward
negativity, which is further reinforced
by the daily news cycles to form a distorted view of reality that convinces us
that the world is all going to pot. Other strong chapters include his chapters
titled “Terrorism” and “Science.” In the
former chapter, Pinker reminds us
(through data, as is his forte) that the
very nature and design of terrorism is
to create an outsized panic by combining major dread with minor harm.
While in the latter chapter, Pinker’s
coverage of C. P. Snow and Snow’s
advocation of a “Third Culture” going
forward is particularly refreshing. In
his chapter, “Democracy,” Pinker
shines when discussing what he aptly
refers to as our civics-class idealization
of democracy and makes the compelling case that throughout history, peo71

ple have always voted with their hearts
and not their minds. However, what
Pinker does best in his book
(sometimes subtly, other times heavyhandedly) is to remind us that it is the
very “nature of progress that it erases
its tracks, and its champions fixate on
the remaining injustices and forget
how far we have come” (Pinker 215). It
is this last profound point of Pinker’s,
which he underscores throughout,
that brings me to my final critique.
Throughout his book, Pinker is
able to make a compelling case for
progress in large part because he takes
a long-durée view of history. Pinker is
correct that if we take a broad view of
history as opposed to a narrow one,
what we begin to see is a more progressive and optimistic trajectory of
history. However, it is equally important to keep in mind that we
should never replace wholesale one
view for the other. It can be extremely
dangerous and misleading to emphasize long-term progress at the cost of
short-term atrocities. Doing so can
make indefensible inhumanities seem
like right actions justified through the
name of progress. Although it can be
easy to agree with Pinker that we live
at a time when progress needs a determined defense, it is vital that this defense must not turn into a fetishization of progress.
So, now that we have been dually
introduced to both the self-eradicating
nature of progress and the dangers in
fetishizing progress—what does the
future of progress look like? As Harari
points out, we find ourselves living in
an age of bewilderment where simultaneously the credibility of liberalism
is being questioned, and the twin revolutions in information technology
and biotechnology are confronting us
head-on and threatening to reshape
the world as we know it. In such a
time of uncertainty, one cannot be
faulted for calling into question the
progressive projection of history and
wondering what the future will hold.
Questions such as “Who are we? What
should we do in life? What kinds of
skills do we need? Given everything
we know and don’t know about science, about God, about politics, and

about religion, what can we say
about the meaning of life today?” (Harari xviii) require fresh answers in an era of looming ecological
crisis and the growing threat of
weapons of mass destruction. Add to
the mix the fact that the revolutions
in infotech and biotech are “giving
humanity the power to reshape and
reengineer life” (Harari xviii), and
these questions become even more
pressing. As Harari concludes, nothing is more crucial in an age of bewilderment than self-observation
and self-knowledge. In the penultimate chapter of 21 Lessons titled
“Meaning: Life Is Not a Story,” Harari
underscores the vital importance of
understanding ourselves. As he
states, “in order to understand ourselves, a crucial step is to
acknowledge that the ‘self’ is a fictional story that the intricate mechanisms of our mind constantly manufacture, update, and rewrite” (Harari
305). This story that we tell ourselves, about ourselves, often bears
little resemblance to reality, and the
vast majority of our experiences never enter into the narrative of the in-

ner self that we choose to create. As
misleading and false as the stories of
ourselves are, they nevertheless provide us with explanations to the
questions of who we are; where we
come from; and where we should
look to go. However, as Harari eloquently explains: if you really want
to understand yourself, “The first
thing you need to know about yourself is that you are not a story” (Harari 306), and that we should
cease to identify with these sanitized
and fictitious inner narratives with
which we choose to delude ourselves. In the immediate future, selfobservation and self-knowledge will
be paramount, for “Unless you are
happy to entrust the future of life to
the mercy of quarterly revenue reports, you need a clear idea of what
life is all about” (Harari xviii).
Although Pinker offers an optimistic take on our past and present
and Harari takes a more tempered
and pessimistic approach to our immediate future, taken together, Enlightenment Now and 21 Lessons for
the 21st Century offer a sobering, cal-
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culated, and thoroughly researched
assessment of the state of the world
and should be given a serious look
by anyone concerned with the contemporary story of who we are,
where we come from, and where we
should look to head in the immediate future.
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Father Thomas Berry was born in
North Carolina in 1914, the third of
thirteen children. He joined the Passionist Order in 1933, after his first
year of college, and he earned a PhD
from Catholic University in 1948, focusing on Giambattista Vico. Berry
studied in China in 1948-1949. He developed a lifelong interest in Asian
religions, later writing Buddhism
(1967) and Religions of India: Hinduism, Yoga, Buddhism (1971).1 In the
United States, Berry taught at a variety
of Roman Catholic universities. At
Fordham (1966-1981), he helped to
create a distinctive religious studies
program, teaching courses in world
religion and cosmic Christianity.
In 1970, Berry founded the Riverdale
Center of Religious Research on the
Hudson River just north of Manhattan.2 The center promoted human
spiritual transformation and reflection
on the mysteries of reality. Berry directed the center from 1970 to 1995.
From 1975 to 1987, he was president of
the American Teilhard Association
and editor of Teilhard Studies.3 Berry
retired to Greensboro, North Carolina
in 1995, living in an apartment above a
former stable owned by his brother Joe
and sister-in-law Jean. He suffered
several strokes and moved to a care
facility in 2008, dying in 2009.
More than a scholar and a priest,
Berry was a “shaman.”4 As a priest and
a scholar, he was trained in theology
and in history, culture, ideas, and religion. He described himself variously,
using terms like “cosmologist,”

“geologian,” and “Earth scholar.” In the
context of Big History, he might best
be described as an “ecotheologian” in
the spirit of Teilhard de Chardin. Berry
promoted ecumenical and interfaith
dialogue over his long life and career,
notably with a deep interest in indigenous spirituality. More famously still,
he promoted the “New Story,” a spiritually inflected creation account, epic
of evolution, or Big History.
“The story of the universe is the
story of the emergence of a galactic
system in which each new level of expression emerges through the urgency
of self-transcendence,” Berry argued in
“The New Story” in 1978. His “gospel”
message was that the “human emerges
not only as an earthling, but also as a
worlding. We bear the universe in our
beings as the universe bears us in its
being. The two have a total presence
to each other and to that deeper mystery out of which both the universe
and ourselves have emerged.”5
Berry retold this “New Story” in
many forms, notably in Dream of the
Earth (1988), The Great Work: Our
Way into the Future (1999), and with
cosmologist Brian Thomas Swimme in
The Universe Story (1992). Swimme
and Mary Evelyn Tucker, in turn, retold it in a book and documentary film
entitled Journey of the Universe (2011).6
Berry’s goal was for people not just to
learn about indigenous cultures, religious traditions, and modern science,
but to learn from them how to live.
This same goal animates Tucker,
Grim, and Angyal’s biography of Berry.
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Readers will learn much about Berry,
but the biography also is written to
encourage readers to learn from Berry’s life and work. It is not a hagiography. Neither is it a work of neutral
or critical scholarship. Rather, it is an
engaging appreciation of Berry by
scholars who were his students and
colleagues. This point should not be
read as negative. It is to honor the
spirit of the book—that readers not
just learn about Berry but learn from
him about how to understand and live
well in the modern world.
Berry defined his calling as closer
to that of a shaman than a scholar or a
priest—“one who entered deeply into
the powers of the universe and Earth
and brought back an integrative vision
for the community,” in Tucker, Grim,
and Angyal’s words. “It was the shamanic dimension of my own psychic
structure that required that I go into
some manner of inner experience with
the natural world,” Berry explained
near the end of his life. “This was not
simply to enter into some form of the
spiritual life but to take on a social
role.”7 That role came in promoting
the New Story and the activism it
called forth.
Tucker, Grim, and Angyal tell
Berry’s life as an arc from an old story
to the New Story. “From his beginnings as a cultural and intellectual
historian”—and his upbringing as a
traditional Roman Catholic—“Berry
became a historian of the Earth.” He
“witnessed in his own lifetime the
emergence of a multicultural planetary

Thomas Berry. Source: Wikipedia
civilization as cultures came in contact
around the globe,” and he wanted to
put this story in “the larger arc of
Earth history and the evolution of the
universe.” Berry “recognized the power
of an evolutionary story to engage humans in the great questions: where
have we come from, how do we belong, why are we here?” Humanity
needed the New Story to meet the
needs of a globalizing humanity transforming not just themselves but the
planet too. Berry believed that such a
transformation was “not only possible
but already emerging.” Tucker, Grim,
and Angyal argue that the possibility
of transformation is “the promise of
Berry’s perspective.” The New Story
“adds fresh energy to what Berry called
the ‘Great Work,’ namely, what each
person and community can contribute
to a flourishing future.”8
Thomas Berry is not structured as
a straightforward biography or a lifeand-times story. The first two-thirds of
the book cover Berry’s formative experiences, the development of his
thought, and the major components of
his career as a teacher, guru, and activist. The last third of the book, in
greater depth, explores both their
sources and their evolution. It includes
chapters on “narratives of time,” Teilhard de Chardin, Confucian thought,
and indigenous traditions.
Nasser Zakariya’s assessment of
“epics of evolution” helps to assess
where Berry’s “New Story” fits with Big
History.9 Zakariya explores the tensions, even contradictions, in how ep-

ics of evolution try to weave together
scientific fact and explanation with a
mythic arc. Like other epics of evolution, Big History blends elements of
modern science with philosophical
and religious assumptions that are
rooted in premodern religious and
cultural traditions. Sometimes the
blending is implicit and intellectual.10
Sometimes it is overtly spiritual or religious in character. In this fashion, Berry’s New Story uses modern science
but is defined by its spirituality, drawing on Judaism and Christianity, other
world religions, and indigenous traditions. The New Story was not materialist, but appealed to primordial experience, mystery, and mysticism. It reflected Berry’s eco-theological interests
and his inter-faith sensibility.
Like many Americans, Berry
viewed Native Americans as the
world’s “first ecologists.”11 One of his
influences was Nicholas Black Elk, a
Lakota healer-shaman and Roman
Catholic catechist. Black Elk lived
closely to the land, especially as a boy
before the American conquest of the
Lakota in the 1870s. He never gave up
his Lakota culture and rituals, but he
converted to Roman Catholicism and
baptized more than four hundred Native Americans. The Church has begun
the process of canonizing Black Elk.12
Black Elk’s life journey was very different than Berry’s, of course, but they
shared an inclination to treat traditions not as mutually exclusive but
cross-pollinating.
What Big Historians will make of
Berry’s New Story depends on whether
they are put off by or value engaging
with mysticism and religious traditions. Berry described himself among
other things as a “cosmologist.” The
term can refer to both scientific and
philosophical or theological accounts,
or a mix of all three. Mythopoetic accounts probably belong in a different,
if overlapping, category (e.g., the account in Genesis 1-3 is a quite different
genre from a systematically developed
cosmology written by a twentieth century theologian). But mythopoetic elements often are woven into epics of
evolution, especially popular ones.
Even if it is not always clear whether
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such weavings are intellectually coherent, they are appealing to people because they offer scientific reference
points, cultural rituals, and spiritual
and emotional experiences.
Berry’s New Story has been influential among some advocates of Big
History and his ideas have been featured at conferences—notably when
the documentary film Journey of the
Universe was screened at the Big History conference at Dominican University in California in 2014. The conference at Villanova in 2018 included New
Story-style “liturgy” in its opening and
closing sessions—all to some controversy. A conflict between “spiritual
agendas” and “science” has been part
of discussions at Big History conferences in 2014, 2016, and 2018 and in the
pages of Origins and the Journal of Big
History. 13
Perhaps the greatest value of
Thomas Berry: A Biography, then, is
that it can help the International Big
History Association to work through
how to engage both Big History scholarship and New Story-style impulses in
the Big History movement; for Big History is more than an academic discipline. From the start it has aspired to,
in Berry’s words, “the ‘Great Work,’
namely, what each person and community can contribute to a flourishing
future.” The conclusion of David
Christian’s TED talk (2011) and its popularity, attest to the appeal of this
“great work.”
My own view is that Big History’s
value is precisely that it is not just
meant to teach people about history,
but to provide them intellectual tools
to live better as individuals and citizens. It exemplifies the holism of a
liberal arts approach to learning. Academia does not need yet another new
trans-disciplinary movement aspiring
to be a new discipline; it needs public
scholars who bring together science,
politics, historiography, philosophy,
and, yes, religion in compelling ways.
If so, then it is appropriate to explore
the cosmological and eco-spiritual impulses of figures like Berry, both as
something to study and critique and as
something from which to learn.
This biography, the writings of Berry, Swimme, and Tucker, and similar

writings are a way to explore what intellectually engaged writing looks like
that crosses the borders among scholarship, advocacy, spirituality, and popular writing.14 Whether one agrees
with Berry’s ideas, or with Tucker,
Grim, and Angyal’s belief that we have
much to learn from Berry, there is intellectual, moral, spiritual, and political profit in engaging a book like this.
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of “green Christianity, see Christopher Hrynkow, “Greening God?
Christian Ecotheology, Environmental Justice, and SocioEcological Flourishing,” Environmental Justice, 10:3, June 2017
(https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/
full/10.1089/env.2017.0009). See
the “Faith and Environment” page
on the Earth Day Network site
(https://www.earthday.org/
campaigns/campaign-forcommunities/communities-offaith/; accessed 28 September
2019) for examples of and “earth
keeping” and “new stories” from a
wider array of religious traditions.
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26 October 2019, Bodega Bay, California, USA
You are doubtless reading these
words as published some weeks or
perhaps even months after the destructive wildfires that struck California in October of 2019, but in the moment at which I am setting these
words to page, my wife Diana and I
remain, unwilling to leave despite a
mandatory evacuation order, in our
coastal home. Just one week ago, I'd
completed reading (for the second
time) the 2019 non-fiction book by Dr.
Lucy Jones: The Big Ones: How Natural
Disasters Have Shaped Us (and What
We Can Do About Them). When I'd
reached the final page last week, I had
no idea that we would soon be experiencing the very subject matter of the
book I'd just finished reading.
But such obliviousness as mine is
very much a theme of Jones's book.
The Big Ones goes well beyond the
physics of natural disasters. Though a
leading seismologist herself, Jones explains only enough of the natural phenomena to allow the reader to comprehend the sheer unopposable power
of earthquakes, volcanoes, floods, and
the like. These forces of nature are
truly beyond human control, but well
within human control is how we plan
for disaster and how we respond to it

once it has struck. This resonates deep
within me today because, although it
is true that wildfires have ignited naturally for millions of years, the wildfire
sweeping toward my home at this moment was likely ignited by faulty electrical transmission equipment. Modern human beings have hundreds of
unnatural ways of sparking what was
once a purely natural occurrence. In
The Big Ones, Jones weaves an interconnected narrative of human psychology, culture, politics, economics,
and technology. Her storytelling is
compelling in itself, while her rich mix
of disciplines should be a pleasure to
readers who appreciate a Big History
approach to understanding our world.
Though the chapters are each multifaceted, the book as a whole is organized by simple chronology, starting
with the volcanic destruction of Pompeii in 79 AD, and proceeding with
each chapter devoted to a particular
event, leading up to recent 21stcentury disasters. The chronological
organization serves an important purpose in developing the key ideas Jones
wishes to impart. We may not see
much change in the physical phenomena of planet Earth, but we see a huge
evolution in the cultural and technological responses to disaster over the
last two thousand years. In sharp con76

trast, we also see human nature remaining relatively unchanged, exhibiting over and over behaviors such as
scapegoating, wishful thinking, and
the leveraging of natural events to
achieve political ends.
Jones opens with a theme that is
familiar to Big Historians but much
underappreciated by many people in a
modern world that insulates us from
our natural surroundings:
We plant farms near rivers and
near the springs that form along
faults, for their access to water;
on the slopes created by volcanoes, for their fertile soil; on the
coast, for fishing and trade. These
locations put us at risk of disruptive natural forces. (8)
My wife and I were certainly aware of
those facts eighteen years ago when
we purchased our Bodega Bay home, a
property that sits almost directly atop
the San Andreas Fault. Indeed, Bodega
Bay exists precisely because of tectonic
plate movements. But Diana and I
were both born and reared just north
of San Francisco, a region where the
1906 earthquake and the specter of a
future Big One loom large in the popular imagination from an early age.
Like most Californians, we have

developed a variety of coping mechanisms and emotional adaptations to
this knowledge. (For example, I am
coping right now by concentrating on
writing this book review because I
have no control over the conflagration
blazing just forty miles away.)
How humans respond to the
pure randomness of natural disasters
is another important theme of The Big
Ones. Such randomness "means that
every moment presents a risk, leaving
us anxious" (10), to which I would add
that humans simply cannot go about
their everyday lives in a permanent
state of anxiety. Jones draws on what
psychologists
describe
as
"normalization bias," the tendency by
which "what we experience now or in
recent memory becomes our definition of what is possible" (10). For Diana and me, recent
memory includes nearby
wildfires of the previous
two years that inundated
our region with noxious
smoke and a horror movie orange sky for weeks.
But we never saw the
flames near our home;
our electricity stayed on;
life continued despite the
discomforts. Our "new
normal" became frequent
nearby wildfires but not
something we had experienced directly. As Jones
explains further, "We
think the common smaller events are all we have
to face, and that, because
the biggest one isn't in
anyone's memory, it isn't
real" (10).
But the "new normal" began changing for
us just a few days ago (as
I write this), in the early
morning of October 24th.
We'd gone to bed the
night before with very
routine expectations for
the next few days. Our
first hint of something
strange came, not from
the Weather Channel,
nor from the local electric
company, nor from any of

the various governmental entities
charged with ensuring public safety.
No, our first hint came from our cat,
Miracle. Around four in the morning,
Miracle began poking us with her
paws and pacing back and forth across
our bed, not unusual behavior for her
when she wants food or attention. But
two hours later, the young cat's fussing and fretting still continued. I began dreading my drive to work after
losing so much sleep due to Miracle's
prolonged nervous behavior. Several
hours later, fortified by much coffee, I
was on the road to my job at Dominican University while listening to the
local news on the radio. Wildfire was
the lead story, indeed almost the only
story being covered that morning. A
blaze had begun around nine-thirty
the previous night about fifty miles
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from our house. Now Miracle's fidgeting made sense. She must have
smelled the first traces of distant
smoke while Diana and I slept peacefully unaware.
However, before you imagine
that I am about to wax eloquent about
the wonders of feline threatperception, I must point out the contrasting case of Miracle's litter-mate
and brother, Merlin. Far from living
up to the prophetic fame of his namesake, Merlin continued to lounge
about the house as always, a laid-back
little lion-king, blissfully oblivious to
any possible danger. Although it's reasonable to speculate that Miracle
might have smelled smoke, the fact is
that animals of any kind are not good
predictors of impending disaster, despite the popular belief that they are.
This is one of the many
popular myths regarding
natural disasters that The
Big Ones debunks. Jones
emphatically makes the
point that the animalpredictor
hypothesis,
which was taken seriously by scientists for decades, has been methodically and exhaustively
investigated and has
yielded no supporting
evidence whatsoever.
Another popular myth
that Jones addresses repeatedly, and in convincing evidence-based detail,
is the claim that scientists
already know how to predict various disasters, but
are hiding what they
know from the public.
Quite to the contrary,
scientists have been actively and energetically
attempting to predict
disasters for over one
hundred years without
coming up with a reliable
method. In particular, the
United States, China, Japan, and Italy have invested huge amounts of
time, effort, and money
attempting to solve this
problem. But if no one

can predict disasters, why does the
myth persist that prediction is already
possible? Jones offers several explanations.
The first is basic wishful thinking. Disasters are scary, but we could
be less afraid if we could be warned in
advance. When scientists refuse to
give such warnings, conspiracy theories are born. Many people choose to
believe, for example, that the government has a top-secret method for
forecasting earthquakes, rather than
accept the fact that an earthquake can
strike at any second with no warning
whatsoever. Jones personally receives
requests on a weekly basis asking her
to divulge this secret knowledge. In
one poignant example, a woman
wrote that she knew that Jones was
not allowed to share her secret information, but perhaps Jones could announce when her own children were
taking a trip out of town.
A second difficulty is the counter
-intuitive quality of statistical information. Scientists do have the historical records to make reasonable probability statements. For example, I recently learned (because I was renewing insurance) that my own home has
a 3% chance of flooding within the
next one hundred years. But that's not
the kind of answer frightened people
want. They want to know exactly
when the next Big One will hit them,
and that information simply does not
exist.
A third factor fueling the myth of
disaster prediction is that some shortterm events are predictable, creating
the illusion that longer-term prediction must also be possible. But current short-term prediction is limited
to obvious observations with simple
cause-and-effect
relationships.
Weather satellites can observe tropical storms forming near the equator;
and experts can make sound predictions of the speed, strength, and path
of the nascent hurricane; but the observable process is already well underway by the time such predictions are
made. Likewise, the causal relationship between earthquakes and tsunamis is well understood. The tsunamis
that devastated the coastlines of the
Indian Ocean in 2004 and Japan in

2011 (which each receive a detailed
chapter in The Big Ones) were entirely
predictable results of magnitude 9.1
and 9.0 earthquakes—but those enormous quakes were themselves thoroughly random, absolutely unpredictable events.
Because of the seismic technology and global communication networks in place in 2004, Jones was notified by e-mail about the Indian
Ocean quake only fifteen minutes
after it occurred, and could easily
foresee the devastating tsunami that
would soon follow. Unfortunately, the
technological infrastructure was not
available to warn the coastal populations along the Indian Ocean that a
deadly wave was heading for their
shores. This was all the more tragic
because all the necessary seismic detectors and communication devices
already existed, but it takes the cooperation and vision of scientists, engineers, bureaucrats, and governments
to create such a rapid-response international warning system. The ease of
modern air travel meant that thousands of foreign tourists and business
travelers were in the stricken regions,
with the result that citizens of fiftyseven countries perished, making this
a disaster mourned by a truly global
community. Within two weeks, aggressive steps began to update the
antiquated warning systems.
When the magnitude 9.0 quake
struck offshore at Fukushima, Japan,
on March 11, 2011, coastal residents of
western North America were rapidly
alerted that a tsunami was headed
their way. Video via television and
Internet showing the devastation taking place in Japan aroused both sympathy and fear. In the days following
the Fukushima earthquake, Diana and
I closely followed the news reports of
the resulting tsunami traversing the
Pacific Ocean and heading for the
California coast and quite literally
aiming at our front door.
One morning just after daybreak,
we received a reverse-911 phone call,
the recorded voice predicting arrival
of the tsunami in five hours and urging residents to seek high ground. I
needed to leave for work, so Diana
took charge of loading our dog (on
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leash) and our cat (in a pet carrier)
into our SUV. We'd bought this rugged vehicle specifically for emergency
conditions, especially the annual
flooding to which the roads near our
home are vulnerable. While I tried to
concentrate on my duties at work,
Diana drove the SUV to the parking
lot of the general store (yes, those still
exist) located on a hillside from which
she could see our house. Not surprisingly, all of our closest neighbors had
picked the same spot to await the arrival of the big wave. There was no
doubt it was coming. The suspense
lay in the fact that the experts could
not predict its size upon reaching
landfall.
As Diana described it to me that
evening, it turned out not to look like
a wave at all. Instead, it looked like a
fast-motion film of the daily tide: the
water in the harbor dropped rapidly,
right down to the muddy bottom,
then refilled just as rapidly, stopping
just short of the level required to
overflow the banks protecting our
home and the homes of our neighbors. It held that height for a few seconds—and all watching held their
breath—then the sea water dropped
about a foot, stabilizing at the normal
level for that time of day. Everyone
broke into applause, whistles, cheers,
and some car-horn-honking. Later, in
a more reflective moment, Diana and
I, well aware that the roles could easily be reversed with the next big California quake, weighed our own good
fortune against the catastrophe still
unfolding in Japan. There is simply no
way to know when such a disaster will
strike.
27 October 2019, Bodega Bay, California, USA
Official warnings began arriving
on Thursday, October 24th, by e-mail,
text, and automated phone messages;
each new message becoming increasingly dire, arriving with increasing
frequency. The wildfire was largely
uncontained. Record-breaking high
winds were expected to whip the
flames across hundreds or thousands
of acres yet untouched. One town
after another received mandatory
evacuation orders, the speed of the
conflagration being described on the

local news as "three football fields per
minute." It was all headed right for us.
Even though the skies remained temporarily blue and clear in our little
village of Bodega Bay, every new text
or automated phone call raised our
anxiety another notch. My wife and I
began to jump at every sound, and
with two cell phones plus a land line
at home, we had an ongoing chorus of
ring tones going off, each new automated text or voice message delivering
increasingly ominous news.
By Saturday, October 26th
(yesterday as I write this), fewer than
three full days after the blaze began,
Diana and I received the phone call
we'd been dreading: electricity being
turned off by the utility company as a
safety precaution and mandatory evacuation ordered for our little coastal
town. Our SUV was already packed
with the essentials, including Diana's
wheelchair. You see, Diana has been
coping for years with a steadily debilitating arthritic condition, a glacial
affliction that makes moving about
incrementally harder for her each
year. She still walks short distances,
using a pair of fore-arm crutches, but
it was critical to have the wheelchair
packed and ready for the other end of
our journey, wherever that might be.
Evacuation was going to be especially
rough on her.
We weighed the mandatory evacuation order against our up-close
knowledge of our own particular circumstances. The fire was nowhere
near us yet. Were we being flogged
into fleeing by overzealous safety officials? Was the Pacific Gas & Electric
Company cutting our electricity prematurely? Part of me was deeply suspicious of the motives of both our government and the private corporation
that delivers our power. But then I
thought of the scapegoating psychology that Jones documents in her book.
Was I falling into the trap of blaming
faceless "big government" and "big
business" just to avoid the reality of
what was happening?
If we ignored the order and chose
to remain in place, what were our
risks? On the one hand, we are about
as far west of the blaze as a person can
get without falling into the Pacific

Ocean. On the other hand, this is a
rural area with limited roads and only
one practical escape route. What if we
guessed wrong, and found ourselves
trapped by an inferno? My strong gut
feeling was that the whole combination of electricity cutoffs and evacuation orders was bogus, a sham display
of private and public officials covering
their own derrieres. As I tried rationally to calculate our odds, another portion of Jones's book kept coming to
mind, her discussion of the evolutionary psychology that drives life-ordeath decisions:
Evolutionary pressure rewarded
brains that saw patterns, even in
randomness. When we heard a
rustle in the grass, we could imagine it was a random breeze and
ignore it, or we could hypothesize
that it hid a waiting predator and
try to escape it. For the many
times it was a breeze, the wrong
answer made us unnecessarily
anxious, but it did not interfere
with our survival. For the rare
times that it was a predator, the
anxious survived, and those who
believed it to be random made a
fatal error. (22)
If we gambled by remaining in our
home, would we be making such a
"fatal error"? Some of our neighbors
came by to check on us and commiserate; they, too, were contending with
the same questions.
In the end, we decided to remain
in our home, but vigilant. We still had
cell phone service, so we could easily
see updates on the spread of the fire.
By the next morning it was plain to see
that hundreds of people in Bodega Bay
had made the same choice. Traffic
bustled back and forth on local streets.
The sound of gasoline-powered generators was humming from nearby
households everywhere. If we had
guessed wrong, at least we had plenty
of company.
30 October 2019, Bodega Bay, California, USA
As I complete this writing, several
more days have passed, and we remain
in our home, with Diana exhausted
and asleep in her armchair while the
two cats, Miracle (the early warning
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system) and Merlin (the nonchalant
aristocrat), take turns sleeping in her
lap. Fortunately, the fire itself is still
quite distant from us, and we have
been advised to continue to "shelter-in
-place" for the time being. The skies in
Bodega Bay are thick with wildfire
smoke. The sun is crisply outlined as a
bright orange disc. The electricity remains off. We are cold and uncomfortable, but we are also counting our
blessings. So many other people have
already lost their homes or been
forced to flee with no place to go. This
is bad, but it is hardly "the big one" for
us.
Speaking as a scientist, Jones explains the rigor expected in defining a
relativistic word like "big" in objective,
measurable terms, especially when
communicating with other scientists.
Much of her work is consumed by
translating how scientists speak in
terms that are useful to urban planners, public safety officials, and the
general public. Much of the value of
reading The Big Ones is that it deepens
the reader's understanding of this
complicated interplay of objective research and practical decision-making.
How big is "big"? How big does a disaster have to be to count as "the big
one"? What is the biggest "big one" for
which we should prepare?
In my personal experience, there
is a psychological, emotional, intuitive
use of the phrase "the big one" that
demands no such rigorous definition
and thrives in common usage because
it feels right. Californians talk about
"the big one" with a quasi-legendary
quality, as though it were the name of
a monster hinted at in a prophetic
vision, always moving toward us but
never quite arriving. No matter what
happens—earthquake, storm, wildfire—the damage and destruction you
live through may be horrendous, but it
is never quite "the big one," because
we know in our hearts that something
even worse is always possible. The Big
One is always coming.
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